

FMEA NO. <u>2.3.7</u> CRITICALITY <u>2/2</u>	SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT <u>TVC/LMA</u> DWG NO. <u>2294819-506 508/</u> <u>2307086-503</u> SHEET <u>1</u> OF <u>7</u>
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
<p>Loss of +28V switched power to the PTU.</p> <p><u>IVC</u> <u>AG</u> Power On/Off Switching. 2294885-501</p>	<p>Loss of PTU function.</p> <p><u>Worst Case:</u> Loss of mission critical video.</p>	<p>DESIGN FEATURES</p> <p>The TVC/Lens Assembly is comprised of 16 electrical subassemblies; 13 subassemblies are RCA Astro designed and fabricated using standard printed-circuit board type of construction. The remaining three assemblies, high voltage power supply, oscillator, and stepper motors, are vendor supplied components which have been specified and purchased according to RCA Specification Control Drawings (SCDs) prepared by engineering and reliability assurance. Specifications per the SCD are prepared to establish the design, performance, test, qualification, and acceptance requirements for a procured piece of equipment.</p> <p>Parts, materials, processes, and design guidelines for the Shuttle CCTV program are specified in accordance with RCA 2295503. This document defines the program requirements for selection and control of EEE parts. To the maximum extent, and consistent with availability, all parts have been selected from military specifications at the JAM level, as a minimum. In addition to the overall selection criteria, a subset of general purpose preferred parts has been defined by this document and the RCA Government Systems Division Standard Parts List. In the case of the CMOS and TTL family of microcircuits, devices are screened and tested to the MIL-STD-883C equivalent and procured under the designations of HI-REL/3WQ and SNC 541S from RCA-SSD and Texas Instruments Corp, respectively. Parts not included in the above documents have been used in the design only after a nonstandard item approval form (NSIAF) has been prepared, submitted to Reliability Assurance Engineering (RAE) and approved for use in the specific application(s) defined in the NSIAF by NASA-JSC.</p> <p>Worst-Case Circuit Analyses have been performed and documented for all circuit designs to demonstrate that sufficient operating margins exist for all operating conditions. The analysis was worst case-in that the value for each of the variable parameters was set to limits that will drive the output to a maximum (or minimum).</p> <p>A component application review and analysis was conducted to verify that the applied stress on each piece part by the temperature extremes identified with environmental qualification testing does not exceed the stress derating values identified in RCA 2295503.</p> <p>In addition, an objective examination of the design was performed through a PDR and CDR to verify that the TVC/Lens assembly met specification and contractual requirements.</p>

FMEA NO. <u>2.3.7</u> CRITICALITY <u>2/2</u>		SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT <u>TVC/HLA</u> DWG NO. <u>2294819-506, 508/ 2307080-503</u> SHEET <u>2</u> OF <u>7</u>
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
Loss of +28V switched power to the PTU. TVC 36 Power On/Off Switching. 2294885-501	Loss of PTU function. Worst Case: Loss of mission critical video.	<p>DESIGN FEATURES (Continued)</p> <p>BARE BOARD DESIGN (A6)</p> <p>The design of the associated A6 board is constructed from laminated copper-clad epoxy glass sheets (NEMA G-10) Grade FR-4), PER MIL-P-55617A. Circuit connections are made through printed traces which run from point to point on the board surfaces. Every trace terminates at an annular ring. The annular ring surrounds the hole in which a component lead or terminal is located. This ring provides a footing for the solder, ensuring good mechanical and electrical performance. Its size and shape are governed by MIL-P-55640 as are trace widths, spacing and routing. These requirements are reiterated specifically in drawing notes to further assure compliance. Variations between the artwork master and the final product (due to irregularities of the etching process) are also controlled by drawing notes. This prevents making defective boards from good artwork. Holes which house no lead or terminal, but serve only to electrically interconnect the different board layers, contain stitch bars for mechanical support and increased reliability.</p> <p>The thru holes are drilled from a drill tape thus eliminating the possibility of human error and allowing tight control over hole and annular ring concentricity, an important reliability criterion. After drilling and etching, All copper cladding is tin-lead plated per MIL-STD-1495. This provides for easy and reliable soldering at the time of board assembly, even after periods of prolonged storage.</p> <p>BOARD ASSEMBLY DESIGN (A6)</p> <p>All components are installed in a manner which assures maximum reliability. Component leads are pre-tinned, allowing total wetting of solder joints. All leads are formed to provide stress relief and the bodies of large components are staked. Special mounting and handling instructions are included in each drawing required after final assembly. The board is coated with urethane which protects against humidity and contamination.</p> <p>BOARD PLACEMENT</p> <p>The A6 board is secured in the electronics assembly by gold-plated beryllium copper card guides. Connections are made to the mother board with blind-mated connectors. Disengagement during launch is prevented by a cover which spans the board's free edge.</p>	

FMEA NO. <u>2.3.7</u> CRITICALITY <u>2/2</u>	SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT <u>IVC/WLA</u> DNG NO. <u>2294819-506.508/</u> <u>2307088-503</u> SHEET <u>3</u> OF <u>7</u>
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FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
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Loss of +28V switched power to the PTU.

IVC
 AS Power On/Off Switching.
 2294885-501

Loss of PTU function.

Worst Case:
 Loss of mission critical video.

ACCEPTANCE TEST

The CCTV systems' WLA is subjected directly, without vibration isolators which might be used in their normal installation, to the following testing:

- Vibration:

20-80Hz:	3 dB/Oct-rise from 0.01 G ² /Hz
80-350 Hz:	0.04 G ² /Hz
350-750 Hz:	-3 dB/10 Oct-slope
Test Duration:	1 Minute per Axis
Test Level:	6.1 Grms
- Thermal Vacuum: In a pressure of 1x10⁻⁵ Torr, the temperature shall be as follows:

125° F:	Time to stabilize equipment plus 1 hour
25° F:	Time to stabilize equipment plus 1 hour
125° f:	Time to stabilize equipment plus 1 hour

The WLA may not have been subjected to the vacuum condition.

for Acceptance Test flow, See Table 1 located at the front of this book.

OPERATIONAL TESTS

In order to verify that CCTV components are operational, a test must verify the health of all the command related components from the PHS (A7A1) panel switch, through the RCU, through the sync lines to the Camera/PTU, to the Camera/PTU command decoder. The test must also verify the camera's ability to produce video, the VSU's ability to route video, and the monitor's ability to display video. A similar test would be performed to verify the MDM command path.

- Pre-Launch on Orbiter Test/In-Flight Test
1. Power CCTV System.
 2. Via the PHS panel, select a monitor as destination and the camera under test as source.
 3. Send "Camera Power On" command from PHS panel.
 4. Select "External Sync" on monitor.
 5. Observe video displayed on monitor. Note that if video on monitor is synchronized (i.e., stable raster) then this indicates that the camera is receiving composite sync from the RCU and that the camera is producing synchronized video.
 6. Send Pan, Tilt, Focus, Zoom, ALC, and Gamma commands and visually (either via the monitor or direct observation) verify operation.
 7. Select downlink as destination and camera under test as source.
 8. Observe video routed to downlink.
 9. Send "Camera Power Off" command via PHS panel.
 10. Repeat Steps 3 through 9 except issue commands via the MDM command path. This proves that the CCTV equipment is operational.

FMEA NO. <u>2.3.7</u> CRITICALITY <u>2/2</u>	SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT <u>TVC/M.A.</u> DWG NO. <u>2294819-506,508/</u> <u>2307000-503</u> SHEET <u>4</u> OF <u>7</u>
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
Loss of +28V switched power to the PTU. TVC AB Power On/Off Switching. 2294885-501	Loss of PTU function. Worst Case: Loss of mission critical video.	<p><u>QA/INSPECTION</u></p> <p><u>Procurement Control</u> - The TVC/M.A. EEE Parts and hardware items are procured from approved vendors and suppliers, which meet the requirements set forth in the CCTV contract and Quality Plan Work Statement (MS-2593176). Resident DCAS personnel review all procurement documents to establish the need for GSI on selected parts (PAI 517).</p> <p><u>Incoming Inspection and Storage</u> - Incoming Quality inspections are made on all received materials and parts. Results are recorded by lot and retained in file by drawing and control numbers for future reference and traceability. All EEE parts are subjected to incoming acceptance tests as called for in PAI 315 - Incoming Inspection Test Instructions. Incoming flight parts are further processed in accordance with RCA 1846604 - Preconditioning and Acceptance Requirements for Electronic Parts, with the exception that DPA and PIND testing is not performed. Mechanical items are inspected per PAI 316 - Incoming Inspection Instructions for mechanical items, PAI 305 - Incoming Quality Control Inspection Instruction, and PAI 612 - Procedure for Processing Incoming or Purchased Parts Designated for Flight Use. Accepted items are delivered to Material Controlled Stores and retained under specified conditions until fabrication is required. Non-conforming materials are held for Material Review Board (MRB) disposition. (PAI 307, PAI IQC 531).</p> <p><u>Board Assembly & Test</u> - Prior to the start of TVC board assembly, all items are verified to be correct by stock room personnel, as the items are accumulated to form a kit. The items are verified again by the operator who assembles the kit by checking against the as-built-parts-list (ABPL). DCAS Mandatory Inspection Points are designated for all printed circuit, wire wrap and welded wire boards, plus harness connectors for soldering wiring, crimping, solder splices and quality workmanship prior to coating of the component side of boards and sleeving of harnesses.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>TVC Boards</u></p> <p>Specific TVC board assembly and test instructions are provided in drawing notes, and applicable documents are called out in the fabrication Procedure and Record (FPR-2294819) and parts list PL2294819. These include shuttle TVC assembly notes 2593660, Process Standard RTV-566 2280881, Process Standard - Bonding Velcro Tape 2280889, Specification Soldering 2280749, Specification Name Plate Application 1960167, Specification - Crimping 2280800, Specification - Bonding and Staking 2280870, Specification - Urethane coating 2280877, Specification - Locking compound 2026116, Specification Epoxy Adhesive 2010985, Specification - Marking 2280876, Specification - Workmanship 8030035, Specification Bonding and Staking 2280875.</p>

FMEA NO. <u>2.3.7</u> CRITICALITY <u>2/2</u>	SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT <u>TVC/WLA</u> DWG NO. <u>2294819-506.508/ 2307088-503</u> SHEET <u>5</u> OF <u>7</u>
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
<p>Loss of +28V switched power to the PTU.</p> <p><u>TVC</u> <u>AS</u> Power On/Off Switching. 2294885-501</p>	<p>Loss of PTU function.</p> <p>Worst Case: Loss of mission critical video.</p>	<p><u>QA/INSPECTION</u> (Continued)</p> <p><u>TVC Assembly and Test</u> - An open box test is performed per TP-IT-2294819, and an Acceptance Test per TP-AT-2294819, including vibration and thermal vacuum. Torques are specified and witnessed, traceability numbers are recorded and calibrated tools are checked prior to use. RCA Quality and DCAS inspections are performed at the completion of specified FPR operations in accordance with PAI 204, PAI 205, PAI 206 and PAI 217. DCAS personnel witness TVC button-up and critical torquing.</p> <p><u>WLA Assembly and Test</u> - An open box test is performed per TP-IT-2307088, Acceptance Test per TP-AT-2307088. Torques are specified and witnessed, traceability numbers are recorded and calibrated tools are checked prior to use. RCA Quality and DCAS inspections are performed at the completion of specified FPR operations in accordance with PAI 204, PAI 205, PAI 217 and PAI 402. DCAS personnel witness WLA button-up and critical torquing.</p> <p><u>TVC/WLA Assembly and Test</u> - After a TVC and a WLA have been tested individually, they are mated and a final acceptance test is performed per TP-AT-2294819, including vibration and thermal vacuum environments. RCA and DCAS personnel monitor these tests and review the acceptance test data/results. These personnel also inspect for conformance after all repair, rework and retest.</p> <p><u>Preparation for Shipment</u> - The TVC and WLA are separated prior to shipment after fabrication and testing is complete. Each is packaged according to CCTV Letter 8011 and 2280746, Process standard for Packaging and Handling guidelines. All related documentation including assembly drawings, Parts List, ABPL, Test Data, etc., is gathered and held in a documentation folder assigned specifically to each assembly. This folder is retained for reference. An EIDP is prepared for each assy in accordance with the requirements of WS-2593176. RCA QC and DCAS personnel witness crating, packaging, packing and marking, and review the EIDP for completeness and accuracy.</p>

FMEA NO. <u>2,3,7</u> CRITICALITY <u>2/2</u>	SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT <u>TVC/NLA</u> DWG NO. <u>2294819-506,508/ 2387088-503</u> SHEET <u>6</u> OF <u>7</u>
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
<p>Loss of +28V switched power to the PIU.</p> <p><u>IVC</u> <u>A6</u> Power On/Off Switching. 2294805-501</p>	<p>Loss of PTU function.</p> <p><u>Worst Case:</u> Loss of mission critical video.</p>	<p><u>FAILURE HISTORY</u></p> <p>TDR - W2740 - Log #0486 - TVC S/N 008-502</p> <p><u>Description:</u> Pre-Launch Test Failure Box Level Ambient Environment</p> <p>REF: VJCS-2-01-0097 unit returned from KSC. Power was applied to wrong pins. (+28V).</p> <p><u>Cause:</u> Incorrect wiring of shuttle craft harness, put +28V to J1-10 and RTN to J1-9.</p> <p><u>Corrective Action:</u> Wiring of shuttle harness to be repaired by responsible organization. Failure analysis performed and corrective action taken on TVC S/N 008. A6 board-failure analysis indicated the following parts are to be changed. Q1, Q3, Q12, CR3, CR6, and RS1 were replaced.</p> <p>TOR - W6823 - Log #558 - TVC S/N 012-502 Y1771 - Log #568 - TVC S/N 009-502 Y1771 - Log #568 - TVC S/N 002-502 Y1771 - Log #568 - TVC S/N 009-502 Y1770 - Log #567 - TVC S/N 014-502 Y1770 - Log #567 - TVC S/N 010-502 Y1770 - Log #568 - TVC S/N 017-502 W1729 - Log #578 - TVC S/N 020-502</p> <p><u>Description:</u> Flight Failure, Spacecraft Level RHS TV Camera circuit breaker popped open during flight mission STS-3.</p> <p><u>Cause:</u> Camera low voltage supply has erratic synchronization mode at low temperature.</p> <p><u>Corrective Action:</u> All flight cameras were returned under CCA35 for rework and retest to ECN C-1881. ECN (C-1881) to the low voltage power supplies eliminates the erratic synchronization problem. TVC group part no. has been changed from 2294819-502 to 504 to denote cameras that contain low voltage power supply modification.</p>

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FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
Loss of +28V switched power to the PTU. TVC A6 Power On/Off Switching. 2294885-501	Loss of PTU function. Worst Case: Loss of mission critical video.	FAILURE HISTORY TOR - W1760 - Log #0838 - TVC S/W 026-506 Description: Flight Failure, Spacecraft Level STS-8 During the flight operations, one time when crew turned camera on they had no control of ALC and Gamma functions. Problem resolved itself by recycling power. Cause: After numerous operations, the reported condition was duplicated on test set. After initial turn on, camera would not except ALC, and Gamma commands. It was found that the output of U33 Pin 6 CHD F.F. reset on A2 board was set in a high state. This should normally have been reset low by either "POR" or bit count 88 pulses, after initial power turn-on. Suspect devices A2 - U26, U66, U67, and U68. Corrective Action: Removed and replaced the following parts on the A2 Board U26, U66, U67, and U68. Lab analysis did not indicated any defect with removed parts. Problem has not recurred after new parts were installed. TOR - A3939 - Log #0954 - TVC S/W 031-506 Description: Flight Failure, Spacecraft Level STS-14 Problem report PV6-004037 No video output Cause: Defective Relay K-1 on the A6 Board. Corrective Action: Cause due to a foreign conductive particle temporarily lodged between relay leads and board P.C. traces. Relay K-1 sent to product assurance lab for analysis, report #A3909. Numerous discrepancies were found, none of which were critical. TOR - 8-3521 - Log #1165 - TVC S/W 038-508 Description: Acceptance Test Failure Box Level Thermal Vac - Hot Envi Excessive supply current, lost all DLR/camera lights and output video information. Cause: Shorted capacitor C14 on A6 board. Corrective Action: C14 removed and replaced with new capacitor. Product assurance lab could not find a cause for shorted cap. (Report # B5321A) Considered random failure.	

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FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
Loss of +28V switched power to the PTU. IVC AG Power On/Off Switching. 2294885-501	Loss of PTU function. Worst Case: Loss of mission critical video.	<p><u>OPERATIONAL EFFECTS</u></p> Loss of video. Possible loss of major mission objectives due to loss of RMS cameras or other required cameras. <p><u>CREW ACTIONS</u></p> If possible, continue RMS operations using alternative visual cues. <p><u>CREW TRAINING</u></p> Crew should be trained to use possible alternatives to CCTV. <p><u>MISSION CONSTRAINT</u></p> Where possible, procedures should be designed so they can be accomplished without CCTV.	