

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL HARDWARE

NUMBER: 03-1-0460 -X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: MAIN PROPULSION

REVISION: 1 11/08/00

PART DATA

	PART NAME	PART NUMBER
	VENDOR NAME	VENDOR NUMBER
LRU	: LINE, LO2 FEED ARROWHEAD PRODUCTS	MC271-0074-0302 13542-304
LRU	: LINE, LO2 FEED ARROWHEAD PRODUCTS	MC271-0074-0303 13543-304
LRU	: LINE, LO2 FEED ARROWHEAD PRODUCTS	MC271-0074-0304 13544-304

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:

LINE, LO2 FEED 12 INCH DIA. FOAM INSULATED. (FH3, FH4, FH5)

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: FH3
FH4
FH5

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 3
ONE OF EACH PART NUMBER PER VEHICLE

FUNCTION:

THE 12 IN DIAMETER LINES EXTEND FROM THE PREVALVE TO THE INDIVIDUAL SSME INLET FLANGE INTERFACE. THE LINE PROVIDES OXIDIZER FLOW FROM THE MANIFOLD TO EACH SSME FOR ENGINE CONDITIONING AND OPERATION. THE LINE IS FOAM INSULATED WITH PENETRATIONS FOR PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS.

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS FMEA -- CIL FAILURE MODE

NUMBER: 03-1-0460-02

REVISION#: 1 11/08/00

SUBSYSTEM NAME: MAIN PROPULSION

LRU: LO2 12" SSME FEEDLINES, FOAMED, FH3, 4 & 5

CRITICALITY OF THIS

ITEM NAME: LO2 12" SSME FEEDLINES, FOAMED, FH3, 4 & 5

FAILURE MODE: 1/1

FAILURE MODE:

RUPTURE/LEAKAGE.

MISSION PHASE:

PL PRE-LAUNCH
LO LIFT-OFF

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:

103 DISCOVERY
104 ATLANTIS
105 ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:

FATIGUE, MATERIAL DEFECT

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN

A) N/A
B) N/A
C) N/A

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

A)

B)

C)

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

(A) SUBSYSTEM:

HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH LEAKAGE OF CRYOGENIC PROPELLANTS. DURING ENGINE OPERATION, POSSIBLE PREMATURE SHUTDOWN OF ALL SSME'S DUE TO LOSS OF PROPELLANT. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CRITICAL ADJACENT COMPONENTS DUE TO CRYO EXPOSURE. POSSIBLE AFT COMPT OVERPRESS AND FIRE HAZARD. LEAKAGE IN THE AFT COMPT DETECTABLE DURING LOADING USING HAZARDOUS GAS DETECTION SYSTEM (HGDS).

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: 03-1-0460-02**

SAME AS A.

(C) MISSION:

ON GROUND, VIOLATION OF HGDS LCC WILL RESULT IN LAUNCH SCRUB.

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):

POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:

NONE.

-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

(A) DESIGN:

THE PRESSURE CARRIER PORTION OF THE LINE ASSEMBLY IS CONSTRUCTED OF INCONEL 718 AND INCORPORATES THREE FLEXIBLE JOINTS (BALL STRUT TIE ROD ASSEMBLIES AT INLET AND CENTER; GIMBAL AT OUTLET) AND A FLANGE AT EACH END. THE FLEXIBLE JOINTS INCORPORATE MULTI-PLY BELLOWS (TWO PLY AT INLET JOINT, THREE PLY AT OTHER TWO JOINTS) TO MINIMIZE STRESS LEVELS AND FLOW LINERS TO ELIMINATE FLOW INDUCED VIBRATIONS. THE FLEXIBLE JOINTS PROVIDE FREE MOVEMENT WITHOUT BINDING WHEN THE TEMPERATURE IS INCREASED FROM 70 DEG F TO 200 DEG F OR DECREASED FROM 70 DEG F TO MINUS 297 DEG F. THE LINE IS DESIGNED FOR A MAXIMUM OPERATING PRESSURE OF 215 PSIA AT -297 DEG F AND A FLOW RATE OF 886 POUNDS PER SECOND NOMINAL. MAXIMUM STATIC PRESSURE IS 270 PSIG. THE PROOF PRESSURE FACTOR IS 1.2 AND THE BURST PRESSURE FACTOR IS 1.5. THE USEFUL DYNAMIC LIFE IS 14.2 HOURS (EQUIVALENT TO 100 ORBITER MISSIONS). THE PRESSURE CARRIER MEETS THE FRACTURE ANALYSIS REQUIREMENT FOR 400 MISSIONS. STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS INDICATES POSITIVE (GREATER THAN 1.4) MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR ALL CONDITIONS OF OPERATION. THE LINE ASSEMBLY WILL WITHSTAND AN IMPLOSION PRESSURE OF 22 PSI, PRESSURE SURGE FROM 215 PSIG TO 275 PSIG IN 200 MILLISECONDS, AND A THERMAL CHANGE FROM 200 DEG F TO MINUS 297 DEG F.

(B) TEST:

ATP

EXAMINATION OF PRODUCT.

PRESSURE CARRIER LEAKAGE (AMBIENT).

PROOF PRESSURE TEST.

OPERATIONAL TEST (CRYO).

ELEVATED AMBIENT TEMPERATURE TEST.

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: 03-1-0460-02**

CERTIFICATION

THE TYPE I, II, AND III FOAM LINES ARE QUALIFIED BY SIMILARITY TO THE TYPE II VACUUM JACKETED LINE (REFERENCE FMEA/CIL 0420). THE TYPE I AND III FOAM INSULATED LINES ARE QUALIFIED BY SIMILARITY TO THE TYPE II FOAM INSULATED LINE. THE TYPE II VACUUM JACKETED LINE WAS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING QUALIFICATION TESTS:

ENDURANCE - 2200 STRUCTURAL DEFLECTION CYCLES, FILLED WITH LN2, 200 PSIG.

THERMAL CYCLE - 102 CYCLES, ROOM AMBIENT TO -300 DEG F TO ROOM AMBIENT.

PRESSURE SURGE - 50 CYCLES COMPRESSED AND 50 CYCLES EXTENDED POSITION, FILLED WITH LN2 CYCLED 215 PSIG TO 275 PSIG TO 215 PSIG.

PRESSURE CYCLING - 1940 CYCLES, 300 DEG F, PRESSURE CYCLES VARYING IN RANGE FROM 0 TO 220 PSIG.

VIBRATION - ALL THREE AXES.

SINUSOIDAL RESONANCE SURVEY FROM 5 TO 2000 HZ WAS CONDUCTED WITH THE LINE PRESSURIZED TO 20 PSIG WITH LIQUID NITROGEN.

RANDOM VIBRATION TEST WAS CONDUCTED WITH THE LINE FILLED WITH LIQUID OXYGEN AND PRESSURIZED TO 70 PSIG FOR THE FIRST 3 HOURS, 180 PSIG FOR THE NEXT 10 HOURS AND LESS THAN 5 PSIG FOR THE LAST 18 MINUTES.

BURST - NO LEAKAGE OR DAMAGE AFTER 5 MINUTES AT 395 PSIG.

THE TYPE II FOAM INSULATED LINE WAS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING QUALIFICATION TESTS:

VIBRATION - ALL THREE AXES.

SINUSOIDAL RESONANCE SURVEY FROM 5 TO 2000 HZ WAS CONDUCTED WITH THE LINE PRESSURIZED TO 20 PSIG WITH LIQUID NITROGEN.

RANDOM VIBRATION TEST WAS CONDUCTED WITH THE LINE FILLED WITH LIQUID OXYGEN AND PRESSURIZED TO 70 PSIG FOR THE FIRST 3 HOURS, 180 PSIG FOR THE NEXT 10 HOURS AND LESS THAN 5 PSIG FOR THE LAST 18 MINUTES.

HEAT TRANSFER AND HUMIDITY - 48 HOURS EXPOSURE AT 80 DEG F AND 95% RELATIVE HUMIDITY. THE LINE WAS THEN FILLED WITH LO2 AND HEAT TRANSFER MEASURED.

BURST - NO LEAKAGE OR DAMAGE AFTER 5 MINUTES AT 413 PSIG.

EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN - NO LEAKAGE OR DAMAGE AFTER 3 MINUTES AT 440 PSIG.

OMRSD

ANY TURNAROUND CHECKOUT IS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OMRSD.

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: 03-1-0460-02**

(C) INSPECTION:

RECEIVING/INSPECTION

RAW MATERIALS, INCLUDING CHEMICAL AND MECHANICAL REQUIREMENTS, ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION FOR MATERIAL AND PROCESS CERTIFICATION.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS GIVEN TO HIGH STRENGTH STRUCTURAL STEELS (INCONEL 718), DURING FABRICATION, IS VERIFIED. ALL COMPONENTS ARE VISUALLY, DIMENSIONALLY, AND INCREMENTALLY INSPECTED DURING FABRICATION. SEALING SURFACES PROTECTION IS VERIFIED. MACHINING OPERATION OF FLANGE DETAIL PARTS ARE PER DRAWING AND APPLICABLE SPECIFICATION AND IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

NON DESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION

WELDS ARE FLUORESCENT PENETRANT AND RADIOGRAPHICALLY INSPECTED. MACHINED PARTS ARE FLUORESCENT PENETRANT INSPECTED.

TESTING

ATP VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

CRITICAL PROCESSES

HEAT TREATMENT VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL

PARTS PROTECTION FROM DAMAGE AND CONTAMINATION ARE VERIFIED. CLEANLINESS TO LEVEL 800A VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

HANDLING/PACKAGING

PACKAGING FOR SHIPMENT VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

(D) FAILURE HISTORY:

THE OV104 LH2 TYPE II (12 INCH) LINE HAD EXCESSIVE VACUUM PRESSURE RISE AFTER ATP ELEVATED TEMPERATURE TEST. CRACKS IN THE SEALING WELD (NON-STRUCTURAL) OF THE BALL STRUT TIE ROD ASSEMBLY BELLOWS ADAPTER WERE FOUND. SEALING WELD WAS REVISED TO REDUCE THE NUGGET SIZE AND MINIMIZE THERMAL EFFECTS. EFFECTIVITY IS FOR ALL OV104 AND SUBS LINES (REFERENCE CAR AC5228). THIS IS A ONE TIME OCCURRENCE. ALL PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT LINES HAVE PASSED ATP. THIS FAILURE IS ATP SCREENABLE.

CURRENT DATA ON TEST FAILURE, FLIGHT FAILURE, UNEXPLAINED ANOMALIES, AND OTHER FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING GROUND PROCESSING ACTIVITY CAN BE FOUND IN THE PRACA DATABASE.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE:

FLIGHT: NO CREW ACTION CAN BE TAKEN.

GROUND: GROUND OPERATIONS SAFING PROCEDURES CONTAIN SAFING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR MAJOR LEAKS IN THE OXYGEN SYSTEM.

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL FAILURE MODE**NUMBER: 03-1-0460-02**

- APPROVALS -

S&R ENGINEERING	: W.P. MUSTY	:/S/ W.P. MUSTY
S&R ENGINEERING ITM	: P. A. STENGER-NGUYEN	:/S/ P.A. STENGER-NGUYEN
DESIGN ENGINEERING	: EARL HIRAKAWA	:/S/ EARL HIRAKAWA
MPS SUBSYSTEM MGR.	: TIM REITH	:/S/ TIM REITH
MOD	: BILL LANE	:/S/ BILL LANE
USA SAM	: MIKE SNYDER	:/S/ MIKE SNYDER
USA ORBITER ELEMENT	: SUZANNE LITTLE	:/S/ SUZANNE LITTLE
NASA SR&QA	: ERICH BASS	:/S/ ERICH BASS