

CIR  
CIR CRITICAL ITEM LIST

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Date: 12/20/90

NAME	FAILURE	NODE S	CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT	REASONABLE FOR ACCEPTANCE
ELECTRICAL SOU HARNESS ASSEMBLY 110V 42A ----- 09771743-3, (1)	4257405; Electrical short, battery charge line.	END 15VDC	High battery power drain and affect power supply.	GTE INTERFACE: Battery discharged until the PDR current shunt open. The circuit power supply shuts down.  MISSION: Loss of EMU.	A. Design - The cable/connector interfaces on either end of the electrical harness are serial relieved to prevent excessive conductor loads and possible shorting. The multiple connector end is potted with ETV and is captured within a metal housing. The vehicle connector utilizes a metal strain relief type bushing. The strain relief and PDU connector interfaces have rubber seals to prevent contamination from entering after being clipped together. The wire is 020 AWG Teflon coated to provide the required insulation resistance. Conductors are tied together at 1 to 2 inch intervals and sheathed in a cloth outer layer to hold cables together so they share any loading and to prevent impact or abrasion of conductors.
				DIVISION VEHICLE:	B. Test - Component Acceptance test - Insulation resistance and isolation resistance tests are performed per 09771743-3 Operation Sheets ops 910 and 920 respectively. The insulation resistance test verifies that there is a minimum of 100 megohm resistance between any current carrying conductor and the harness shell at 500 VDC. The isolation resistance test verifies that the minimum resistance between each current carrying conductor and every other current carrying conductor is 0 megohms at 50 VDC. These tests insure no conductor is shorted to any other conductor or to the harness shell, and that no conductor has insulation damage.
					PDU Test - Insulation resistance and dielectric tests, are performed per 0900-50-000, tests 25.0 and 26.0 respectively to insure this item has not shorted.
					Certification test - The item completed the 15 year structural vibration and shock certification requirement during 10/91. Engineering change 47806-124 (Definition of Mechanically Locked Socichell) has been incorporated and deemed to have no impact on certification since this configuration was certified.

L7P  
Cage 95  
Socichell

**CIL**  
**EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST**

NAME	FAILURE	MODE 4	CAUSED	97/07/98 APPROVED	ANALYST:
				FAILURE EFFECT	
EMU	4231H05;				

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**G. Inspection -**

Final Inspection of the harness assembly checks face of connector for conductive contaminants. Visual inspection of conductors prior to potting operation to insure there are no damaged conductors and that the conductors are properly routed.

In-process electrical checkout of harness before and after potting to insure there are no short circuits. Visual inspection of the conductors prior to assembly of outer sheath to insure there are no damaged conductors to cause a short circuit.

**H. Failure History -**

None.

**I. Ground turnaround -**

Tested per PEWI-2-001, Orbital power interface and charging system functional sheet.

**J. Operational use -**

Crew Response - PrePostEVA: troubleshoot problem, if no success, discontinue use of EMU; consider third EMU if available.

Training - Standard EMU training covers this failure mode. Operational Considerations - flight rules define go/no go criteria related to EMU battery and EMU power. EVA checklist procedures verify hardware integrity and system operational status prior to use.

478  
Change Control  
Log  
Sheet