

NAME P/N QTY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
HELMET ASSEMBLY, ITEM 105 ----- A/L 9672-03 (1)	2/2	105FM04 Loss of attachment, Fresnel Lens. Defective material or contamination.	END ITEM: Loose Fresnel Lens in helmet. GFE INTERFACE: Unable to use fresnel lens to read DCM display. MISSION: Terminate EVA. CREW/VEHICLE: None. TIME TO EFFECT /ACTIONS: Seconds. TIME AVAILABLE: N/A TIME REQUIRED: N/A REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A-N/A B-N/A C-N/A	A. Design - GFE supplied. The fresnel lens is a commercially available item. It is flexible and requires no adhesive to attach to the helmet shell. Prior to installation, that area of the helmet is cleaned with distilled or de-ionized water. B. Test - Certification - The fresnel lens was installed in the helmet and successfully passed S/AD shock, vibration and acceleration requirements (Ref. HS TER's 3067, 3048, 3043 and 3076). C. Inspection - None. D. Failure History - None. E. Ground Turnaround - The Fresnel lens is a crew option item. If required it will be inspected for non-EET processing per FEMU-R-001, Pre-Flight External visual inspection. None for EET processing. F. Operational Use - Operational Use Crew Response - Pre/post-EVA : Troubleshoot problem. Special Training - No training specifically covers this failure mode. Operational Considerations - EVA checklist procedures verify hardware integrity and systems operational status prior to EVA.

EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT
SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW
FOR THE
I-105 HELMET ASSEMBLY
CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)
EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150

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