

EMEA NO. <u>4.3.6.2</u> CRITICALITY <u>2/2</u>	SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT <u>TVC/WLA</u> DWG NO. <u>2294B19-506, 508/</u> <u>2307088-503</u> SHEET <u>1</u> OF <u>9</u>
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FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
<p>Loss of Iris Function (mechanical). Loss of Zoom Function (mechanical). Loss of Focus Function (mechanical).</p> <p>HLA -Motor failure -Gear Train failure -lens failure</p>	<p>Inability to control focus, zoom, or iris.</p> <p>Worst Case: Loss of mission critical video.</p>	<p>DESIGN FEATURES</p> <p>The TVC/lens Assembly is comprised of 16 electrical subassemblies; 13 subassemblies are RCA Astro designed and fabricated using standard printed-circuit board type of construction. The remaining three assemblies, high voltage power supply, oscillator, and stepper motors, are vendor supplied components which have been specified and purchased according to RCA Specification Control Drawings (SCDs) prepared by engineering and reliability assurance. Specifications per the SCD are prepared to establish the design, performance, test, qualification, and acceptance requirements for a procured piece of equipment.</p> <p>Parts, materials, processes, and design guidelines for the Shuttle CCTV program are specified in accordance with RCA 2295503. This document defines the program requirements for selection and control of EEE parts. To the maximum extent, and consistent with availability, all parts have been selected from military specifications at the JAW level, as a minimum. In addition to the overall selection criteria, a subset of general purpose preferred parts has been defined by this document and the RCA Government Systems Division Standard Parts List. In the case of the CMOS and TTL family of microcircuits, devices are screened and tested to the MIL-STD-883C equivalent and procured under the designations of MI-REL/3HQ and SRC 54LS from RCA-SSD and Texas Instruments Corp, respectively. Parts not included in the above documents have been used in the design only after a nonstandard item approval form (NSIAF) has been prepared, submitted to Reliability Assurance Engineering (RAE) and approved for use in the specific application(s) defined in the NSIAF by NASA-JSC.</p> <p>Worst-Case Circuit Analyses have been performed and documented for all circuit designs to demonstrate that sufficient operating margins exist for all operating conditions. The analysis was worst case-in that the value for each of the variable parameters was set to limits that will drive the output to a maximum (or minimum).</p> <p>A component application review and analysis was conducted to verify that the applied stress on each piece part by the temperature extremes identified with environmental qualification testing does not exceed the stress derating values identified in RCA 2295503.</p> <p>In addition, an objective examination of the design was performed through a PDA and CDM to verify that the TVC/Lens assembly met specification and contractual requirements.</p>

IMEA NO. <u>4.3.6.2</u> CRITICALITY <u>2/2</u>	SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT <u>TYC/WLA</u> DWG NO. <u>2294819-506.508/</u> <u>2307088-503</u> SHEET <u>2</u> OF <u>9</u>
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
Loss of Iris Function (mechanical). Loss of Zoom Function (mechanical). Loss of Focus Function (mechanical). WLA -Motor failure -Gear train failure -Lens failure	Inability to control focus, zoom, or iris. Worst Case: Loss of mission critical video.	<p><u>DESIGN FEATURES</u></p> <p>The general arrangement of the lens assembly is to provide an integrated housing, motor, and circuit board package which can accommodate various commercially available lenses. Emphasis is placed on accessibility of the lens, its drive components, and limit stops. Components within the lens assembly have been modularized, serving both the MLA, CCA, and WLA assemblies.</p> <p>The lens housing structure is a one-piece casting designed to minimize machining and provide a rugged dimensionally stable mounting for the optical components. The housing is in the form of a right angle. The vertical member interfaces with the front surface of the camera and the horizontal member supports the drive motors on the upper surface with the lens function circuit boards in a cavity on the underside.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Lens Function Drive Train</u></p> <p>The iris, zoom, and focus drives are identical in concept; the only difference is the lower gear ratio in the iris train to provide the 2.8-second end-to-end travel capability necessary for the ALC operation.</p> <p>The table (on next page) shows the drive train parameters with overall torque margins for the three lens functions.</p> <p>The motor/gear heads are mounted on the lens housing rather than on the lens, to permit the desired lens interchangeability for the Shuttle mission with minimum impact on the actual lenses.</p> <p>Various types of motors were considered for this application, trading off size, power, weight, control-circuit complexity, command capability, and qualification status. The brushless and stepper-motor types fit the package and power requirements, the latter being preferred because of its simplicity, reliability, and space-qualified status. The selected stepper motor (a size-8, Alnico-9 pole-piece, permanent-magnet stepper) is mated with a spur train gearhead. Both units are manufactured by Monaco Motor Co. A 48-diametral-pitch (48-DP) spur gear on the gearhead output shaft meshes directly with the gears which are a part of the zoom, focus, and iris ring functions on the lens gear.</p>

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FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE

FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM

Loss of Iris Function (mechanical).
 Loss of Zoom Function (mechanical).
 Loss of Focus Function (mechanical).
 LA
 Motor failure
 Gear train failure
 lens failure

Inability to control focus, zoom, or iris.
 Worst Case:
 Loss of mission critical video.

RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE

DESIGN FEATURES

LENS DRIVE TRAIN PARAMETERS

Drive	Component	Travel (degrees)	Time End-to-End (seconds)	Input Torque (oz-in)	Ratio No. or Teeth	Efficiency (%)	Loss Torque (oz-in)	Net Torque (oz-in)
Zoom	Motor	150 ↓	6.6	-	-	-	-	0.27
	Gearhead			0.27	78:1	80	3.7	18.4
	Gearhead Output Gear			18.4	50	96	2.2	52.0
	lens Gear				156		10.0	Torque Margin 5.2:1
Focus	Motor	202 ↓	7.5	-	-	-	-	0.27
	Gearhead			0.27	48:1	80	2.6	10.3
	Gearhead Output Gear			10.3	50	96	1.3	30.0
	lens Gear				156		10.0	Torque Margin 3:1
Iris	Motor	105 ↓	2.0	-	-	-	-	0.27
	Gearhead			0.27	48:1	80	2.6	10.3
	Gearhead Output Gear			10.3	50	96	1.3	30.0
	lens Gear				156		5.8	Torque Margin 6:1

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UNIT TVC/HLA
 DWG NO. 2294819-506,508/
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 SHEET 4 OF 9

FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE

FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM

RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE

Loss of Iris Function (mechanical).
 Loss of Zoom Function (mechanical).
 Loss of Focus Function (mechanical).

Inability to control focus, zoom, or iris.

Worst Case:
 Loss of mission critical video.

Wide Angle Lens Assembly

The Angenieux lens used in the WLA was designed specifically for STS CCTV use. It is a wide angle zoom lens 8 mm to 24 mm focal range having a 3.9 minimum l-stop to an extended range of f-720 and a fully closed position. The high quality optical system is engineered into a rugged lens assembly utilizing space-approved materials. The zoom and focus controls are cam-driven linear motions with dry-lubricated sliding contacts. Motion to the cams is provided by ball bearing-supported gear rings which interface with the lens function drive motor in the HLA assembly.

The IRIS mechanism is a variable mechanical aperture with a superimposed neutral density wedge. The aperture plate and wedge are edge-driven by a spur gear ring which again interfaces with the function drive motor in the HLA housing.

Care was exercised in the design to assure the optical elements are secured in strain-free, environmentally secure mountings.

The lens assembly was qualification tested at the vendor's facility; this was followed by qualification testing on the WLA system at RCA. The assembly has been used on repetitive STS missions.

QUALIFICATION TEST

For Qualification Test flow, see Table 2 located at the front of this book.

Motor failure
 Gear Train failure
 Lens failure

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DWG NO.	2294819-506, 508/ 2302001-503
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FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE																
<p>Loss of Iris Function (mechanical). Loss of Zoom Function (mechanical). Loss of Focus function (mechanical).</p> <p>dLA -Motor failure -Gear Train failure -Lens failure</p>	<p>Inability to control focus, zoom, or iris.</p> <p><u>Worst Case:</u> Loss of mission critical video.</p>	<p>ACCEPTANCE TEST</p> <p>The CCTV systems' WLA is subjected directly, without vibration isolators which might be used in their normal installation, to the following testing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vibration: <table border="0" style="margin-left: 20px;"> <tr> <td>20-80Hz:</td> <td>3 dB/Oct-rise from 0.01 G²/Hz</td> </tr> <tr> <td>80-350 Hz:</td> <td>0.04 G²/Hz</td> </tr> <tr> <td>350-750 Hz:</td> <td>-3 dB/10 Oct-slope</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Test Duration:</td> <td>1 Minute per Axis</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Test Level:</td> <td>6.1 Grms</td> </tr> </table> • Thermal Vacuum: In a pressure of 1X10⁻⁵ Torr, the temperature shall be as follows: <table border="0" style="margin-left: 20px;"> <tr> <td>125° F:</td> <td>Time to stabilize equipment plus 1 hour</td> </tr> <tr> <td>25° F:</td> <td>Time to stabilize equipment plus 1 hour</td> </tr> <tr> <td>125° F:</td> <td>Time to stabilize equipment plus 1 hour</td> </tr> </table> <p>The WLA may not have been subjected to the vacuum condition.</p> <p>For Acceptance test flow, See table I located at the front of this book.</p> <p>OPERATIONAL TESTS</p> <p>In order to verify that CCTV components are operational, a test must verify the health of all the command related components from the PHS (A7A1) panel switch, through the RCU, through the sync lines to the Camera/PTU, to the Camera/PTU command decoder. The test must also verify the camera's ability to produce video, the VSO's ability to route video, and the monitor's ability to display video. A similar test would be performed to verify the MON command path.</p> <p><u>Pre-Launch on Orbiter Test/In-Flight Test</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Power CCTV System. 2. Via the PHS panel, select a monitor as destination and the camera under test as source. 3. Send "Camera Power On" command from PHS panel. 4. Select "External Sync" on monitor. 5. Observe video displayed on monitor. Note that if video on monitor is synchronized (i.e., stable raster) then this indicates that the camera is receiving composite sync from the RCU and that the camera is producing synchronized video. 6. Send Pan, Tilt, Focus, Zoom, DLR, AND Gamma commands and visually (either via the monitor or direct observation) verify operation. 7. Select downlink as destination and camera under test as source. 8. Observe video routed to downlink. 9. Send "Camera Power Off" command via PHS panel. 10. Repeat Steps 3 through 9 except issue commands via the HMM command path. This proves that the CCTV equipment is operational. 	20-80Hz:	3 dB/Oct-rise from 0.01 G ² /Hz	80-350 Hz:	0.04 G ² /Hz	350-750 Hz:	-3 dB/10 Oct-slope	Test Duration:	1 Minute per Axis	Test Level:	6.1 Grms	125° F:	Time to stabilize equipment plus 1 hour	25° F:	Time to stabilize equipment plus 1 hour	125° F:	Time to stabilize equipment plus 1 hour
20-80Hz:	3 dB/Oct-rise from 0.01 G ² /Hz																	
80-350 Hz:	0.04 G ² /Hz																	
350-750 Hz:	-3 dB/10 Oct-slope																	
Test Duration:	1 Minute per Axis																	
Test Level:	6.1 Grms																	
125° F:	Time to stabilize equipment plus 1 hour																	
25° F:	Time to stabilize equipment plus 1 hour																	
125° F:	Time to stabilize equipment plus 1 hour																	

FMEA NO. <u>4362</u> CRITICALITY <u>2/2</u>	SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT <u>IVC/WLA</u> DWG NO. <u>2294819-506, 508/</u> <u>2307088-503</u> SHEET <u>6</u> OF <u>9</u>
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE Loss of Iris Function (mechanical). Loss of Zoom Function (mechanical). Loss of focus Function (mechanical). WLS -Motor failure -Gear train failure -lens failure	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM Inability to control focus, zoom, or iris. Worst Case: Loss of mission critical video.	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE <u>DCAS INSPECTION</u> <u>Procurement Control</u> - The IVC/WLA EEE Parts and hardware items are procured from approved vendors and suppliers, which meet the requirements set forth in the CCTV contract and Quality Plan Work Statement (WS-2593176). Resident DCAS personnel review all procurement documents to establish the need for GSI on selected parts (PAI 517). <u>Incoming Inspection and Storage</u> - Incoming Quality inspections are made on all received materials and parts. Results are recorded by lot and retained in file by drawing and control numbers for future reference and traceability. All EEE parts are subjected to incoming acceptance tests as called for in PAI 315 - Incoming Inspection Test Instructions. Incoming flight parts are further processed in accordance with RCA 1846684 - Preconditioning and Acceptance Requirements for Electronic Parts, with the exception that DPA and PIND testing is not performed. Mechanical items are inspected per PAI 316 - Incoming Inspection Instructions for mechanical items, PAI 305 - Incoming Quality Control Inspection Instruction, and PAI 612 - Procedure for Processing Incoming or Purchased Parts Designated for Flight Use. Accepted items are delivered to Material Controlled Stores and retained under specified conditions until fabrication is required. Non-conforming materials are held for Material Review Board (MRB) disposition. (PAI 307, PAI IQC 531). <u>Board Assembly & Test</u> - Prior to the start of WLA board assembly, all items are verified to be correct by stock room personnel, as the items are accumulated to form a kit. The items are verified again by the operator who assembles the kit by checking against the as-built-parts-list (ABPL). DCAS Mandatory Inspection Points are designated for all printed circuit, wire wrap and welded wire boards, plus harness connectors for soldering wiring, crimping, solder splices and quality workmanship prior to coating of the component side of boards and sleeving of harnesses. Specific instructions are given in assembly drawing notes and applicable documents called out in the fabrication procedure and record (FPR-2307088) and Parts List PL 2307088. These include wire connection list 2303349, Notes - wide angle zoom lens assy 2307191, Process Standard - bonding staking, potting, encapsulating 2280878, Specification - Urethane protective coating 2280877 and Workmanship Spec 8D10035. <u>IVC Assembly and Test</u> - An open box test is performed per TP-11-2294819, and an Acceptance Test per TP-AT-2294819, including vibration and thermal vacuum. Torques are specified and witnessed, traceability numbers are recorded and calibrated tools are checked prior to use. RCA Quality and DCAS inspections are performed at the completion of specified FPR operations in accordance with PAI 204, PAI 205, PAI 206 and PAI 217. DCAS personnel witness IVC button-up and critical torquing.

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FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
Loss of Iris Function (mechanical). Loss of Zoom Function (mechanical). Loss of Focus Function (mechanical). WLS -Motor failure -Gear Train failure -Lens failure	Inability to control focus, zoom, or iris. Worst Case: Loss of mission critical video.	<p>QA/INSPECTION (Continued)</p> <p>WLA Assembly and Test - An open box test is performed per TP-11-2307088, Acceptance Test per TP-AI-2307088. Torques are specified and witnessed, traceability numbers are recorded and calibrated tools are checked prior to use. RCA Quality and DCAS inspections are performed at the completion of specified FPR operations in accordance with PAI 204, PAI 205, PAI 217 and PAI 402. DCAS personnel witness WLA button-up and critical torquing.</p> <p>TVC/WLA Assembly and Test - After a TVC and a WLA have been tested individually, they are mated and a final acceptance test is performed per TP-AI-2294819, including vibration and thermal vacuum environments. RCA and DCAS personnel monitor these tests and review the acceptance test data/results. These personnel also inspect after all repair, rework and retest.</p> <p>Preparation for Shipment - The TVC and WLA are separated prior to shipment after fabrication and testing is complete. Each is packaged according to CCTV letter 8011 and 2280746, Process standard for Packaging and Handling guidelines. All related documentation including assembly drawings, Parts List, ABPL, Test Data, etc., is gathered and held in a documentation folder assigned specifically to each assembly. This folder is retained for reference. An EIDP is prepared for each assy in accordance with the requirements of WS-2593176. RCA QC and DCAS personnel witness crating, packaging, packing and marking, and review the EIDP for completeness and accuracy.</p>

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FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
Loss of Iris function (mechanical). Loss of Zoom function (mechanical). Loss of Focus Function (mechanical). WLA -Motor failure -gear train failure -Lens failure	Inability to control focus, zoom, or iris. Worst Case: Loss of mission critical video.	FAILURE HISTORY TDR W-6848, Log #0923, WLA 005-501 TDR A-2649, Log #0906, WLA 005-501 Description: Flight failure. Spacecraft Level. Loose element observed in lens. Cause: Retaining ring holding lens in place was loose. This retaining ring is held in place by using a staking material, which was missing. Corrective Action: All of the evidence indicates this failure to be an isolated instance of an omitted manufacturing step. Since this failure, vendor has prepared a detailed manufacturing procedure with proper QC inspection checks to insure proper production.	

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SHUTTLE CCTV
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FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
<p>Loss of Iris function (mechanical). Loss of Zoom Function (mechanical). Loss of Focus function (mechanical).</p> <p>WLS -Motor failure -Gear Train failure -lens failure</p>	<p>Inability to control focus, zoom, or iris.</p> <p>Worst Case: Loss of mission critical video.</p>	<p><u>OPERATIONAL EFFECTS</u> Loss of video. Possible loss of major mission objectives due to loss of RMS cameras or other required cameras.</p> <p><u>CREW ACTIONS</u> If possible, continue RMS operations using alternative visual cues.</p> <p><u>CREW TRAINING</u> Crew should be trained to use possible alternatives to CCTV.</p> <p><u>MISSION CONSTRAINTS</u> Where possible, procedures should be designed so they can be accomplished without CCTV.</p>