



**CRITICAL ITEMS LIST**

PROJECT: SRMS  
ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: EEEU

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM  
ASS'Y P/N: 51140FTT74-38-5

SHEET: 2

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOUR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
3320	2	COMMAND LOGIC QTY-1 REFERENCE SCHEMATIC 2563765	<p>MODE: LOSS OF CAPTURE AND DERIGIDIZE.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) U10C FAILS L.</p>	<p>ARM REMAINS LIMP UNTIL EE MODE SW TO OFF DURING AN AUTO CAPTURE SEQUENCE. WHEN CAPTURE OR DERIGIDIZE COMMANDED, EEEU WILL NOT PRODUCE MOTOR ENABLE.</p> <p>WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED PAYLOAD MOTION. INCOMPLETE SNARE/RELEASE SEQUENCE. CREW ACTION REQ.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- 1) MANUAL EE MODE RELEASE. 2) BACKUP EE RELEASE.</p>	<p>ACCEPTANCE TESTS ----- THE EEEU IS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING ACCEPTANCE ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING AS AN SRU.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>O VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION REFERENCE TABLE 6</li> <li>O THERMAL: +70 DEGREES C TO -25 DEGREES C (1 1/2 CYCLES)</li> </ul> <p>THE EEEU IS INTEGRATED INTO THE END EFFECTOR AND IS FURTHER EXPOSED TO THE END EFFECTOR ACCEPTANCE TEST ENVIRONMENTS (VIBRATION AND THERMAL VACUUM).</p> <p>THE END EFFECTOR ASSEMBLY IS PART OF THE INTEGRATED RMS SYSTEM TESTS (1P510 RMS STRONGBACK TEST AND 1P552 FLAT FLOOR TEST) WHICH VERIFIES THE ABSENCE OF THE FAILURE MODE.</p> <p>QUALIFICATION TESTS ----- THE EEEU IS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING SRU QUALIFICATION TEST ENVIRONMENTS.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>O VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 6</li> <li>O SHOCK: 20G/11MS - 3 AXES (6 DIRECTIONS)</li> <li>O THERMAL: +81 DEGREES C TO -36 DEGREES C (6 CYCLES) 1 X 10<sup>-6</sup> TORR</li> <li>O HUMIDITY: TESTED IN THE END EFFECTOR HUMIDITY TEST.</li> <li>O EMC: MIL-STD-461 AS MODIFIED BY SL-E-0002 (TESTS CE01, CE03, CS01, CS02, CS06, RE01, RE02 (N/B) RS01).</li> </ul> <p>FLIGHT CHECKOUT ----- DORS OPS CHECKLIST (ALL VEHICLES) JSC 16987</p>

RMS/ELEC - 984

**CRITICAL ITEMS LIST**

PROJECT: SRMS  
 ASSY NOMENCLATURE: EEEU

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM  
 ASSY P/N: 51120FT174-38-5

SHEET: 3

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
3320	2	COMMAND LOGIC QTY-1 REFERENCE SCHEMATIC 2563765	NAME: LOSS OF CAPTURE AND DERIGIDIZE. CAUSE: (1) UIUC PARTS L.	ARM REMAINS LIMP UNTIL EE MODE SW TO OFF DURING AN AUTO CAPTURE SEQUENCE. WHEN CAPTURE OR DERIGIDIZE COMMANDED, EEEU WILL NOT PRODUCE MOTOR ENABLE.  WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED PAYLOAD MOTION. INCOMPLETE SHARE/RELEASE SEQUENCE. CREW ACTION REQ.  REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- 1) MANUAL EE MODE RELEASE. 2) BACKUP EE RELEASE.	QA/INSPECTIONS -----	<p>UNITS ARE MANUFACTURED UNDER DOCUMENTED QUALITY CONTROLS. THESE CONTROLS ARE EXERCISED THROUGHOUT DESIGN PROCUREMENT, PLANNING, RECEIVING, PROCESSING, FABRICATION, ASSEMBLY, TESTING AND SHIPPING OF THE UNITS. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINTS ARE EMPLOYED AT VARIOUS STAGES OF FABRICATION ASSEMBLY AND TEST. GOVERNMENT SOURCE INSPECTION IS INVOKED AT VARIOUS CONTROL LEVELS.</p> <p>EEE PARTS INSPECTION IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003. EACH EEE PART IS QUALIFIED AT THE PART LEVEL TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE APPLICABLE SPECIFICATION. ALL EEE PARTS ARE 100% SCREENED AND BURNED IN, AS A MINIMUM AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003, BY THE SUPPLIER. ADDITIONALLY, EEE PARTS ARE 100% RE-SCREENED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS, BY AN INDEPENDENT SPAR APPROVED TESTING FACILITY. DPA IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY PA.003 ON A RANDOMLY SELECTED 5% OF PARTS, MAXIMUM 5 PIECES, MINIMUM 3 PIECES FOR EACH LOT NUMBER/DATE CODE OF PARTS RECEIVED.</p> <p>WIRE IS PROCURED TO SPECIFICATION MIL-W-22759 OR MIL-W-81381 AND INSPECTED AND TESTED TO NASA JSCB080 STANDARD NUMBER 95A.</p> <p>RECEIVING INSPECTION VERIFIES THAT ALL PARTS RECEIVED ARE AS IDENTIFIED IN THE PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS, THAT NO PHYSICAL DAMAGE HAS OCCURRED TO PARTS DURING SHIPMENT, THAT THE RECEIVING DOCUMENTS PROVIDE ADEQUATE TRACEABILITY INFORMATION AND SCREENING DATA CLEARLY IDENTIFIES ACCEPTABLE PARTS.</p> <p>PARTS ARE INSPECTED THROUGHOUT MANUFACTURE AND ASSEMBLY AS APPROPRIATE TO THE MANUFACTURING STAGE COMPLETED. THESE INSPECTIONS INCLUDE,</p> <p>PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD INSPECTION FOR TRACK SEPARATION, DAMAGE AND ADEQUACY OF PLATED THROUGH HOLES,</p> <p>COMPONENT MOUNTING INSPECTION FOR CORRECT SOLDERING, WIRE LOOPING, STRAPPING, ETC. OPERATORS AND INSPECTORS ARE TRAINED AND CERTIFIED TO NASA NHB 5300.4(3-1) STANDARD.</p> <p>CONFORMAL COATING INSPECTION FOR ADEQUATE PROCESSING IS PERFORMED USING ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT TECHNIQUES.</p> <p>POST P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, CLEANLINESS AND WORKMANSHIP (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p> <p>P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, CHECK FOR CORRECT BOARD INSTALLATION, ALIGNMENT OF BOARDS, PROPER CONNECTOR CONTACT MATING, WIRE ROUTING, STRAPPING OF WIRES ETC.,</p> <p>PRE-CLOSURE INSPECTION, WORKMANSHIP AND CLEANLINESS (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p> <p>PRE-ACCEPTANCE TEST INSPECTION, WHICH INCLUDES AN AUDIT OF LOWER TIER INSPECTION COMPLETION, AS BUILT CONFIGURATION VERIFICATION TO AS DESIGN ETC., (MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT).</p>

PREPARED BY:

MFVG

SUPERCEDING DATE: 06 OCT 87

APPROVED BY:

DATE: 24 JUL 91

CTL REV: 1

RMS/ELEC - 985

**CRITICAL ITEMS LIST**

PR 115  
ASSY Nomenclature: **EEEU**

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM  
ASSY P/N: 51140PT174-38-5

SHEET: 4

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
3320	2	COMMAND LOGIC QTY-1 REFERENCE SCHEMATIC 2563765	<p>MODE: LOSS OF CAPTURE AND DERIGIDIZE.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) VIOC FAILS L.</p>	<p>ARM REMAINS LIMP UNTIL EE MODE SW TO OFF DURING AN AUTO CAPTURE SEQUENCE. WHEN CAPTURE OR DERIGIDIZE COMMANDED, EEEU WILL NOT PRODUCE MOTOR ENABLE.</p> <p>WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED PAYLOAD MOTION. INCOMPLETE SHARE/RELEASE SEQUENCE. CREW ACTION . REQ.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- 1) MANUAL EE MODE RELEASE. 2) BACKUP EE RELEASE.</p>	<p>A TEST READINESS REVIEW (TRR) WHICH INCLUDES VERIFICATION OF TEST PERSONNEL, TEST DOCUMENTS, TEST EQUIPMENT CALIBRATION/ VALIDATION STATUS AND HARDWARE CONFIGURATION IS CONVENED BY QUALITY ASSURANCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH ENGINEERING, RELIABILITY, CONFIGURATION CONTROL, SUPPLIER AS APPLICABLE, AND THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE, PRIOR TO THE START OF ANY FORMAL TESTING (ACCEPTANCE OR QUALIFICATION).</p> <p>ACCEPTANCE TESTING (ATP) INCLUDES AMBIENT PERFORMANCE, THERMAL AND VIBRATION TESTING, (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT).</p> <p>INTEGRATION OF UNIT TO END EFFECTOR ASSY - INSPECTIONS INCLUDE GROUNDING CHECKS, CONNECTERS FOR BENT OF PUSHBACK CONTACTS, VISUAL, CLEANLINESS, INTERCONNECT WIRING ETC. AND POWER-UP TEST TO SPAR INSPECTION TEST PROCEDURE ITP-251D.</p> <p>PRE-ACCEPTANCE TEST INSPECTION, WHICH INCLUDES AN AUDIT OF LOWER TIER INSPECTION COMPLETION, AS BUILT CONFIGURATION VERIFICATION TO AS DESIGN ETC., (MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT).</p> <p>ACCEPTANCE TESTING (ATP) INCLUDES, AMBIENT, VIBRATION AND THERMAL-VAC TESTING, (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p> <p>SRMS SYSTEMS INTEGRATION. THE INTEGRATION OF MECHANICAL ARM SUBASSEMBLIES AND THE FLIGHT CABIN EQUIPMENT TO FORM THE SRMS. INSPECTIONS ARE PERFORMED AT EACH PHASE OF INTEGRATION WHICH INCLUDES GROUNDING CHECKS, THRU WIRING CHECKS, WIRING ROUTING, INTERFACE CONNECTORS FOR BENT OR PUSH BACK CONTACTS ETC.</p> <p>SRMS SYSTEMS TESTING - STRONGBACK AND FLAT FLOOR AMBIENT PERFORMANCE TEST. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p>

RMS/ELEC - 986

**CRITICAL ITEMS L**

JECT: SRMS  
ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: E

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM  
ASS'Y P/N: 51140FT174-36-5

SHEET: 5

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, DRAWING REF., DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
3320	2	COMMAND LOGIC QTY-1 REFERENCE SCHEMATIC 2583785	MODE: LOSS OF CAP AND DER.  CAUSE: (1) VIB. FAILS E.	ARM REMAINS LIMP UNTIL EE MODE SW TO OFF DURING AN AUTO CAPTURE SEQUENCE. WHEN CAPTURE OR DERIGIDIZE COMMANDED, EEEU WILL NOT PRODUCE MOTOR ENABLE.  WORST CASE UNEXPECTED PAYLOAD MOTION. INCOMPLETE SHARE/RELEASE SEQUENCE. CREW ACTION REQ.  REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING 1) MANUAL EE MODE RELEASE. 2) BACKUP EE RELEASE.	FAILURE HISTORY ----- THERE HAVE BEEN NO FAILURES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS FAILURE MODE ON THE SRMS PROGRAM.

RMS/ELEC - 987

**CRITICAL ITEMS LIST**

UNIT: SRMS  
 PART NOMENCLATURE: EEEU

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM  
 ASS'Y P/N: 51120F1174-34-5

SHEET: 6

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOWR / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
3320	2	COMMAND LOGIC QTY-1 REFERENCE SCHEMATIC 2563765	MODE: LOSS OF CAPTURE AND DERIGIDIZE.  CAUSE(S): (1) UTC FAILS L.	ARM REMAINS LIMP UNTIL EE MODE SW TO OFF DURING AN AUTO CAPTURE SEQUENCE. WHEN CAPTURE OR DERIGIDIZE COMMANDED, EEEU WILL NOT PRODUCE MOTOR ENABLE.  WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED PAYLOAD MOTION. INCOMPLETE SNARE/RELEASE SEQUENCE. CREW ACTION REQ.  REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- 1) MANUAL EE MODE RELEASE.  2) BACKUP EE RELEASE.	OPERATIONAL EFFECTS ----- EE DOES NOT OPERATE NOMINALLY WHEN COMMANDED. ARM REMAINS LIMP UNTIL EE MODE SWITCH IS TURNED OFF DURING AN AUTO CAPTURE SEQUENCE.  CREW ACTION ----- FOR ANY OFF NOMINAL OPERATION OF THE EE, THE EE MODE SWITCH SHOULD BE TURNED OFF. ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE IN THE ALTERNATE MODE. IF THE SNARES REMAIN OPEN, MANEUVER ARM AWAY FROM PAYLOAD. IF THE SNARES ARE PARTIALLY CLOSED, ATTEMPT RELEASE USING A PRIMARY EE MODE. IF SNARES OPEN, MANEUVER THE ARM AWAY FROM THE PAYLOAD. IF SNARES DON'T OPEN, ATTEMPT TO RELEASE IN BACKUP MODE. IF SNARES OPEN, MANEUVER ARM AWAY FROM THE PAYLOAD. MANEUVER ORBITER AWAY FROM PAYLOAD. IF SNARES CANNOT BE OPENED, IN ANY MODE, EVA CAN BE USED TO RELEASE THE PAYLOAD OR THE ARM/PAYLOAD COMBINATION CAN BE JETTISONED.  CREW TRAINING ----- CREW WILL BE TRAINED TO RECOGNIZE OFF NOMINAL EE OPERATIONS AND TO MANEUVER THE ORBITER AWAY FROM A FREE FLYING PAYLOAD AT ANY TIME DURING ARM OPERATIONS.  MISSION CONSTRAINT ----- WHEN CAPTURING A FREE FLYING PAYLOAD, THE EE MUST BE FAR ENOUGH AWAY FROM STRUCTURE TO PROHIBIT CONTACT REGARDLESS OF PAYLOAD ROTATIONS. THE EE MODE SWITCH SHOULD BE PLACED BACK IN THE OFF POSITION IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SPEC DRIVE TIME HAS ELAPSED.  OMRSD OFFLINE ----- PERFORM MANUAL EE CAPTURE VERIFY CORRECT TIME FOR CLOSE FLAG TO CHANGE STATE PERFORM MANUAL EE DERIGIDIZE VERIFY CORRECT TIME FOR EXTEND FLAG TO CHANGE STATE  OMRSD ONLINE INSTALLATION ----- NONE  OMRSD ONLINE TURNAROUND ----- PERFORM MANUAL EE CAPTURE

RMS/ELEC - 988

**CRITICAL ITEMS LIST**

PROJECT: SRMS  
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: EEEU

SYSTEM: ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM  
 ASS'Y P/N: 51140F1174-3A-5

SHEET: 7

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HWMN / FUNC. 2/1R CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
3320	2	COMMAND LOGIC QTY-1 REFERENCE SCHEMATIC 2563765	MODE: LOSS OF CAPTURE AND DERIGIDIZE.  CAUSE(S): (1) UIOC FAILS L.	ARM REMAINS LIMP UNTIL EE MODE SW TO OFF DURING AN AUTO CAPTURE SEQUENCE. WHEN CAPTURE OR DERIGIDIZE COMMANDED, EEEU WILL NOT PRODUCE MOTOR ENABLE.  WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED PAYLOAD MOTION, INCOMPLETE SHARE/RELEASE SEQUENCE, CREW ACTION REQ.  REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING ----- 1) MANUAL EE MODE RELEASE.  2) BACKUP EE RELEASE.		VERIFY CORRECT TIME FOR CLOSED FLAG TO CHANGE TO GREY PERFORM MANUAL EE DERIGIDIZE VERIFY CORRECT TIME FOR EXTEND FLAG TO CHANGE TO GREY

RMS/ELEC - 989