

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS (-5 MCIU INSTALLED)
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: MCIU

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
 ASS'Y P/N: 51155F160-5

SHEET: 1

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY. & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HWDR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
2005	0	ANALOG INTERFACE QTY. 1. SCHEMATIC 012742	<p>MODE: CORRUPT DATA FROM ANALOG INTERFACE--MADC</p> <p>CAUSE(S): 1) ONE OR MORE CALIBRATION VOLTAGE CHANNELS OF MULTIPLEXER FAIL 2) CALIBRATION VOLTAGE CIRCUIT FAILS 3) THERMISTOR CONDITIONING VOLTAGE CIRCUIT FAILS 4) ONE OR MORE OF BITS 5, 6, OR 7 OF OUTPUT DATA LINES FAIL LOW. 5) ONE OR MORE OF BITS 6 OR 7 OF OUTPUT DATA LINES FAIL HIGH.</p>	<p>ERRONEOUS DATA FROM THE MADC WILL BE DETECTED BY MADC OUT OF TOLERANCE CHECK. ANALOG DATA IS INVALID. MCIU FAILURE WARNING. AUTOBRAKES. ARM COMES TO REST. LOSS OF COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. D&C AND ABE COMMUNICATION PATHS REMAIN OPERABLE. GPC I/O IS NOT LOST. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE.</p> <p>WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED MOTION. SIX JOINT RUNAWAY. AUTOBRAKES</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- 1) AUTOBRAKES (FOR SAFING THE SYSTEM) 2) DIRECT DRIVE (FOR CONTINUING OPERATIONS)</p>	<p>DESIGN FEATURES ----- THE THERMISTOR REFERENCE VOLTAGE IS DERIVED FROM THE A/D REFERENCE VOLTAGE USING A STANDARD LM101 TYPE OP-AMP AND A TRANSISTOR USED AS AN EMITTER FOLLOWER:</p> <p>MULTIPLEXING IS PERFORMED USING A GATED FET SWITCH DEVICE. THE DEVICE USES CMOS TECHNOLOGY. CLOCK, FRAME SYNCH., ENABLE, READ IN STROBE, AND MADC SELECT ARE PROCESSED BY STANDARD CMOS LOGIC DEVICES.</p> <p>EEE PARTS HAVE BEEN SELECTED AND CONTROLLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003. THIS DOCUMENT DEFINES THE PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS FOR MONITORING AND CONTROLLING EEE PARTS. THE REQUIREMENTS INCLUDE PART SELECTION TO AT LEAST "ESTABLISHED RELIABILITY" LEVELS, AND ADEQUATE DERATING OF PART STRESS LEVELS. PROCEDURES AND ACTIVITIES ARE SPECIFIED TO ENSURE AT LEAST EQUIVALENT QUALITY FOR NONSTANDARD AND IRREGULAR PARTS. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS HAS CONFIRMED NO PARTS WITH GENERICALLY HIGH FAILURE RATES. AEROSPACE DESIGN STANDARDS FOR DETAILING ELECTRONIC PARTS PACKAGING, MOUNTING AND STRUCTURAL/MECHANICAL/INTEGRITY OF ASSEMBLIES ARE APPLIED. SUCH DESIGN HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND FOUND SATISFACTORY THROUGH THE DESIGN AUDIT PROCESS, INCLUDING THE USE OF RELIABILITY MAINTAINABILITY AND SAFETY CHECKLISTS. MATERIAL SELECTION AND USAGE CONFORMS TO SPAR-SG.368 WHICH IS EQUIVALENT TO THE NASA MATERIALS USAGE REQUIREMENTS. WORST CASE ANALYSIS HAS BEEN CONDUCTED TO ENSURE THAT PERFORMANCE CAN BE MET UNDER WORST CASE TEMPERATURE AND AGING EFFECTS. EEE PARTS STRESS ANALYSIS HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND CONFIRMS THAT THE PARTS MEET THE DERATING REQUIREMENTS.</p> <p>PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD DESIGNS HAVE BEEN REVIEWED TO ENSURE ADEQUATE CIRCUIT PATH WIDTH AND SEPARATION AND TO CONFIRM APPROPRIATE DIMENSIONS OF CIRCUIT SOLDER PADS AND OF COMPONENT HOLE PROVISIONS.</p> <p>PARTS MOUNTING METHODS ARE CONTROLLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH MSFC-STD-136 WHICH DEFINES APPROVED MOUNTING METHODS, STRESS RELIEF, AND COMPONENT SECURITY.</p> <p>WHERE APPLICABLE, DESIGN DRAWINGS AND DOCUMENTATION GIVE CLEAR IDENTIFICATION OF HANDLING PRECAUTIONS FOR ESD SENSITIVE PARTS.</p> <p>BOARD ASSEMBLY DRAWINGS INCLUDE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR SOLDERING STANDARDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH NHB 5300.4(3) AND JSC 08800.</p> <p>CALIBRATION VOLTAGES ARE DERIVED BY RESISTOR ZENER DIODE COMBINATIONS.</p> <p>ALL RESISTORS AND CAPACITORS USED IN THE DESIGN ARE SELECTED FROM ESTABLISHED RELIABILITY (ER) TYPES. LIFE EXPECTANCY IS INCREASED BY ENSURING THAT ALL ALLOWABLE STRESS LEVELS ARE DERATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003. ALL CERAMIC AND ELECTROLYTIC CAPACITORS ARE ROUTINELY SUBJECTED TO RADIOGRAPHIC INSPECTION.</p> <p>DISCRETE SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES SPECIFIED TO AT LEAST THE 1X</p>	

PREPARED BY: MFWG

SUPERCEDING DATE: NONE

DATE: 11 JUL 91

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SHEET: 2

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
2005	0	ANALOG INTERFACE QTY. 1. SCHEMATIC 812742	MODE: CORRUPT DATA FROM ANALOG INTERFACE--MADC CAUSE(S): 1) ONE OR MORE CALIBRATION VOLTAGE CHANNELS OF MULTIPLEXER FAIL 2) CALIBRATION VOLTAGE CIRCUIT FAILS 3) THERMISTOR CONDITIONING VOLTAGE CIRCUIT FAILS 4) ONE OR MORE OF BITS 5,6,OR 7 OF OUTPUT DATA LINES FAIL LOW. 5) ONE OR MORE OF BITS 6 OR 7 OF OUTPUT DATA LINES FAIL HIGH.	ERRONEOUS DATA FROM THE MADC WILL BE DETECTED BY MADC OUT OF TOLERANCE CHECK. ANALOG DATA IS INVALID. MCIU FAILURE WARNING. AUTOBRAKES. ARM COMES TO REST. LOSS OF COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. DAC AND ABE COMMUNICATION PATHS REMAIN OPERABLE. GPC I/O IS NOT LOST. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE. WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED MOTION. SIX JOINT RUNAWAY. AUTOBRAKES REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- 1) AUTOBRAKES (FOR SAFING THE SYSTEM) 2) DIRECT DRIVE (FOR CONTINUING OPERATIONS)	LEVEL OF MIL-S-19500. ALL DEVICES ARE SUBJECTED TO RE-SCREENING BY AN INDEPENDANT TEST HOUSE. SAMPLES OF ALL PROCURED LOTS/DATE CODES ARE SUBJECTED TO DESTRUCTIVE PHYSICAL ANALYSIS (DPA) TO VERIFY THE INTEGRITY OF THE MANUFACTURING PROCESSES. DEVICE STRESS LEVELS ARE, DERATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003 AND VERIFIED BY DESIGN REVIEW. CMOS DEVICES OPERATE AT LOW POWER AND HENCE DO NOT EXPERIENCE SIGNIFICANT OPERATING STRESSES. THE TECHNOLOGY IS MATURE, AND DEVICE RELIABILITY HISTORY IS WELL DOCUMENTED. ALL STRESSES ARE ADDITIONALLY REDUCED BY DERATING THE APPROPRIATE PARAMETERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003. SPECIAL HANDLING PRECAUTIONS ARE USED AT ALL STAGES OF MANUFACTURE TO PRECLUDE DAMAGE/STRESS DUE TO ELECTROSTATIC DISCHARGE. COMPARATORS AND OPERATIONAL AMPLIFIERS ARE STANDARD LINEAR INTEGRATED CIRCUITS WITH MATURE MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY. APPLICATION CONSTRAINTS ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003.

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SHEET: 3

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
2005	0	ANALOG INTERFACE QTY. 1. SCHEMATIC 812742	<p>MODE: CORRUPT DATA FROM ANALOG INTERFACE--MADC</p> <p>CAUSE(S): 1) ONE OR MORE CALIBRATION VOLTAGE CHANNELS OF MULTIPLEXER FAIL 2) CALIBRATION VOLTAGE CIRCUIT FAILS 3) THERMISTOR CONDITIONING VOLTAGE CIRCUIT FAILS 4) ONE OR MORE OF BITS 5,6,OR 7 OF OUTPUT DATA LINES FAIL LOW. 5) ONE OR MORE OF BITS 6 OR 7 OF OUTPUT DATA LINES FAIL HIGH.</p>	<p>ERRONEOUS DATA FROM THE MADC WILL BE DETECTED BY MADC OUT OF TOLERANCE CHECK. ANALOG DATA IS INVALID. MCIU FAILURE WARNING. AUTOBRAKES. ARM COMES TO REST. LOSS OF COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. D&C AND ABE COMMUNICATION PATHS REMAIN OPERABLE. GPC 1/D IS NOT LOST. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE.</p> <p>WORST CASE</p> <p>UNEXPECTED MOTION. SIX JOINT RUNAWAY. AUTOBRAKES</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING</p> <p>1) AUTOBRAKES (FOR SAFING THE SYSTEM) 2) DIRECT DRIVE (FOR CONTINUING OPERATIONS)</p>	<p>ACCEPTANCE TESTS</p> <p>THE MCIU IS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING ACCEPTANCE ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING AS AN LRU.</p> <p>0 VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 3.2</p> <p>0 THERMAL: +40 DEGREES C TO -16 DEGREES C (2 CYCLES)</p> <p>QUALIFICATION TESTS</p> <p>THE MCIU IS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING LRU QUALIFICATION ENVIRONMENTS:</p> <p>0 VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 3.2</p> <p>0 SHOCK: BY SIMILARITY TO -3 MCIU</p> <p>0 THERMAL: +51 DEGREES C TO -27 DEGREES C (10 CYCLES)</p> <p>0 HUMIDITY: BY SIMILARITY TO -3 MCIU</p> <p>0 EMC: MIL-STD-461 AS MODIFIED BY SL-E-0002 (TESTS CE01, CE03, CS01, CS02, CS06, RE02 (N/B), RS01, RS02)</p> <p>0 LIFE: 630 OPERATING HOURS 1000 POWER ON/OFF CYCLES</p> <p>FLIGHT CHECKOUT</p> <p>PDRS OPS CHECKLIST (ALL VEHICLES) JSC 16987</p>	

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SHEET: 4

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	NDMR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
2005	0	ANALOG INTERFACE QTY. 1. SCHEMATIC 812742	<p>MODE: CORRUPT DATA FROM ANALOG INTERFACE--MADC</p> <p>CAUSE(S): 1) ONE OR MORE CALIBRATION VOLTAGE CHANNELS OF MULTIPLEXER FAIL 2) CALIBRATION VOLTAGE CIRCUIT FAILS 3) THERMISTOR CONDITIONING VOLTAGE CIRCUIT FAILS 4) ONE OR MORE OF BITS 5, 6 OR 7 OF OUTPUT DATA LINES FAIL LOW. 5) ONE OR MORE OF BITS 6 OR 7 OF OUTPUT DATA LINES FAIL HIGH.</p>	<p>ERRONEOUS DATA FROM THE MADC WILL BE DETECTED BY MADC OUT OF TOLERANCE CHECK. ANALOG DATA IS INVALID. MCIU FAILURE WARNING. AUTOBRAKES. ARM COMES TO REST. LOSS OF COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. D&C AND ABE COMMUNICATION PATHS REMAIN OPERABLE. GPC I/O IS NOT LOST. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE.</p> <p>WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED MOTION. STX JOINT RUNAWAY. AUTOBRAKES</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING</p> <p>1) AUTOBRAKES (FOR SAFING THE SYSTEM) 2) DIRECT DRIVE (FOR CONTINUING OPERATIONS)</p>	<p>QA/INSPECTIONS</p> <p>DOCUMENTED QUALITY CONTROLS ARE EXERCISED THROUGHOUT DESIGN PROCUREMENT, PLANNING, RECEIVING, PROCESSING FABRICATION, ASSEMBLY, TESTING AND SHIPPING OF THE MCIU. GOVERNMENT SOURCE INSPECTION IS INVOKED AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF COMPONENT ASSEMBLY AND TEST OPERATIONS. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINTS ARE EMPLOYED AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF ASSEMBLY AND TEST.</p> <p>EEE PARTS INSPECTION IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003. EACH EEE PART IS QUALIFIED AT THE PART LEVEL TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE APPLICABLE SPECIFICATION. ALL EEE PARTS ARE 100% SCREENED AND BURNED IN, AS A MINIMUM, AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003, BY THE SUPPLIER. ADDITIONALLY, EEE PARTS ARE 100% RE-SCREENED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS, BY AN INDEPENDENT SPAR APPROVED TESTING FACILITY. DPA IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY PA.003 ON A RANDOMLY SELECTED 5% OF PARTS, MAXIMUM 3 PIECES, MINIMUM 3 PIECES FOR EACH LOT NUMBER/DATE CODE OF PARTS RECEIVED.</p> <p>WIRE IS PROCURED, INSPECTED, AND TESTED TO SPAR-RMS-PA.003.</p> <p>RECEIVING INSPECTION VERIFIES THAT ALL PARTS RECEIVED ARE AS IDENTIFIED IN THE PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS, THAT NO PHYSICAL DAMAGE HAS OCCURRED TO PARTS DURING SHIPMENT, THAT THE RECEIVING DOCUMENTS PROVIDE ADEQUATE TRACEABILITY INFORMATION AND SCREENING DATA CLEARLY IDENTIFIES ACCEPTABLE PARTS.</p> <p>PARTS ARE INSPECTED THROUGHOUT MANUFACTURE AND ASSEMBLY AS APPROPRIATE TO THE MANUFACTURING STAGE COMPLETED. THESE INSPECTIONS INCLUDE,</p> <p>PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD INSPECTION FOR TRACK SEPARATION, DAMAGE AND ADEQUACY OF PLATED THROUGH HOLES,</p> <p>COMPONENT MOUNTING INSPECTION FOR CORRECT SOLDERING, WIRE LOOPING, STRAPPING ETC. OPERATORS AND INSPECTORS ARE TRAINED AND CERTIFIED TO NASA NHB 5300.4(3A-1) STANDARD.</p> <p>CONFORMAL COATING INSPECTION FOR ADEQUATE PROCESSING IS PERFORMED USING ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT TECHNIQUES.</p> <p>POST P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, CLEANLINESS AND WORKMANSHIP (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p> <p>P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, CHECK FOR CORRECT BOARD INSTALLATION, ALIGNMENT OF BOARDS, PROPER CONNECTOR CONTACT MATING, WIRE ROUTING, STRAPPING OF WIRES ETC.,</p> <p>PRE-CLOSURE INSPECTION, WORKMANSHIP AND CLEANLINESS (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p> <p>PRE-ACCEPTANCE TEST INSPECTION, WHICH INCLUDES AN AUDIT OF LOWER TIER INSPECTION COMPLETION, AS BUILT CONFIGURATION VERIFICATION TO AS DESIGN ETC., (MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT).</p> <p>A TEST READINESS REVIEW (TRR) WHICH INCLUDES VERIFICATION OF TEST PERSONNEL, TEST DOCUMENTS, TEST EQUIPMENT CALIBRATION/ VALIDATION STATUS AND HARDWARE CONFIGURATION IS CONVENED BY</p>	

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CTL REV: 0

S040257A
 ATTACHMENT
 PAGE 303 OF 471

RELEASE
 PROCESSING

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS (-5 MCIU INSTALLED)
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SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
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SHEET: 5

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
2005	0	ANALOG INTERFACE QTY. 1. SCHEMATIC 812742	<p>MODE: CORRUPT DATA FROM ANALOG INTERFACE--MADC</p> <p>CAUSE(S): 1) ONE OR MORE CALIBRATION VOLTAGE CHANNELS OF MULTIPLEXER FAIL 2) CALIBRATION VOLTAGE CIRCUIT FAILS 3) THERMISTOR CONDITIONING VOLTAGE CIRCUIT FAILS 4) ONE OR MORE OF BITS 5, 6 OR 7 OF OUTPUT DATA LINES FAIL LOW. 5) ONE OR MORE OF BITS 6 OR 7 OF OUTPUT DATA LINES FAIL HIGH.</p>	<p>ERRONEOUS DATA FROM THE MADC WILL BE DETECTED BY MADC OUT OF TOLERANCE CHECK. ANALOG DATA IS INVALID. MCIU FAILURE WARNING. AUTOBRAKES. ARM COMES TO REST. LOSS OF COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. D&C AND ABE COMMUNICATION PATHS REMAIN OPERABLE. GPC I/O IS NOT LOST. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE.</p> <p>WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED MOTION. SIX JOINT RUNAWAY. AUTOBRAKES</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- 1) AUTOBRAKES (FOR SAFING THE SYSTEM) 2) DIRECT DRIVE (FOR CONTINUING OPERATIONS)</p>		<p>QUALITY ASSURANCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH ENGINEERING, RELIABILITY, CONFIGURATION CONTROL, SUPPLIER AS APPLICABLE, AND THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE, PRIOR TO THE START OF ANY FORMAL TESTING (ACCEPTANCE OR QUALIFICATION).</p> <p>ACCEPTANCE TESTING (ATP) INCLUDES AMBIENT, VIBRATION, AND THERMAL TESTING (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT).</p>

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 ATTACHMENT -
 PAGE 304 OF 471

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SHEET: 6

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	MDMR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
2005	0	ANALOG INTERFACE QTY. 1. SCHEMATIC 812742	MODE: CORRUPT DATA FROM ANALOG INTERFACE--MADC CAUSE(S): 1) ONE OR MORE CALIBRATION VOLTAGE CHANNELS OF MULTIPLEXER FAIL 2) CALIBRATION VOLTAGE CIRCUIT FAILS 3) THERMISTOR CONDITIONING VOLTAGE CIRCUIT FAILS 4) ONE OR MORE OF BITS 5, 6, OR 7 OF OUTPUT DATA LINES FAIL LOW. 5) ONE OR MORE OF BITS 6 OR 7 OF OUTPUT DATA LINES FAIL HIGH.	ERRONEOUS DATA FROM THE MADC WILL BE DETECTED BY MADC OUT OF TOLERANCE CHECK. ANALOG DATA IS INVALID. MCIU FAILURE WARNING. AUTOBRAKES. ARM COMES TO REST. LOSS OF COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. D&C AND ABE COMMUNICATION PATHS REMAIN OPERABLE. GPC I/O IS NOT LOST. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE. WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED MOTION. SIX JOINT RUNAWAY. AUTOBRAKES REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- 1) AUTOBRAKES (FOR SAFING THE SYSTEM) 2) DIRECT DRIVE (FOR CONTINUING OPERATIONS)	FAILURE HISTORY ----- THERE HAVE BEEN NO FAILURES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS FAILURE MODE ON THE SRMS PROGRAM.

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SHEET: 7

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT OR END ITEM	HMWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
2005	0	ANALOG INTERFACE QTY. 1. SCHEMATIC 812742	<p>MODE: CORRUPT DATA FROM ANALOG INTERFACE-- MADC</p> <p>CAUSE(S): 1) ONE OR MORE CALIBRATION VOLTAGE CHANNELS OF MULTIPLEXER FAIL 2) CALIBRATION VOLTAGE CIRCUIT FAILS 3) THERMISTOR CONDITIONING VOLTAGE CIRCUIT FAILS 4) ONE OR MORE OF BITS 5,6, OR 7 OF OUTPUT DATA LINES FAIL LOW. 5) ONE OR MORE OF BITS 6 OR 7 OF OUTPUT DATA LINES FAIL HIGH.</p>	<p>ERRONEOUS DATA FROM THE MADC WILL BE DETECTED BY MADC OUT OF TOLERANCE CHECK. ANALOG DATA IS INVALID. MCIU FAILURE WARNING. AUTOBRAKES. ARM COMES TO REST. LOSS OF COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. O&C AND ABE COMMUNICATION PATHS REMAIN OPERABLE. GPC I/O IS NOT LOST. LOSS OF LIMPING DURING END EFFECTOR CAPTURE.</p> <p>WORST CASE</p> <p>UNEXPECTED MOTION. SIX JOINT RUNAWAY. AUTOBRAKES</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING</p> <p>1) AUTOBRAKES (FOR SAFING THE SYSTEM) 2) DIRECT DRIVE (FOR CONTINUING OPERATIONS)</p>	<p>OPERATIONAL EFFECT</p> <p>LOSS OF DATA. AUTOBRAKES. LOSS OF COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. LOSS OF LIMPING. O&C TEMPERATURE DATA MAY BE INVALID. DIRECT DRIVE AND BACKUP AVAILABLE.</p> <p>CREW ACTIONS</p> <p>SELECT DIRECT DRIVE. SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH SHOULD BE PULSED TO MAINTAIN PROPER RATES.</p> <p>CREW TRAINING</p> <p>CREW IS TRAINED TO ALWAYS OBSERVE WHETHER THE ARM IS RESPONDING TO COMMANDS. IF IT ISN'T, APPLY BRAKES.</p> <p>MISSION CONSTRAINT</p> <p>OPERATE UNDER VERNIER RATES WITHIN 10 FT OF STRUCTURE. THE OPERATOR MUST BE ABLE TO DETECT THAT THE ARM/PAYLOAD IS RESPONDING PROPERLY TO COMMANDS VIA WINDOW AND/OR CCTV VIEWS DURING ALL ARM OPERATIONS.</p> <p>SCREEN FAILURES</p> <p>N/A</p> <p>OMRSD OFFLINE</p> <p>EXERCISE ANALOG INTERFACE. VERIFY ABSENCE OF MADC BITE.</p> <p>OMRSD ONLINE INSTALLATION</p> <p>NONE</p> <p>OMRSD ONLINE TURNAROUND</p> <p>EXE (CTSE ANALOG INTERFACE. VERIFY ABSENCE OF MCIU FAILURE WARNING (DUE TO MADC BITE).</p>	

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