

FMEA  
EMU FAILURE MODE, EFFECT ANALYSIS

Page: 1  
Date: 04/18/90

81/82/90 SUPERSERIES / /

ANALYSIS:

NAME	FAILURE				TIME TO	EFFECT/		REMARKS/	REF
P/N	NODE &	MISSION		FAILURE DETECTION		ACTIONS	CRT	HAZARD	
QTY	FUNCTION	CAUSES	PHASE	EFFECT	FLIGHT/GROUND				
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS ELECTRONICS, ITEM 350 SV792281 (1)	Provides current limiting for EVC, feedwater solenoid and DCV solenoid power. Provides optical isolation and discrete signal conditioning for DCV input. Discretes and EVC have discretes. Contains battery current and voltage sense circuits, DDCI display, and provides secondary power to DCN display, CMS, and sensors.	350W005: Feedwater valve (337) current limiter fails shorted (input to output).	PRE-EVA EVA	EMP ITEM: Loss of overcurrent protection of the GCR for a short in the feedwater power line.	FLIGHT: No.	None.	S/IR	The redundant paths are the electrical system and the SOP. The CMS measures battery current and issues a warning if pre-selected limits are exceeded. Circuit breakers (current limiters) are standby redundant.	None.
	CAUSE:	Electrical short in wiring or component.		GFE INTERFACE: None for single failure. Subsequent failure (either) could cause EMU power failure.	GROUND: Test. FLIGHT: R/A	TIME: 0-PASS AVAILABLE: C-PASS	R-PASS		
				MISSION: None for single failure. Terminal EVA for subsequent failures that result in EMU power loss.		REQUIRED: N/A			
				CREW/VEHICLE: None for single or double failure. Possible loss of crewman with loss of SOP.					

SD402288  
ATTACHMENT -  
PAGE 21 OF 30

SEM-43-1  
937