

CIL
EMU CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

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12/26/91 SUPERSEDES 10/31/90

ANALYST:

NAME	P/N	FAILURE	MODE & CAUSED	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
	QTY	CRIT			
BACTERIA FILTER,	2/2	416FM01A1	EMD J44H:		A. Design -
ITEM 416		External leakage, EMD	Water leakage to potable water, EMD attached.		Face-type silicone and (viton) radial o-seals are designed to prevent external leakage. O-rings are made from elastomeric material. Surface finish and seal configuration provide seal squeeze under all loading conditions. Minimum and squeeze for the face seal is 0.008 in. and for the radial seals, the minimum squeeze is 0.007 in. Straight through bolt hole design for covers and fittings provides centering of the radial o-seals, while the self locking fasteners ensure continuous metal-to-metal contact at the face seal for constant squeeze.
SV787709-14			CAUSE:	OFF INTERFACE: Depletion of EMD water reservoir.	B. Test -
(1)					Component In-Process -
				MISISON: Unable to use EMD during airlock activity.	The filter assembly is tested for external leakage per SV787709-14 operations sheets operation 100 by pressurizing it to 30-41 psig with water. While the filter is pressurized it is examined for evidence of leakage for a period of minutes. No leakage is allowed.
				CREW/VEHICLE: Possible crew discomfort (hot).	CDA -
					The bacteria filter (housing and seals) integrity is tested in EMDU-60-005. The filter assembly undergoes a proof test in which the filter is pressurized to 60-64 psig for 5 minutes minimum. Next, the filter is leak tested by pressurizing it to 30-41 psig with water. While the filter is pressurized, it is examined for evidence of leakage for a period of 60 minutes. No leakage is allowed.
					Certification -
					The item completed leakage testing to 25 psig, proof pressure testing to 34.5 psig, and was analyzed for its acceptability to burst pressure (46 psig) during 1/82. The following engineering changes have been incorporated and certified since that time: 42806-282 and 202-1 (revised SCU potable water max. op. press. to 40 psig, proof press. to 60 psig and burst press. to 80 psig); 42806-454 (height update); and 42806-591 (eliminate loosening of SCU multiple connector setscrews).
					D. Inspection -
					There are eight radial seals and one face seal that prevent external leakage. All nine interfacing surfaces are 100%

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					ANALYST:
	2/2	416FM01A;		<p>Inspected to meet dimensional and surface finish requirements.</p> <p>All o-rings are 100% inspected to meet dimensional and surface finish requirements.</p> <p>At final inspection, the filter assembly is examined for evidence of damage.</p>	

D. Failure History -
S-EMU-400-1801 (9/13/90)
External water leakage occurred from the item 416 Bacteria Filter test ports TPG and TPK caused by corrosion/pitting on the test port plug sealing surfaces. The stainless steel test port became corroded because of the water and iodine from the Iodine impregnated epoxy beads used in the filter cartridge. No corrective action was taken.

E. Ground Turnaround -
Tested per FMEA-A-001, V1103-02 EMU in Orbiter checkout.

F. Operational Use -
EVA Response -
Pre/PostEVA: Troubleshoot problem. If no success, isolate leak by discontinuing use of SDW and closing airlock panel water supply valve. Operate EMU on battery power. Consider sharing other SCU for cooling and O2 if battery constraints permit. Consider In-suit battery swap using spare battery(s).
Special Training - Standard EMU training covers this failure mode.
Operational Considerations - At least one spare EMU battery is manifested for each flight. EVA checklist procedures verify hardware integrity and systems operational status prior to EVA.

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