

NAME P/N QTY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
POROUS PLATE SUBLIMATOR, ITEM 140 ----- SV783850-24 (1)	2/1R	External leakage, ventilation circuit.	END ITEM: Suit gas leakage to ambient.	A. Design - External leakage is prevented by elastomeric 0-ring seals. The 0-ring design dimensions and rigidness of assembly provide 0-ring squeeze under all load conditions. The temperature and pressure are not extreme (32 degree F to 120 degree F and 4.3 psid).
OR ----- SV805279-5 (1)		Failure, seal bypass leakage.	GFE INTERFACE: Excessive consumption of the primary oxygen supply. The SOP is automatically activated during EVA if the suit pressure drops below 3.33 psid.	B. Test - Component Acceptance Test - During the vent loop leakage test performed per AT-E-140-2 the vent loop is pressurized to 5.6 psig with nitrogen for 60 minutes minimum. PDA Test - A vent loop external leakage is performed per SEMU-60-010. The vent loop is pressurized to 18.9-19.1 psia with oxygen and the pressure is allowed to stabilize. The external leakage must not exceed 4.66 scc/min O2. Certification Test - Certified for a useful life of 25 years (ref. EMUM1-0243, EMUM1-1269).
			MISSION: Terminate EVA. Loss of use of one EMU.	C. Inspection - 0-ring grooves are 100% inspected per drawing dimensions and surface finish. 0-rings are inspected for surface characteristics per SVHS3432; 100% for Class I and II 0-rings, and at least 1.5 AQL for Class III.
			CREW/VEHICLE: None for single failure. Possible loss of crewman with loss of SOP.	D. Failure History - J-EMU-140-A001 (8-23-82) - Leakage between sublimator and valve module which was caused by bent alignment pins causing misalignment of the sublimator to the valve module. Corrective action changed the pin material from aluminum to stainless steel and also the receptacle diameter was increased to make mating easier. H-EMU-140-D018 (7-29-86) - Excessive vent circuit leakage was observed at the vent outlet interface caused by a cut o-seal on the vent outlet test fixture. corrective action was to add a lead-in chamfer to minimize seal damage during assembly of the test fixture. also, a vent circuit leakage test was added to IPT.
			TIME TO EFFECT /ACTIONS: Seconds.	E. Ground Turnaround - Tested for non-EET processing per FEMU-R-001, Final SEMU Gas Structural and Leakage. None for EET processing.
			TIME AVAILABLE: Minutes.	F. Operational Use - Crew Response - PreEVA: Trouble shoot problem, if no success, consider EMU 3 if available. EVA: When CWS data confirms an accelerated primary O2 use rate, terminate EVA. If CWS data confirms an accelerated primary O2 use rate coupled with loss of suit pressure regulation, abort EVA.
			TIME REQUIRED: Immediate.	Training - Standard EMU training covers this failure mode.
			REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A-PASS B-PASS C-PASS	Operational Considerations - Flight rules define go/no go criteria related to EMU suit pressure regulation. Flight rules require termination of EVA upon activation of SOP. EVA checklist

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140FM09

and FDF procedures verify hardware integrity and systems operational status prior to EVA. Real Time Data System allows ground monitoring of EMU systems.

EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT
SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW
FOR THE
I-140 SUBLIMATOR
CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)

EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

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