

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL)

SYSTEM: Propulsion/Mechanical FUNCTIONAL CRIT: 1
 SUBSYSTEM: G02 Pressurization PHASE(S): b
 REV & DATE: J, 12-19-97 HAZARD REF: P.07, P.09,
 DCN & DATE: ANALYSTS: J. Kutruff/H. Claybrook S.07, S.11

FAILURE MODE: Leakage
 FAILURE EFFECT: b) Loss of mission and vehicle/crew due to fire/explosion.
 TIME TO EFFECT: Seconds
 FAILURE CAUSE(S): A: Scratched/Nicked/Misaligned
 B: Deterioration
 C: Flange Mating Surface Defects
 D: Fracture of One Flange Bolt
 REDUNDANCY SCREENS: Not Applicable
 FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION: Prevents leakage of G02 between the pressurization line joint and the Ogive Cover Plate.

<u>FMEA ITEM CODE(S)</u>	<u>PART NO.</u>	<u>PART NAME</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>EFFECTIVITY</u>
2.2.8.1	55L11-5T	Naflex Seal	1	LWT-54 & Up

REMARKS:

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL)
CONTINUATION SHEET

SYSTEM: Propulsion/Mechanical
SUBSYSTEM: G02 Pressurization
FMEA ITEM CODE(S): 2.2.8.1

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RATIONALE FOR RETENTION

DESIGN:

A-C: The Naflex seal has been used on Saturn IC, II and IVB vehicles and meets ET pressurization system operating requirements. The configuration utilizes a cantilevered deflection-loaded primary seal and a simple gasket type secondary seal. Deflection of the primary seal provides the initial contact load to accomplish sealing at the primary seal-flange interface. The secondary seal provides a barrier and means for measuring leakage across the primary seal.

Seal 55L11-5T is made from ring forged Inconel. The seal is coated with teflon to provide optimum sealing and prevent leakage attributed by flange surface finish imperfections. Tighter dimensional tolerances were imposed on 55L11 sealing surfaces to reduce rejection rate during flange joint acceptance leak test. Internal fluid pressure assists in maintaining seal joint contact under operating conditions.

A: Improper handling and installation leads only to leakage which is detected by test. If the flange joint is disassembled, seal reuse/replacement is specified and controlled by STP2012.

B: Procurement of seals is governed by material, fabrication, processing, test and inspection specifications per MMC Standard 55L11. Coating material compatibility testing is specified for oxygen service per (NHB 8060.1).

C: Flange seal leakage monitoring is accomplished by a detection port incorporated on each flanged joint. Mating surface flatness, waviness and finish are specified on engineering drawings to assure performance within the capability of the seal.

D: Flange bolts were selected from the Approved Standard Parts List (ASPL 826-3500), installed per STP2014 and torqued using values specified on engineering drawings. Procurement of fasteners is by material, fabrication, processing, test and inspection specification per MMC Standard 26L2.

TEST:

The Naflex Seal is certified. Reference HCS MMC-ET-TM08-L-P011.

Qualification: MMA conducted a study that compared the Naflex Seal performance at ET environments past usage environments experienced by the seal. The study concluded that the seal design is qualified by similarity for all ET environments.

The 55L11 was qualified by analysis and similarity to the 55L6.

MPTA Firings/Tankings: The seal has been used in a single location in the G02 pressurization subsystem with no evidence of leakage. Multiple seals have been used throughout the test program and have accumulated 62.5 minutes of firing time and 42 pressurization cycles. Leakage test prior to all static firings and after SF-12 was within acceptable limits of .67 scim helium at 6 psig. No leakage due to operation or environment was noted.

Acceptance:

MAF - (Total Installation):

A, C: Perform seal leakage rate test at each joint after seal installation (MMC-ET-TM04k)

D: Attachment bolts are procured and tested to the applicable standard drawing.

Launch Site:

A, C: Perform seal leakage test on joint at station XT852 after final reassembly to flight configuration (OMRSD File IV).

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INSPECTION:

Vendor Inspection - Lockheed Martin Surveillance:

B, D: Verify materials selection and verification controls (MMC-ET-SE16, Standard drawings 26L2 and 55L11).

MAF Quality Inspection:

A: Inspect seal surfaces for freedom of nicks, radial scratches or other imperfections during installation (drawing 80921021009).

C: Inspect sealing surface dimensions, surface flatness and finish (drawing 80911001207).

C: Inspect sealing surfaces for freedom of nicks, radial scratches or other imperfections during installation (Acceptance drawing 82620000001).

A, D: Verify installation and witness torque (drawing 80921021009).

A, C: Verify leak test ports clear prior to assembly (STP2012).

A, C: Witness seal flange leakage test (MMC-ET-TM04k).

Launch Site:

A, C: Witness seal flange leakage test on joint at station XT852 (OMRSD File IV).

FAILURE HISTORY:

Current data on test failures, unexplained anomalies and other failures experienced during ground processing activity can be found in the PRACA data base.