

Critical Item: Logic Control Card**Find Number:** 75-70129 1 ea.

APR 28 1993

Criticality Category: 1S

SYSTEM	AREA	CRIT	TOTAL LRU'S
Hypergol Vapor Detection Sys	LOA	1S	1

SAA No: 09IT09-001**System/Area:** LPS/CCMS/FR1/FR2/CR3**NASA****PMN/** L72-3564-02**Part No:** NONE**Name:** RCVS III**Mfg/** Electrospace Systems Inc./**Drawing/****Part No:** 75-70129**Sheet No:** MCR7656 VOL. III 5.5.2 (REV D)

Function: This RCVS Critical Item is used in support of a critical user system. It provides connect and disconnect commands to the switch card drivers.

Critical Failure Mode/Failure Mode No: * Failure Mode - Erroneous output/09IT09-001.498

* Logic Control Card failures could result in an incorrect matrix connection which could disconnect the FEP to HIM interface resulting in loss of the data path for the critical system being monitored/controlled.

Failure Cause: Electrical/Electronic failure of LRU piece part

SYSTEM	FAILURE EFFECT	CRIT
Hypergol Vapor Detection System (LOA)	Loss of output signal will fail to provide the console operator with an input that would indicate a leak in the hypergol propellant servicing system. Loss of the capability to detect a leak during hazardous operations could result in loss of life and/or vehicle. Time to effect: Immediate. Detection method: Software detects loss of communication.	1S

Logic Control Card (Continued)

SYSTEM

FAILURE EFFECT

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CRIT

ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE

Design: The Logic Control Card was designed per the requirements of the following documents.

1. CP09IT0910: General design requirements specification for LPS/CCMS.
2. CP09IT0917: Contract end item assembly specifications for V&DA for LPS/CCMS.

These specifications support the Shuttle design and procurement philosophy procurement of hardware that is not undergoing development but to procure "off-the-shelf hardware" and to maximum extent possible parts previously qualified through proven design.

Test: Rigorous sets of acceptance tests were performed to verify performance and design requirements of the LPS/CCMS. This process occurred on each end item from "In Process Assembly" phase to "Site Acceptance". Master control procedures (MCPs) 78K-M401 and 78K-M701 were utilized for acceptance testing by MMC. Following this acceptance testing IBM performed integrated testing of each set. Test procedures KSC-LPS-IB-086, Book 3 and KSC-LPS-IB-105, Book 5 were utilized.

Hypergol Vapor Detection Sys

- OMRSD File VI Volume 1 requires a sensor functional test prior to each flow. OMI V3542 "Hypergol Vapor Detection System Operations Support (LPS)" provides an end-to-end verification of the system (LPS/HVDS).
- During loading operations, personnel are stationed on the RSS to provide visual monitor.

Inspection: LPS system integrity is continuously monitored by on-line software programs. These programs provide health and status to system operators. OMRSD File VI requires inspection, cleaning, adjustments, and verification of RCVS operation. OMI C6051.01 "RCVS Subassembly (Main) PM" and C6051.02 "RCVS Subassembly (Local) PM" satisfy these OMRSD requirement. Proper RCVS operation is verified by each user system as part of the end-to-end verification of their integrated system.

Logic Control Card (Continued)**Failure History:**

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The PRACA Data Base was used for this analyses (time frame APR. 88 to Sep. 90). There were no Problem Reports initiated on Logic Control Cards that relate to failure modes depicted on this CIL sheet. There is a total population of 5 Logic Control Cards installed in various CCMS Station Sets. In the basic SAA the timeframe of Jan. 84 to Mar. 88 was used with 0 Problem Reports identified from a total population of 5 cards installed. Operation use varies from 7 days a week, 24 hours a day to as required.

Operational Use:

- **Correcting Action:**

Troubleshooting required to isolate and replace failed unit.

- **Timeframe:**

Varies, troubleshooting required.