

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS (-5 MCIU INSTALLED)
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
 ASS'Y P/N: 211406391

SHEET: 1

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT OR END ITEM	HOW / FUNC. CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: 2-PA11 , 3-PA11 , 4-PA11
1055	0	MCIU - D&C DATA INTERFACE QTY-1 SCHEMATIC ED 87305	<p>MODE: ADDRESS DECODER INPUT LINE FAILS LOW OR HIGH.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) EEE PARTS FAILURE. (2) ADDRESS BIT OF INPUT TO PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERSION CIRCUIT FAILS.</p>	<p>LOSS OF COMMUNICATION WITH D&C INTERFACE WILL INITIATE D&C COMMUNICATION FAILURE DETECTION. AUTOBRAKES. ARM COMES TO REST. GPC DOES INTO IDLE MODE. LOSS OF COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. ARE COMMUNICATION PATH REMAINS OPERABLE.</p> <p>IF D&C RESPONSE EE COMMAND BITS ARE CORRUPT: ONE OR MORE EE COMMANDS MAY FAIL ON. EE MAY BE COMMANDED AS SOON AS EE MODE SWITCH SET TO AUTO. DURING AUTO CAPTURE LIMPING IS LOST.</p> <p>FOR CAUSE 2): D&C COMMAND ADDRESS BIT FAILS TO "0" OR "1". D&C RESPONSE DATA IS CORRUPT.</p> <p>WORST CASE UNEXPECTED PAYLOAD MOTION. UNCOMMANDED END EFFECTOR AUTO RELEASE SEQUENCE. IF EE CREW ACTION REQUIRED. ANNUNCIATED.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING</p>	<p>DESIGN FEATURES</p> <p>PROCESSING OF ADDRESS DECODING IS PERFORMED USING 'A' TYPE CMOS LOGIC DEVICES. INPUT DATA IS BUFFERED BY A COMPLEMENTARY TRANSISTOR STAGE. THE CMOS LOGIC CIRCUITS ARE OF THE GENERIC TYPE SERIES "4000A". THE COMPLEMENTARY TRANSISTORS ARE 2N2222A AND 2N2907A.</p> <p>CMOS DEVICES OPERATE AT LOW POWER AND HENCE DO NOT EXPERIENCE SIGNIFICANT OPERATING STRESSES. THE TECHNOLOGY IS MATURE AND DEVICE RELIABILITY HISTORY IS WELL DOCUMENTED. ALL STRESSES, ARE ADDITIONALLY REDUCED BY DERATING THE APPROPRIATE PARAMETERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003. SPECIAL HANDLING PRECAUTIONS ARE USED AT ALL STAGES OF MANUFACTURE TO PRECLUDE DAMAGE/STRESS DUE TO ELECTROSTATIC DISCHARGE.</p> <p>DISCRETE SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES SPECIFIED TO AT LEAST THE TX LEVEL OF MIL-S-19500. ALL DEVICES ARE SUBJECTED TO RE-SCREENING BY AN INDEPENDANT TEST HOUSE. SAMPLES OF ALL PROCURED LOTS/DATE CODES ARE SUBJECTED TO DESTRUCTIVE PHYSICAL ANALYSIS (DPA) TO VERIFY THE INTEGRITY OF THE MANUFACTURING PROCESSES. DEVICE STRESS LEVELS ARE, DERATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003 AND VERIFIED BY DESIGN REVIEW.</p> <p>EEE PARTS HAVE BEEN SELECTED AND CONTROLLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPAR-RMS-PA.003. THIS DOCUMENT DEFINES THE PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS FOR MONITORING AND CONTROLLING EEE PARTS. THE REQUIREMENTS INCLUDE PARTS SELECTION TO AT LEAST "ESTABLISHED RELIABILITY" LEVELS, AND ADEQUATE DERATING OF PART STRESS LEVELS. PROCEDURES AND ACTIVITIES ARE SPECIFIED TO ENSURE AT LEAST EQUIVALENT QUALITY FOR NONSTANDARD AND IRREGULAR PARTS. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS HAS CONFIRMED NO PARTS WITH GENERICALLY HIGH FAILURE RATES. AEROSPACE DESIGN STANDARDS FOR DETAILING ELECTRONIC PARTS PACKAGING, MOUNTING AND STRUCTURAL/MECHANICAL/INTEGRITY OF ASSEMBLIES ARE APPLIED. SUCH DESIGN HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND FOUND SATISFACTORY THROUGH THE DESIGN AUDIT PROCESS, INCLUDING THE USE OF RELIABILITY MAINTAINABILITY AND SAFETY CHECKLISTS. MATERIAL SELECTION AND USAGE CONFORMS TO SPAR-SC.368 WHICH IS EQUIVALENT TO THE NASA MATERIALS USAGE REQUIREMENTS. WORST CASE ANALYSIS HAS BEEN CONDUCTED TO ENSURE THAT PERFORMANCE CAN BE MET UNDER WORST CASE TEMPERATURE AND AGING EFFECTS. EEE PARTS STRESS ANALYSIS HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND CONFIRMS THAT THE PARTS MEET THE DERATING REQUIREMENTS.</p> <p>PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD DESIGNS HAVE BEEN REVIEWED TO ENSURE ADEQUATE CIRCUIT PATH WIDTH AND SEPARATION AND TO CONFIRM APPROPRIATE DIMENSIONS OF CIRCUIT SOLDER PADS AND OF COMPONENT HOLE PROVISIONS.</p> <p>PARTS MOUNTING METHODS ARE CONTROLLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH MSFC-STD-136 AND CAE PD93489. THESE DOCUMENTS REQUIRE APPROVED-MOUNTING METHODS, STRESS RELIEF, AND COMPONENT SECURITY.</p> <p>WHERE APPLICABLE, DESIGN DRAWINGS AND DOCUMENTATION GIVE CLEAR IDENTIFICATION OF HANDLING PRECAUTIONS FOR ESD SENSITIVE PARTS.</p>	

PREPARED BY: MFWG

SUPERCEDING DATE: NONE

RMS/D&C - 181

DATE: 11 JUL 91

CIL REV: 0

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CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: RMS (-5 MCIU INSTALLED)
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
 ASS'Y P/N: 21140E301

SHEET: 2

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY. & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HWM / FUNC. CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: APP A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
1055	0	MCIU - D&C DATA INTERFACE QTT-1 SCHEMATIC ED 87305	MODE: ADDRESS DECODER INPUT LINE FAILS LOW OR HIGH. CAUSE(S): (1) EEE PARTS FAILURE. (2) ADDRESS BIT OF INPUT TO PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERSION CIRCUIT FAILS.	FFF 1) AUTOBRAKES AND (FOR SAFING THE SYSTEM) 2) DIRECT DRIVE AND BE MANUAL MODE (FOR CONTINUING OPERATIONS)	FFF EE MODE SWITCH	BOARD ASSEMBLY DRAWINGS INCLUDE THE REQUIREMENT FOR SOLDERING STANDARDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MHB 5300.4(3A) AND JSC 08800A.

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PREPARED BY: MFG

SUPERCEDING DATE: NONE

DATE: 11 JUL 91

CIL REV: 0

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS (-5 MCIU INSTALLED)
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
 ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391

SHEET: 3

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOWR / FUNC. CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: ALL A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
1055	0	MCIU - D&C DATA INTERFACE QTY: 1 SCHEMATIC ED 87305	<p>MODE: ADDRESS DECODER INPUT LINE FAILS LOW OR HIGH.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) EEE PARTS FAILURE. (2) ADDRESS BIT OF INPUT TO PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERSION CIRCUIT FAILS.</p>	<p>LOSS OF COMMUNICATION WITH D&C INTERFACE WILL INITIATE D&C COMMUNICATION FAILURE DETECTION. AUTOBRAKES. ARM COMES TO REST. GPC GOES INTO IDLE MODE. LOSS OF COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. ABE COMMUNICATION PATH REMAINS OPERABLE.</p> <p>IF D&C RESPONSE EE COMMAND BITS ARE CORRUPT: ONE OR MORE EE COMMANDS MAY FAIL ON. EE MAY BE COMMANDED AS SOON AS EE MODE SWITCH SET TO AUTO. DURING AUTO CAPTURE LIMPING IS LOST.</p> <p>FOR CAUSE 2): D&C COMMAND ADDRESS BIT FAILS TO "0" OR "1". D&C RESPONSE DATA IS CORRUPT.</p> <p>WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED PAYLOAD MOTION. UNCOMMANDED END EFFECTOR AUTO RELEASE SEQUENCE. IF EE MODE SET TO AUTO. CREW ACTION REQUIRED. ANNUNCIATED.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING -----</p>	<p>ACCEPTANCE TESTS ----- THE HARDWARE ITEM IS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING ACCEPTANCE ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING AS PART OF THE D&C PANEL.</p> <p>O VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 1</p> <p>O THERMAL: +100 DEGREES F TO +10 DEGREES F 2 CYCLES (9.5 HRS PER CYCLE)</p> <p>THE D&C PANEL ASSEMBLY IS FURTHER TESTED AS PART OF THE RMS SYSTEM (TP518 RMS STRONGBACK TEST AND TP552 FLAT FLOOR TEST) WHICH VERIFIES THE ABSENCE OF THE FAILURE MODE.</p> <p>QUALIFICATION TESTS ----- THE D&C PANEL HAS BEEN SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING QUALIFICATION TEST ENVIRONMENT:</p> <p>O VIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 1</p> <p>O SHOCK: 20G/11MS - 3 AXES (6 DIRECTION)</p> <p>O THERMAL: 130 DEGREES F TO -23 DEGREES F (12 HRS PER CYCLE) (6 CYCLES)</p> <p>O HUMIDITY: 95% (120 DEGREES F TO 82 DEGREES F CYCLE IN 16 HRS) 10 CYCLES TOTAL</p> <p>O EMC: MIL-STD-461 AS MODIFIED BY SL-E-0002 (TEST CE01, CE CE03, CS01(DC/AC), CS02, CS06, RE02 (B/N), RS02, RS03, RS04) RE02 (B/N) RS02, 03, 04)</p> <p>FLIGHT CHECKOUT ----- PORS OPS CHECKLIST (ALL VEHICLES) JSC 16987</p>	

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CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS (-5 MCIU INSTALLED)
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
 ASS'Y P/N: 511402371

SHEET: 4

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOWR / FUNC. CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE
1055	0	MCIU - D&C DATA INTERFACE QTY-1 SCHEMATIC ED 07305	<p>MODE: ADDRESS DECODER INPUT LINE FAILS LOW OR HIGH.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) EEE PARTS FAILURE. (2) ADDRESS BIT OF INPUT TO PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERSION CIRCUIT FAILS.</p>	<p>###</p> <p>1) AUTOBRAKES AND EE MODE SWITCH (FOR SAFING THE SYSTEM)</p> <p>2) DIRECT DRIVE AND EE MANUAL MODES (FOR CONTINUING OPERATIONS).</p>	<p>### 2/R</p> <p>QA/INSPECTIONS</p>	<p>SCREENS: ### A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS</p> <p>EEE PARTS INSPECTION IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003. EACH EEE PART IS QUALIFIED AT THE PART LEVEL TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE APPLICABLE SPECIFICATION. ALL EEE PARTS ARE 100% SCREENED AND BURNED IN, AS A MINIMUM, AS REQUIRED BY SPAR-RMS-PA.003, BY THE SUPPLIER. ADDITIONALLY, EEE PARTS ARE 100% RE-SCREENED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS, BY AN INDEPENDENT SPAR APPROVED TESTING FACILITY. DPA IS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED BY PA.003 ON A RANDOMLY SELECTED 5% OF PARTS, MAXIMUM 5 PIECES, MINIMUM 3 PIECES FOR EACH LOT NUMBER/DATE CODE OF PARTS RECEIVED.</p> <p>WIRE IS PROCURED TO SPECIFICATION MIL-W-22759 OR MIL-W-81381 AND INSPECTED AND TESTED TO NASA JSCM8080 STANDARD NUMBER 95A.</p> <p>RECEIVING INSPECTION VERIFIES THAT ALL PARTS RECEIVED ARE AS IDENTIFIED IN THE PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS, THAT NO PHYSICAL DAMAGE HAS OCCURRED TO PARTS DURING SHIPMENT, THAT THE RECEIVING DOCUMENTS PROVIDE ADEQUATE TRACEABILITY INFORMATION AND SCREENING DATA CLEARLY IDENTIFIES ACCEPTABLE PARTS.</p> <p>PARTS ARE INSPECTED THROUGHOUT MANUFACTURE AND ASSEMBLY AS APPROPRIATE TO THE MANUFACTURING STAGE COMPLETED. THESE INSPECTIONS INCLUDE,</p> <p>PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD INSPECTION FOR TRACK SEPARATION, DAMAGE AND ADEQUACY OF PLATED THROUGH HOLES,</p> <p>COMPONENT MOUNTING INSPECTION FOR CORRECT SOLDERING, WIRE LOOPING, STRAPPING, ETC. OPERATORS AND INSPECTORS ARE TRAINED AND CERTIFIED TO NASA NHB 5300.4(3A) STANDARD, AS MODIFIED BY JSC 08800A.</p> <p>CONFORMAL COATING INSPECTION FOR ADEQUATE PROCESSING IS PERFORMED USING ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT TECHNIQUES.</p> <p>POST P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, CLEANLINESS AND WORKMANSHIP (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p> <p>P.C. BD. INSTALLATION INSPECTION, CHECK FOR CORRECT BOARD INSTALLATION, ALIGNMENT OF BOARDS, PROPER CONNECTOR CONTACT MATING, WIRE ROUTING, STRAPPING OF WIRES ETC.,</p> <p>PRE-TEST INSPECTION OF D&C PANEL ASSY INCLUDES AN AUDIT OF LOWER TIER INSPECTION COMPLETION, AS BUILD CONFIGURATION VERIFICATION TO AS DESIGN ETC. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p> <p>A TEST READINESS REVIEW (TRR) WHICH INCLUDES VERIFICATION OF TEST PERSONNEL, TEST DOCUMENTS, TEST EQUIPMENT CALIBRATION/ VALIDATION STATUS AND HARDWARE CONFIGURATION IS CONVENED BY QUALITY ASSURANCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH ENGINEERING, RELIABILITY, CONFIGURATION CONTROL, SUPPLIER AS APPLICABLE, AND THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE, PRIOR TO THE START OF ANY FORMAL TESTING (ACCEPTANCE OR QUALIFICATION).</p> <p>ACCEPTANCE TESTING (AIP) INCLUDES AMBIENT PERFORMANCE,</p>

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PREPARED BY:

MFNG

SUPERCEDING DATE: NONE

DATE: 11 JUL 91

CIL REV: 0

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS (-5 MCIU INSTALLED)
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
 ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391

SHEET: 5

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT OR END ITEM	HDWR / FUNC. CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: A A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
1055	0	MCIU - D&C DATA INTERFACE QTY-1 SCHEMATIC ED 67305	<p>MODE: ADDRESS DECODER INPUT LINE FAILS LOW OR HIGH.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) EEE PARTS FAILURE. (2) ADDRESS BIT OF INPUT TO PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERSION CIRCUIT FAILS.</p>	<p>LOSS OF COMMUNICATION WITH D&C INTERFACE WILL INITIATE D&C COMMUNICATION FAILURE DETECTION. AUTOBRAKES. ARM COMES TO REST. GPC GOES INTO IDLE MODE. LOSS OF COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. ABE COMMUNICATION PATH REMAINS OPERABLE.</p> <p>IF D&C RESPONSE EE COMMAND BITS ARE CORRUPT: ONE OR MORE EE COMMANDS MAY FAIL ON. EE MAY BE COMMANDED AS SOON AS EE MODE SWITCH SET TO AUTO. DURING AUTO CAPTURE LIMPING IS LOST.</p> <p>FOR CAUSE 2): D&C COMMAND ADDRESS BIT FAILS TO "0" OR "1". D&C RESPONSE DATA IS CORRUPT.</p> <p>WORST CASE ----- UNEXPECTED PAYLOAD MOTION. UNCOMMANDED END EFFECTOR AUTO RELEASE SEQUENCE. IF GC MODE SET TO AUTO, CREW ACTION REQUIRED. ANNUNCIATED.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING</p>	<p>THRMAL AND VIBRATION TESTING, (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT).</p> <p>INTEGRATION OF D&C PANEL, RHC, THC AND MCIU, INSPECTIONS ARE PERFORMED AT EACH STAGE OF INTEGRATION, WHICH INCLUDES GROUNDING CHECKS, INTER CONNECT CABLE VERIFICATION, CONNECTOR INSPECTION FOR BENT OR PUSHBACK CONTACTS ETC.</p> <p>SUB-SYSTEM PERFORMANCE TESTING (ATP). INCLUDES AN AMBIENT PERFORMANCE TEST. (MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT).</p> <p>SRMS SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, THE INTEGRATION OF MECHANICAL ARM SUBASSEMBLIES AND THE FLIGHT CABIN EQUIPMENT TO FORM THE SRMS. INSPECTIONS ARE PERFORMED AT EACH PHASE OF INTEGRATION WHICH INCLUDES GROUNDING CHECKS, THRU WIRING CHECKS, WIRING ROUTING, INTERFACE CONNECTORS FOR BENT OR PUSH BACK CONTACTS ETC.</p> <p>SRMS SYSTEMS TESTING - STRONGBACK AND FLAT FLOOR AMBIENT PERFORMANCE TEST. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. - MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT)</p>	

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SUPERCEDING DATE: NONE

DATE: 11 JUL 91

CIL REV: 0

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CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS (-5 MCIU INSTALLED)
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
 ASS'Y P/N: 51160E391

SHEET: 6

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOWR / FUNC. CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: ### A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
1055	0	MCIU - D&C DATA INTERFACE QTY-1 SCHEMATIC ED 87305	<p>MODE: ADDRESS DECODER INPUT LINE FAILS LOW OR HIGH.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) EEE PARTS FAILURE. (2) ADDRESS BIT OF INPUT TO PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERSION CIRCUIT FAILS.</p>	<p>###</p> <p>1) AUTOBRAKE 1 AND EE MODE SWITCH (FOR SAFING TIME SYSTEM) 2) DIRECT DRIVE AND EE MANUAL MODE1 (FOR CONTINUING OPERATIONS)</p>	<p>### 2/R</p>	<p>FAILURE HISTORY</p> <p>-----</p> <p>THERE HAVE BEEN NO FAILURES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS FAILURE MODE ON THE SRMS PROGRAM.</p>

PREPARED BY: MFWG SUPERCEDING DATE: NONE

DATE: 11 JUL 91 CIL REV: 0

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS (-5 MCIU INSTALLED)
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
 ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391

SHEET: 7

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT OR END ITEM	HOURLY / FUNC. CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: AAA A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
1055	0	MCIU - D&C DATA INTERFACE QTY-1 SCHEMATIC ED 87305	<p>MODE: ADDRESS DECODER INPUT LINE FAILS LOW OR HIGH.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) EEE PARTS FAILURE. (2) ADDRESS BIT OF INPUT TO PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERSION CIRCUIT FAILS.</p>	<p>LOSS OF COMMUNICATION WITH D&C INTERFACE WILL INITIATE D&C COMMUNICATION FAILURE DETECTION. AUTOBRAKES. ARM COMES TO REST. GPC GOES INTO IDLE MODE. LOSS OF COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES. ABE COMMUNICATION PATH REMAINS OPERABLE.</p> <p>IF D&C RESPONSE EE COMMAND BITS ARE CORRUPT: ONE OR MORE EE COMMANDS MAY FAIL ON. EE MAY BE COMMANDED AS SOON AS EE MODE SWITCH SET TO AUTO. DURING AUTO CAPTURE LIMPING IS LOST.</p> <p>FOR CAUSE 2): D&C COMMAND ADDRESS BIT FAILS TO "0" OR "1". D&C RESPONSE DATA IS CORRUPT.</p> <p>WORST CASE UNEXPECTED PAYLOAD MOTION. UNCOMMANDED END EFFECTOR AUTO RELEASE SEQUENCE. IF EE MODE TO AUTO.</p> <p>REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING</p>	<p>OPERATIONAL EFFECTS COMPUTER SUPPORTED MODES CANNOT BE USED TO COMPLETE THE MISSION. DIRECT DRIVE AND BACKUP MODES REMAIN. IF PAYLOAD ATTACHED, THE ARM SHOULD BE MANEUVERED TO A SAFE POSITION FOR PAYLOAD RELEASE. LOSS OF NEXT REDUNDANT PATH RESULTS IN BEING ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM INABILITY TO CRADLE ARM. IF WITH SUBSEQUENT FAILURES ALL DRIVE MODES ARE LOST, THE ARM MAY BE JETTISONED. OR UNABLE TO RIGIDIZE/DERIGIDIZE. IF FAILURE OCCURS DURING RIGIDIZE SEQUENCE, THE CARRIAGE WILL NOT COMPLETELY RIGIDIZE AND ARM WILL REMAIN LIMP. IF IN AUTO MODE, OPERATOR WILL DETECT OFF NOMINAL OPERATION OF THE EE. OR ARM WILL NOT LIMP DURING CAP/RIG SEQUENCE. ARM JOINTS WILL NOT CONFORM TO PAYLOAD DURING A CAPTURE SEQUENCE. IF THERE IS ANY MISALIGNMENT WITH THE GRAPPLE FIXTURE, THE PAYLOAD WILL CHANGE ITS ATTITUDE DURING A FREE FLYING CAPTURE, OR THE ARM WILL BE PRELOADED IF THE PAYLOAD IS BERTHED. IT MAY TAKE LONGER TO COMPLETE A CAPTURE SEQUENCE.</p> <p>CREW ACTION APPLY BRAKES INSTEAD OF THE PROCEED/STOP SWITCH TO STOP THE ARM. OR THE EE MODE SWITCH SHOULD BE TURNED OFF. CREW SHOULD OBSERVE THE CAPTURE SEQUENCE AND DETERMINE THAT THE GRAPPLE FIXTURE HAS BEEN DRAWN FAR ENOUGH INTO THE EE TO PROHIBIT PAYLOAD ROTATIONS. IF THE INTERFACE DOES NOT APPEAR RIGID, ATTEMPT TO RIGIDIZE IN THE ALTERNATE MODE. IF RIGIDIZE IS UNSUCCESSFUL, ATTEMPT RELEASE USING A PRIMARY EE MODE. IF SNARES OPEN, MANEUVER THE ARM AWAY FROM THE PAYLOAD. IF SNARES DON'T OPEN, ATTEMPT TO RELEASE IN BACKUP MODE. IF SNARES OPEN, MANEUVER ARM AWAY FROM THE PAYLOAD. MANEUVER ORBITER AWAY FROM PAYLOAD. IF SNARES CANNOT BE OPENED IN ANY MODE, THEN THE ARM/PAYLOAD COMBINATION CAN BE JETTISONED. OR NONE FOR FREE FLYING CAPTURES. ENTER TEST MODE TO LIMP ARM AFTER COMPLETION OF A BERTHED PAYLOAD CAPTURE. OR REDUCE HAND CONTROLLER COMMANDS FOR MANUAL AUGMENTED MODES. FOR SINGLE MODE, THE SWITCH MAY BE TOGGLED TO ACHIEVE REDUCED RATES. FOR AUTO MODES, APPLY BRAKES IF RATE IS EXCESSIVELY HIGH.</p> <p>CREW TRAINING THE CREW WILL BE TRAINED TO ALWAYS OBSERVE WHETHER THE ARM IS RESPONDING PROPERLY TO COMMANDS. IF IT ISN'T, APPLY BRAKES. CREW TO BE TRAINED TO RECOGNIZE OFF NOMINAL OPERATION OF THE EE AND TO TURN MODE SWITCH TO OFF AFTER SPEC TIME AND MANEUVER THE ORBITER AWAY FROM A FREE FLYING PAYLOAD AT ANY TIME DURING ARM OPERATIONS. CREW SHOULD BE TRAINED TO OBTAIN MINIMUM MISALIGNMENT ERRORS PRIOR TO CAPTURE OF PAYLOAD TO KEEP PRELOAD ON ARM TO A MINIMUM. CREW WILL BE TRAINED TO SELECT EE MODE ONLY AFTER PAYLOAD IS</p>	

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CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS (-5 MCIU INSTALLED)
 ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: D&C PANEL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM
 ASS'Y P/N: 51140E30

SHEET: 8

FMEA REF.	FMEA REV.	NAME, QTY, & DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOURLY / FUNC. CRITICALITY	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE SCREENS: AAA A-PASS, B-PASS, C-PASS
1055	0	MCIU - D&C DATA INTERFACE QTY-1 SCHEMATIC ED 87305	<p>MODE: ADDRESS DECODER INPUT LINE FAILS LOW OR HIGH.</p> <p>CAUSE(S): (1) EEE PARTS FAILURE. (2) ADDRESS BIT OF INPUT TO PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERSION CIRCUIT FAILS.</p>	<p>AAA</p> <p>1) AUTOBRAKES AND EE MODE SWITCH (FOR SAVING THE SYSTEM) 2) DIRECT DRIVE AND EE MANUAL MODES (FOR CONTINUING OPERATIONS)</p>	<p>STABILIZED AND ITS RELEASE POSITION.</p> <p>MISSION CONSTRAINT</p> <p>CREW SHOULD NOT ENTER ANY AUTO MODE UNLESS THEY KNOW EXACTLY WHAT TRAJECTORY THE ARM WILL TAKE AND ENSURE THAT THERE ARE NO OBSTACLES IN THE PATH OF THE SEQUENCE. WHEN CAPTURING A FREE FLYING PAYLOAD, THE EE MUST BE FAR ENOUGH AWAY FROM STRUCTURE TO PROHIBIT CONTACT REGARDLESS OF PAYLOAD ROTATIONS. EE MODE SWITCH SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THE OFF POSITION IMMEDIATELY AFTER SPEC DRIVE TIME HAS ELAPSED. OPERATE UNDER VERNIER RATES WITHIN 10 FT OF STRUCTURE. THE OPERATOR MUST BE ABLE TO DETECT THAT THE ARM IS RESPONDING PROPERLY TO COMMANDS VIA WINDOW AND/OR CCTV VIEWS DURING ALL ARM OPERATIONS. THE OPERATOR MUST BE ABLE TO DETECT THAT THE ARM IS RESPONDING PROPERLY TO COMMANDS VIA WINDOW AND/OR CCTV VIEWS DURING ALL OPERATIONS.</p> <p>OMRSD OFFLINE</p> <p>VERIFY INPUT AND RETURN DATA BUS BY SENDING DATA TO NRU, RATE METER, AND ANNUNCIATORS, AND BY RECEIVING DATA FROM D&C PANEL SWITCHES</p> <p>OMRSD ONLINE INSTALLATION</p> <p>NONE</p> <p>OMRSD ONLINE TURNAROUND</p> <p>VERIFY ALL DISPLAYED DATA IS CORRECT VERIFY NO UNSCHEDULED CAUTION/WARNING ANNUNCIATORS</p>	

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PREPARED BY: MEWG

SUPERSEDING DATE: NONE

DATE: 11 JUL 91

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