

NAME P/N QTY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
JUMPER HARNESS, ITEM 391 ----- SV821755-1 (1)	3/1RAB	391FM10 Battery (-) line fails open. Cable chafing against connector shell or shield. Improper connector strain relief, conductor severed, contact resistance, insulation breakdown.	END ITEM: Loss of continuity in one of two redundant battery (-) lines. GFE INTERFACE: Loss of one of two redundant battery (-) lines. Slight increase (0.05 ohm) in path resistance. MISSION: None for single failure. Terminate EVA with loss of second line. (loss of fan). CREW/VEHICLE: None for single or double failure. Possible loss of crewman with loss of SOP. TIME TO EFFECT /ACTIONS: Seconds. TIME AVAILABLE: Minutes. TIME REQUIRED: Seconds. REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A-FAIL B-FAIL C-PASS	A. Design - A. Design - Short circuits are minimized by the following: Each connector/adaptor ring interface is locked in place to prevent rotation by a mechanical lock. #22 Teflon insulated wires and connector provide electrical conduction and insulation properties. Connector pins are operating at 56.7% of derated temperature and 6.9% of derated voltage and the wire is at 89.4% of derated current. The convoluted tubing provides an additional layer of insulation to prevent shorts between the EMI braid and any internal unshielded conductors woven Halar sheath is assembled over the internal cables to provide protection from abrasion and impact. Connector pins are insulated by a polyphenylene sulfide insert. The P3 connector backshell housing has internal edges bler smooth to prevent cable chafing. Strain relief is provided by the combination of convolute tubing, metal EMI braid , and 0.5" extra cable length. The b items are secured by a band strap at each connector/cable interface. The convolute tubing is threaded into the connectors. Wire crimping is performed SVHS4909 (based on MSFC Spec-Q-1A). B. Test - Component Acceptance Test - The 391 harness is subjected to acceptance testing per AT-E-391 prior to final acceptance to ensure there are no workmanship problems that could cause an or short circuit. Each connector/harness interface is subjected to a 9-lb. test. The insulation resistance between each conductor and the ground circuit is measured during this test to ensure there are no intermittent shorts and verify the integrity of the harness strain relief. A continuity test is performed to measure the resistance of each circuit to ensure there are no circuits or high resistance paths. The insulation resistance and dielectric strength between each conductor and the shield ground is measured to ensure there are no shorts. PDA Test - The (-) battery power line is checked during DCM PDA testing per SEMU-60-01 para. 4.0 (Electrical Testing). Certification Test - Certified for a useful life of 15 years (ref. EMU1-13-046). C. Inspection - To ensure that there are no workmanship problems which could cause a short circuit in the harness conductors, the following inspections are made: Contact crimp samples are made prior to start of crimping and at the conclusion of crimping and pull tested to ensure the crimp tooling is operating properly. All crimp terminations are inspected for defects. Harness cables and conductors are visually inspected prior to assembly to ensure there are no defects which could cause a short due to workmanship. Electrical bond test is performed to verify ground path through various points on the harness. In-process and final electrical checkout of the harness (conductor continuity, dielectric strength and insulation resistance tests) are performed to ensure there are no open circuits. D. Failure History - None.


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		391FM10		<p>E. Ground Turnaround - Tested per FEMU-R-001, Final Pre-Flight Communications.</p> <p>F. Operational Use - Crew Response -PreEVA: Single failure not detectable. EVA: When loss of fan, comm and CWS data occurs, open helmet purge valve and deactivate EMU power. Terminate EVA.</p> <p>Training - Standard training covers this failure mode.</p> <p>Operational Considerations - Flight rule A15.1.2-2 of "Space Shuttle Operational Flight Rules", NSTS-128 defines go/no go criteria related to EMU battery power. Generic EVA Checklist JSC-48023, procedures Section 3 (EMU Checkout) and 4 (EVA prep) verify hardware integrity and systems operational status prior to EVA. Real Time Data System allows ground monitoring of EMU systems.</p>


EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT
SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW
FOR THE
I-391 JUMPER POWER HARNESS
CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)
EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

Prepared by: 
HS - Project Engineering

Approved by:  5/24/02
NASA - SSA/SSM
LSS


HS - Reliability


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