

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS
ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
ASS'Y P/N: 5115SE117

SHEET: 1

FREA REF.	REV.	NAME, QTY & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HWR / FUNC. I/I: CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
1420	2	ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER QTY-1 SPAR P/N 5115SE117	<p>MODE: NO OUTPUT FROM ONE OR MORE CHANNELS.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) TRANSDUCER FAILS (2) OP AMP FAILURE. (3) MECHANICAL LINKAGE FAILURE. (4) TRANSFORMER FAILURE.</p>	<p>LOSS OF ANY CHANNEL WILL CAUSE UNEXPECTED TRAJECTORY.</p> <p>WORST CASE</p> <p>UNEXPECTED MOTION, INCORRECT H/C COMMANDS, UNANNUNCIATED, CREW ACTION REQ.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING</p> <p>N/A</p>		<p>DESIGN FEATURES.</p> <p>THE TRANSDUCERS, AND THE MECHANICAL LINKAGE SYSTEMS BETWEEN HANDGRIP AND THE TRANSDUCERS, ARE IDENTICAL IN DESIGN TO THE ORBITER RHC. DESIGN REVIEW HAS CONFIRMED THAT MATERIALS USAGE, FASTENING METHODS, AND LUBRICANT SYSTEMS ARE APPROPRIATE. ALL WIRE TERMINATIONS ARE POSTED TO AFFORD STRESS RELIEF.</p> <p>THREE IDENTICAL CIRCUITS PROVIDE SIGNAL DEMODULATION FOR EACH OF THE THREE TRANSDUCERS.</p> <p>IN EACH CIRCUIT, TWO TRANSISTORS ARE ALTERNATELY SWITCHED BY THE OUTPUT OF A TRANSFORMER WHICH IS DRIVEN BY 20 VAC, 1500HZ. THE SWITCHING ACTION OF THE TRANSISTORS RESULTS IN PHASE-SENSITIVE RECTIFICATION OF THE TRANSDUCER OUTPUT. THE RECTIFIED OUTPUT IS FILTERED, AND SCALED BY AN OPERATIONAL AMPLIFIER. ONE TRANSFORMER PROVIDES THE SWITCHING COMMANDS FOR ALL THREE CIRCUITS.</p> <p>TRANSISTORS ARE 2N2432A TYPE. OP-AMPS ARE TYPE LM101A.</p> <p>EEE PARTS HAVE BEEN SELECTED AND CONTROLLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003. THIS DOCUMENT DEFINES THE PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS FOR MONITORING AND CONTROLLING EEE PARTS. THE REQUIREMENTS INCLUDE PARTS SELECTION TO AT LEAST "ESTABLISHED RELIABILITY" LEVELS, AND ADEQUATE DERATING OF PART STRESS LEVELS. PROCEDURES AND ACTIVITIES ARE SPECIFIED TO ENSURE AT LEAST EQUIVALENT QUALITY FOR NONSTANDARD AND IRREGULAR PARTS. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS HAS CONFIRMED NO PARTS WITH GENERICALLY HIGH FAILURE RATES. AEROSPACE DESIGN STANDARDS FOR DETAILING ELECTRONIC PARTS PACKAGING, MOUNTING AND STRUCTURAL/MECHANICAL/INTEGRITY OF ASSEMBLIES ARE APPLIED. SUCH DESIGN HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND FOUND SATISFACTORY THROUGH THE DESIGN AUDIT PROCESS INCLUDING THE USE OF RELIABILITY, MAINTAINABILITY AND SAFETY CHECKLISTS. MATERIAL SELECTION AND USAGE CONFORMS TO SPAR-SC. 368 WHICH IS EQUIVALENT TO THE NASA MATERIALS USAGE REQUIREMENTS. WORST CASE ANALYSIS HAS BEEN CONDUCTED TO ENSURE THAT PERFORMANCE CAN BE MET UNDER WORST CASE TEMPERATURE AND AGING EFFECTS. EEE PARTS STRESS ANALYSIS HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND CONFIRMS THAT THE PARTS MEET THE DERATING REQUIREMENTS.</p> <p>PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD DESIGNS HAVE BEEN REVIEWED TO ENSURE ADEQUATE CIRCUIT PATH WIDTH AND SEPARATION AND TO CONFIRM APPROPRIATE DIMENSIONS OF CIRCUIT SOLDER PADS AND OF COMPONENT HOLE PROVISIONS.</p> <p>PARTS MOUNTING METHODS ARE CONTROLLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH NSFC-STD-136 AND CAE PD93489. THESE DOCUMENTS REQUIRE APPROVED-MOUNTING METHODS, STRESS RELIEF, AND COMPONENT SECURITY.</p> <p>WHERE APPLICABLE, DESIGN DRAWINGS AND DOCUMENTATION GIVE CLEAR IDENTIFICATION OF HANDLING PRECAUTIONS FOR ESD SENSITIVE PARTS.</p> <p>BOARD ASSEMBLY DRAWINGS INCLUDE THE REQUIREMENT FOR SOLDERING STANDARDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MHD 5390.4(3A) AND JSC 08B00A.</p>

PREPARED BY: RMG

SUPERCEDING DATE: 06 OCT 97

APPROVED BY:

RMS/D&C - 330

TE:

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS
ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
ASS'Y P/N: 51155E117

SHEET: 2

FREA REF.	REV.	NAME, QTY & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HWR / FUNC. I/I CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
1420	2	ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER QTY-1 SPAR P/N 51155E117	MODE: NO OUTPUT FROM ONE OR MORE CHANNELS. CAUSE(S): (1) TRANSDUCER FAILS (2) OP AMP FAILURE. (3) MECHANICAL LINKAGE FAILURE. (4) TRANSFORMER FAILURE.	LOSS OF ANY CHANNEL WILL CAUSE UNEXPECTED TRAJECTORY. WORST CASE UNEXPECTED MOTION. INCORRECT H/C COMMANDS. UNANNUNCIATED. CREW ACTION REQ. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING N/A		PROCESSING OF ADDRESS DECODING IS PERFORMED USING 'A' TYPE CMOS LOGIC DEVICES. INPUT DATA IS BUFFERED BY A COMPLEMENTARY TRANSISTOR STAGE. THE CMOS LOGIC CIRCUITS ARE OF THE GENERIC TYPE SERIES "4000A". THE COMPLEMENTARY TRANSISTORS ARE 2N2222A AND 2N2907A.

PREPARED BY: MFUG

SUPERSEDING DATE: 06 OCT 87

APPROVED BY: _____

DATE: _____

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: RMS

ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM

ASS'Y P/N: S1155E117

SHEET: 3

AREA REF.	REV.	NAME, QTY & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HWR / FUNC. I/I CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
1420	2	ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER QTY-1 SPAR P/N S1155E117	<p>MODE: NO OUTPUT FROM ONE OR MORE CHANNELS.</p> <p>CAUSE(S):</p> <p>(1) TRANSDUCER FAILS</p> <p>(2) OP AMP FAILURE.</p> <p>(3) MECHANICAL LINKAGE FAILURE.</p> <p>(4) TRANSFORMER FAILURE.</p>	<p>LOSS OF ANY CHANNEL WILL CAUSE UNEXPECTED TRAJECTORY.</p> <p>WORST CASE UNEXPECTED MOTION. INCORRECT H/C COMMANDS. UNANNUNCIATED. CREW ACTION REQ.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING</p> <p>N/A</p>		<p>ACCEPTANCE TESTS</p> <p>THE RHC IS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING ACCEPTANCE ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING AS AN SRU.</p> <p>D VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION REFERENCE TABLE 1</p> <p>D THERMAL: +120 DEGREES F TO 20 DEGREES F (12 HRS PER CYCLE) 2 CYCLES TOTAL.</p> <p>THE RHC IS TESTED AS PART OF THE D&C SUBSYSTEM; WHICH CONSIST OF D&C PANEL, IHC AND RHC; PER TP 347.</p> <p>THE TOTAL D&C SUBSYSTEM UNDERGOES RMS SYSTEM TESTING (TP 518 RMS STRONGBACK, AND TP552 FLAT FLOOR TESTS) WHICH VERIFIES THE ABSENCE OF THE FAILURE MODE.</p> <p>QUALIFICATIONS TESTS</p> <p>THE RHC IS CERTIFIED BY SIMILARITY TO THE ORBITER USED RHC EXCEPT FOR FINGER OPERATED SWITCHES. THE BASIC DIFFERENCES IS THAT THE ORBITER RHC IS TRIPLE REDUNDANT AND THE RMS RHC IS SINGLE STRING.</p> <p>FLIGHT CHECKOUT</p> <p>PORS OPS CHECKLIST (ALL VEHICLES) JSC 16987</p>

PREPARED BY: PHG

SUPERSEDING DATE: 06 OCT 87

APPROVED

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CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

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SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
ASS'Y P/N: 51155E117 SHEET: 4

P/CA REF.	REV.	NAME, QTY & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDMR / FUNC. I/I CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
1420	2	ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER QTY-1 SPAR P/N 51155E117	<p>MODE: NO OUTPUT FROM ONE OR MORE CHANNELS.</p> <p>CAUSE(S):</p> <p>(1) TRANSDUCER FAILS</p> <p>(2) OP AMP FAILURE.</p> <p>(3) MECHANICAL LINKAGE FAILURE.</p> <p>(4) TRANSFORMER FAILURE.</p>	<p>LOSS OF ANY CHANNEL WILL CAUSE UNEXPECTED TRAJECTORY.</p> <p>WORST CASE</p> <p>UNEXPECTED MOTION, INCORRECT W/C COMMANDS, UNANNUNCIATED CREW ACTION REQ.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING</p> <p>N/A</p>	QA/INSPECTIONS	<p>-----</p> <p>EEE PARTS INSPECTION IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003. EACH EEE PART IS QUALIFIED AT THE PART LEVEL TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE APPLICABLE SPECIFICATION. ALL EEE PARTS ARE 100% SCREENED AND BURNED IN, AS A MINIMUM, AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003, BY THE SUPPLIER. ADDITIONALLY, EEE PARTS ARE 100% RE-SCREENED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS, BY AN INDEPENDENT SPAR APPROVED TESTING FACILITY. DPA IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY PA.003 ON A RANDOMLY SELECTED 5% OF PARTS, MAXIMUM 5 PIECES, MINIMUM 3 PIECES FOR EACH LOT NUMBER/DATE CODE OF PARTS RECEIVED.</p> <p>WIRE IS PROCURED TO SPECIFICATION MIL-W-22759 OR MIL-W-81381 AND INSPECTED AND TESTED TO NASA JSC80060 STANDARD NUMBER 95A.</p> <p>RECEIVING INSPECTION VERIFIES THAT ALL PARTS RECEIVED ARE AS IDENTIFIED IN THE PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS, THAT NO PHYSICAL DAMAGE HAS OCCURRED TO PARTS DURING SHIPMENT, THAT THE RECEIVING DOCUMENTS PROVIDE ADEQUATE TRACEABILITY INFORMATION AND SCREENING DATA CLEARLY IDENTIFIES ACCEPTABLE PARTS.</p> <p>PARTS ARE INSPECTED THROUGHOUT MANUFACTURE AND ASSEMBLY AS APPROPRIATE TO THE MANUFACTURING STAGE COMPLETED. THESE INSPECTIONS INCLUDE:</p> <p>PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD INSPECTION FOR TRACK SEPARATION, DAMAGE AND ADEQUACY OF PLATED THROUGH HOLES.</p> <p>COMPONENT MOUNTING INSPECTION FOR CORRECT SOLDERING, WIRE LOOPING, STRAPPING, ETC. OPERATORS AND INSPECTORS ARE TRAINED AND CERTIFIED TO NASA MHB 5300.4(JA) STANDARD, AS MODIFIED BY JSC 09800A.</p> <p>CONFORMAL COATING INSPECTION FOR ADEQUATE PROCESSING IS PERFORMED USING ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT TECHNIQUES.</p> <p>POST P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, WORKMANSHIP & CLEANLINESS (MONEYWELL/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p> <p>P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, CHECK FOR CORRECT BOARD INSTALLATION, ALIGNMENT OF BOARDS, PROPER CONNECTOR CONTACT RATING, WIRE ROUTING, STRAPPING OF WIRES ETC.,</p> <p>PRE-CLOSURE INSPECTION, WORKMANSHIP AND CLEANLINESS (CAE/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p> <p>PRE-ACCEPTANCE TEST INSPECTION, WHICH INCLUDES AN AUDIT OF LOWER TIER INSPECTION COMPLETION, AS BUILT CONFIGURATION VERIFICATION TO AS DESIGN ETC., (MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT).</p> <p>A TEST READINESS REVIEW (TRR) WHICH INCLUDES VERIFICATION OF TEST PERSONNEL, TEST DOCUMENTS, TEST EQUIPMENT CALIBRATION/ VALIDATION STATUS AND HARDWARE CONFIGURATION IS CONVENED BY QUALITY ASSURANCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH ENGINEERING, RELIABILITY CONFIGURATION CONTROL, SUPPLIER AS APPLICABLE, AND THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE, PRIOR TO THE START OF ANY</p>

PREPARED BY: MEG

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SHEET: 5

P/N & REF.	REV.	NAME, QTY & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HWR / FUNC. I/I CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
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PREPARED BY: RMG

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CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

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SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
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SHEET: 6

P/N & REF.	REV.	NAME, QTY. & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HDWR / FUNC. I/I CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
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PREPARED BY: MFMC

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SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
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SHEET: 7

FREA REF.	REV.	NAME QTY & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOMR / FUNC. I/I CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
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PREPARED BY: HWG

SUPERCEDING DATE: 06 OCT 87

APPROVED BY:

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TE: _____