

## CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

REFERENCE DESIGNATION: HST-PFR-4  
 NAME / QUANTITY: Platform Assembly  
 DRAWING REFERENCE: 4177182

PROJECT: HST  
 LRU NAME / QUANTITY: PFR  
 LRU PART NUMBER: 5ED00101000-001

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 SUBSYSTEM: N/A  
 EFFECTIVITY: ALL ORBITERS

FAILURE MODE NUMBER HST-PFR-4-1	CRITICALITY 2/2	FAILURE EFFECT	RETENTION RATIONALE
<b>FUNCTION</b>  This is the primary attachment location for the EMU to the HST PFR. It also serves as the support surface for the crewmember at a worksite.		<b>END ITEM</b>  Cannot remove HST-PFR from socket	<p>I. Design Feature to Minimize the Chance of the Failure Mode</p> <p>A. Design All HST PFRs were designed to an ultimate structural safety factor of 1.4</p> <p>B. Tolerances Sufficient tolerances were used in the HST PFR design to prevent jamming by expansion and contraction of material due to temperature extremes or on-orbit use.</p> <p>C. Materials - Major Components See material list (Table B-2).</p> <p>D. Testing and Analysis</p> <p>A. Acceptance Testing</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. PIA  A full pre-inspection acceptance (PIA) test will be performed on each HST PFR before it is delivered to KSC to support any STS flight. The PIA will verify that the HST PFRs are within tolerances and that the assembly is clean.</li> <li>2. Vibration  The HST PFRs were exposed to qualification level vibration loads during their initial development in support of STS-31. The test verified that the HST PFRs were free of manufacturing defects and tolerance problems. (Reference LMSC Document number H177097-501.)</li> </ol>
<b>FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE</b>  <b>MODE</b> The user cannot remove the EMU boot from the heel support on the platform  <b>CAUSES</b> 1) Binding due to thermal extremes 2) Misalignment during installation 3) Contamination		<b>MISSION</b>  No effect on mission objectives if backup HST-PFR is available	
<b>REDUNDANCY SCHEDULE</b> A - N/A B - N/A C - N/A	<b>REMANUFACTURE PARTS</b> None	<b>C&amp;MW &amp; VEHICLE</b>  None	
<b>MISSION PHASE</b>	<b>CORRECTIVE ACTION TIMES</b>		
	TIME TO EFFECT	TIME TO CORRECT	
EVA	Minutes	N/A	

## CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

REFERENCE DESIGNATOR: HST-PFR-4  
 NAME / QUANTITY: Platform Asy/l  
 DRAWING REFERENCE: 4177102

PROJECT: HST  
 LRU NAME / QUANTITY: PFR  
 LRU PART NUMBER: 8EDP0467055-001

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 SUBSYSTEM: N/A  
 EFFECTIVITY: ALL ORBITERS

FAILURE MODE NUMBER HST-PFR-4-1		CRITICALITY 2/2	FAILURE EFFECT	RETENTION RATIONALE																											
<b>FUNCTION</b>		<b>END ITEM</b> Cannot dismount from HST-PFR				A. <u>Acceptance Testing (continued)</u> The following vibration levels are per: <table> <thead> <tr> <th>Frequency (Hz)</th> <th>Slope (dB/oct.)</th> <th>Constant Level (G<sup>2</sup>/Hz)</th> <th>Overall Gmax</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>20</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>7.7</td> </tr> <tr> <td>20-45</td> <td>+7.0</td> <td>.009</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>45-800</td> <td></td> <td>.06</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>800-2000</td> <td>-6.0</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>2000</td> <td></td> <td>.0054</td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		Frequency (Hz)	Slope (dB/oct.)	Constant Level (G <sup>2</sup> /Hz)	Overall Gmax	20			7.7	20-45	+7.0	.009		45-800		.06		800-2000	-6.0			2000		.0054	
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<b>FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE</b>		<b>MISSION</b> No effect on mission objectives if backup HST-PFR is available				B. <u>Certification Testing</u> 1. Thermal Vacuum The HST-PFR was exposed to a cold temperature (-132°F) vacuum ( $1 \times 10^{-5}$ torrs) environment. This test was used to check the workmanship of the PFR platform. The operational requirement was -90°F (Ref. JSC-23550). No parts on the platform involved with this failure mode were found to have shifted or come loose due to the thermal extremes.																									
<b>CAUSE/S</b>		<b>CREW / VEHICLE</b> None																													
<b>REDUNDANCY SCREENS</b>		<b>INTERFACE</b> None																													
<b>MISSION PHASE</b>	<b>REMANING PARTS</b>																														
	<b>TIME TO EFFECT</b>	<b>TIME TO CORRECT</b>																													
EVA	Minutes	N/A																													

# CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

REFERENCE DESIGNATOR: HST-PFR-4  
 NAME / QUANTITY: Platform Assembly  
 DRAWING REFERENCE: 407700R

PROJECT: HST  
 LRU NAME / QUANTITY: PFR  
 LRU PART NUMBER: 5800H-07040-001

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 SUBSYSTEM: N/A  
 EFFECTIVITY: ALL ORDINERS

FAILURE MODE NUMBER HST-PFR-4-1	CRITICALITY 2/2	FAILURE EFFECT	RETENTION RATIONALE
<b>FUNCTION</b>		<u>END-ITEM</u>  Cannot dismount from HST-PFR	C. <u>Certification Analysis</u> An HST PFR components were be analyzed to the following induced environments to verify that the assembly can withstand the environment levels:  I. Requirements      Source a. <u>Shock</u> - Functional      NSTS-07700 VOL. XIV b. <u>Vibration (F1, Levels)</u> - Acceptance      NSTS-07700 VOL. XIV c. <u>Structural</u> - UL (R = 2.0)      NSTS-07700 VOL. XIV - Fracture      NSTS-07700 VOL. XIV d. <u>Acceleration</u> - Flight      MF0004-014D - Crash      MIL-STD-810, Meth. 516, Proced. I e. <u>Temperature</u> - Hot (+250°F)      NSTS-07700 VOL. XIV, Appendix 7. - Cold (-90°F)      JSC-23550
<b>FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE</b>		<u>MISSION</u>  No effect on mission objectives if backup HST-PFR is available	
<b>MODE</b>  The user cannot remove the EMU boot from the heel support on the platform			
<b>CAUSE(S)</b>		<u>CREW / VEHICLE</u>  None	
1) Binding due to thermal extremes 2) Misalignment during installation			
<b>REDUNDANCY SCREENS</b>	<b>REMAINING PATHS</b>		
A - N/A B - N/A C - N/A	None		
<b>MISSION PHASE</b>	<b>CORRECTIVE ACTION TIMES</b>		
	<b>TIME TO EFFECT</b>	<b>TIME TO CORRECT</b>	
EVA	Minutes	N/A	

REFERENCE DESIGNATOR: HST-PFR-4  
 NAME / QUANTITY: Platform Assembly  
 DRAWING REFERENCE: 4177MS

## CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: HST  
 LRU NAME / QUANTITY: PFR  
 LRU PART NUMBER: 5ED03W7088-301

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 SUBSYSTEM: N/A  
 EFFECTIVITY: ALL DRAWINGS

FAILURE MODE NUMBER HST-PFR-4-1	CRITICALITY 2/2	FAILURE EFFECT	RETENTION RATIONALE
FUNCTION	This is the primary attachment location for the EMU to the HST-PFR. It also serves as the support surface for the crewmember seat worksite.	END ITEM  Cannot dismount from HST-PFR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>B. Inspection</li> <li>A. Manufacturing</li> </ul> <p>1. The HST-PFR components were inspected prior to build-up for conformance to their applicable drawings.</p>
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE MODE	The user cannot remove the EMU boot from the heel support on the platform	MISSION  No effect on mission objectives if backup HST-PFR is available	<p>2. All fracture critical piece parts were and will be inspected as described in their applicable drawings.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>B. Assembly</li> </ul> <p>1. HST-PFR will be cleaned and inspected to the levels described in JSC 50122B.    Once cleaned, the HST-PFR will be bagged to prevent any contamination from entering the unit.</p>
CAUSE(S)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Binding due to thermal extremes</li> <li>2) Misalignment during installation</li> </ul>	CREW / VEHICLE  None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>C. Testing</li> </ul> <p>1. The hardware will be fully inspected for any signs of misalignment or loose parts as during the pre/post functional tests performed prior to and immediately after all certification and acceptance tests.</p>
REDUNDANCY BACKUPS	REMAINING PATHS		
A - N/A B - N/A C - N/A	None		
MISSION PHASE	TIME TO EFFECT	TIME TO CORRECT	
EVA	Minutes	N/A	