

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) - CIL HARDWARE
NUMBER: 05-6S-BFUS3 -X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: EPD&C-DATA PROC. SYSTEM, & COMPUTERS (05-5)
REVISION: 4 04/10/96

PART DATA

	PART NAME	PART NUMBER
	VENDOR NAME	VENDOR NUMBER
LRU	: PANEL 06	V070-730389
SRU	: FUSE	ME451-0018-0300

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:
 FUSE. 3 AMP.

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: 33V73A0F40

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 1
 ONE

FUNCTION:
 PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION BETWEEN THE NORM-TERM-BU SWITCH (06S39) AND
 ESSENTIAL BUS ESS3AB.

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) - CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: 05-6S-BFUS3-01**

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):

BFS (PRE-ENGAGE): UNABLE TO SELECT OR ENGAGE BACKUP GPC. LOSS OF BFS ENGAGE CAPABILITY.

(C) MISSION:

NO EFFECT FIRST FAILURE.

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):

NO EFFECT FIRST FAILURE.

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:

CRITICALITY R2 DUE TO THE FOLLOWING REASON:

FAILURE OF THIS FUSE COUPLED WITH A GENERIC HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ERROR IN THE PRIMARY SYSTEM LEADS TO INABILITY TO CONTROL THE VEHICLE AND RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

(A) DESIGN:

REFER TO APPENDIX D, ITEM NO. 4 - FUSE.

(B) TEST:

REFER TO APPENDIX D, ITEM NO. 4 - FUSE.

GROUND TURNAROUND TEST: ALL TURNAROUND CHECKOUT TESTING IS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OMRSD.

(C) INSPECTION:

REFER TO APPENDIX D, ITEM NO. 4 - FUSE.

(D) FAILURE HISTORY:

REFER TO APPENDIX D, ITEM NO. 4 - FUSE

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) - CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: 05-6S-BFUS3-01**

CURRENT DATA ON TEST FAILURES, FLIGHT FAILURES, UNEXPLAINED ANOMALIES, AND OTHER FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING GROUND PROCESSING ACTIVITY CAN BE FOUND IN THE PRACA DATABASE

(E) OPERATIONAL USE:
NONE.

- APPROVALS -

EDITORIALLY APPROVED : RI
EDITORIALLY APPROVED : JSC
TECHNICAL APPROVAL : VIA APPROVAL FORM

Bob Caproni
Alan Sedivy
96-CIL-013_05-6S