

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL)

SYSTEM:	ASI	FUNCTIONAL CRIT:	1
SUBSYSTEM:	Electrical Cable Trays	PHASE(S):	b
REV & DATE:	J, 12-19-97	HAZARD REF:	S.11
DCN & DATE:			
ANALYSTS:	J. Hicks/E. Howell		

FAILURE MODE: Structural Failure

FAILURE EFFECT: b) Loss of mission and vehicle/crew due to ET structural failure or debris source to Orbiter from cover.

TIME TO EFFECT: Immediate

FAILURE CAUSE(S):
 A: Improper Manufacture
 B: Failure of Attaching Hardware

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: Not Applicable

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION: Covers for fairing between RH SRB and RH vertical strut trays.

<u>FMEA ITEM</u> <u>CODE(S)</u>	<u>PART NO.</u>	<u>PART NAME</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>EFFECTIVITY</u>
4.3.95.1	80911031898-030	Cable Tray Cover	1	LWT-54 & Up
4.3.96.1	80911031898-050	Cable Tray Cover	1	LWT-54 & Up

REMARKS: The covers are grouped as the failure mode, causes and effects are the same.

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL)
CONTINUATION SHEET

SYSTEM: ASI
SUBSYSTEM: Electrical Cable Trays
FMEA ITEM CODE(S): 4.3.95.1, 4.3.96.1

REV & DATE: J, 12-19-97
DCN & DATE:

RATIONALE FOR RETENTION

DESIGN:

- A, B: The cable tray cover is machined from 2219-T62 aluminum alloy sheet stock for -030 part and 2219-T87 for -050 part. Materials selected for this part number are in accordance with MMC-ET-SE16 which assures repetitive conformance of composition and properties. Surface integrity is assured by penetrant inspection per STP2501.
- A: The covers are designed to the required yield (1.1) and ultimate (1.4) safety factors (ET Stress Report 826-2188).
- B: The attaching hardware is selected from the Approved Standard Parts List (ASPL 826-3500). The hardware is installed per STP2014 and torqued using values specified on Engineering drawings. Tensile installation loads are sufficient to provide screening for major flaws in individual fasteners.

TEST:

The Cable Tray Cover is certified. Reference MCS MMC-ET-TM08-L-S055 (LWT-54 thru 88) and MCS MMC-ET-TM08-L-S517 (LWT-89 & Up).

Vendor:

- B: Attaching fasteners are procured and tested to standard drawings 26L3 and 33L3.

INSPECTION:

Vendor Inspection-Lockheed Martin Surveillance:

- A, B: Verify materials selection and verification controls (MMC-ET-SE16, drawing 80911031898 and standard drawings 26L3 and 33L3).
- A: Inspect dimensional conformance (drawing 80911031898).
- A: Penetrant inspect part (drawing 80911031898 and STP2501 Type 1, Method A).

MAF Quality Inspection:

- B: Inspect that attaching hardware is free from damage (drawing 80911031849 and STP2014).
- A, B: Verify installation and witness torque (drawing 80911031849 and STP2014).

FAILURE HISTORY:

Current data on test failures, unexplained anomalies and other failures experienced during ground processing activity can be found in the PRACA data base.