

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - MAIN PROP. FMEA NO 05-6J -2034 -1 REV:06/20/86

ASSEMBLY : APT LCA - 1, 2, 3 CRIT. FUNC: 1R
 P/N RI : JANTXVIN5551 CRIT. HDW: 3
 P/N VENDOR: VEHICLE 102 103 104
 QUANTITY : 12 EFFECTIVITY: X X X
 : TWELVE PHASE(S): PL LO X OO DO LS
 :

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-FAIL C-PASS
 PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY: APPROVED BY (NASA):
 DES *J Brown* J BROWN DES *R Brown* EPDC SSM *[Signature]*
 REL *F DEFENSOR* F DEFENSOR REL *J Kamura 6/27/88* MPS SSM *[Signature]*
 QE *D MASAI* D MASAI QE *G.J. Pannan 6/27/88* EPDC RED *[Signature]*
 MPS RED *[Signature]* QE *[Signature]*

ITEM:

DIODE, BLOCKING (3 AMP), GH2/GO2 FLOW CONTROL VALVE, TRANSDUCER REPLACEMENT INHIBIT SIGNAL.

FUNCTION:

DIODE ISOLATES TRANSDUCER REPLACEMENT INHIBIT SIGNALS FROM EACH OTHER. CONDUCTS REPLACEMENT INHIBIT SIGNAL TO HDC I SO THAT ONLY ONE SPARE ULLAGE PRESSURE TRANSDUCER CAN BE SELECTED.
 54V76A121J3(88), J3(89), J3(90), J3(91). 55V76A122J3(88), J3(89), J3(90), J3(91). 56V76A123J3(88), J3(89), J3(90), J3(91).

FAILURE MODE:

OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT.

CAUSE(S):

STRUCTURAL FAILURE (MECHANICAL STRESS, VIBRATION), ELECTRICAL STRESS, THERMAL STRESS, PROCESSING ANOMALY.

EFFECT(S) ON:

(A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY

(A) LOSS OF INHIBIT SIGNAL TO HDC I WHEN A TRANSDUCER REPLACEMENT COMMAND IS SELECTED.

(B,C,D) NO EFFECT - FIRST FAILURE.

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(E) CASE I: LO2/LH2 "LOW" FAILURES.

1R/3, 3 SUCCESS PATHS AFTER FIRST FAILURE.
TIME FRAME - ASCENT.

- 1) PRELAUNCH, PRIMARY ULLAGE TRANSDUCER FAILS AND IS REPLACED WITH NO. 4 TRANSDUCER.
- 2) NO. 4 TRANSDUCER FAILS WITH ERRONEOUS LOW OUTPUT.
- 3) INADVERTENT MDM REPLACE COMMAND TO PARALLEL RELAY.
- 4) ASSOCIATED BLOCKING DIODE FAILS OPEN.

FAILURES RESULT IN TWO ULLAGE PRESSURE SIGNAL CONDITIONERS DRIVEN BY FAULTY NO. 4 TRANSDUCER. RESULTS IN EXCESSIVE ULLAGE PRESSURE CAUSING ET VENT VALVE TO RELIEVE EXCESS PRESSURE. POTENTIAL FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD EXTERIOR TO THE VEHICLE. POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE ET MAXIMUM STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

CASE II: LH2 "HIGH" FAILURES.

1R/3, 3 SUCCESS PATHS AFTER FIRST FAILURE.
TIME FRAME - ASCENT.

- 1) PRELAUNCH, PRIMARY ULLAGE TRANSDUCER FAILS AND IS REPLACED WITH NO. 4 TRANSDUCER.
- 2) NO. 4 TRANSDUCER FAILS WITH ERRONEOUS HIGH OUTPUT.
- 3) INADVERTENT MDM REPLACE COMMAND TO PARALLEL RELAY.
- 4) ASSOCIATED BLOCKING DIODE FAILS OPEN.

FAILURES RESULT IN TWO ULLAGE PRESSURE SIGNAL CONDITIONERS DRIVEN BY FAULTY NO. 4 TRANSDUCER. RESULTS IN INSUFFICIENT PRESSURIZATION GAS TO MAINTAIN LH2 ULLAGE PRESSURE IN THE REQUIRED FLIGHT CONTROL BAND (32-34 PSIA). POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF TANK MINIMUM STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS AND UNCONTAINED SSME SHUTDOWN DUE TO LOW NPSP. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

CASE III: LO2 "HIGH" FAILURES.

1R/3, 3 SUCCESS PATHS AFTER FIRST FAILURE.
TIME FRAME - ASCENT.

- 1) PRELAUNCH, PRIMARY ULLAGE TRANSDUCER FAILS AND IS REPLACED WITH NO. 4 TRANSDUCER.
- 2) NO. 4 TRANSDUCER FAILS WITH ERRONEOUS HIGH OUTPUT.
- 3) INADVERTENT MDM REPLACE COMMAND TO PARALLEL RELAY.
- 4) ASSOCIATED BLOCKING DIODE FAILS OPEN.

FAILURES RESULT IN TWO ULLAGE PRESSURE SIGNAL CONDITIONERS DRIVEN BY FAULTY NO. 4 TRANSDUCER. LOSS OF ET LO2 ULLAGE PRESSURE WILL RESULT IN VIOLATION OF TANK MINIMUM STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS. MASS OF LO2 AND VEHICLE ACCELERATION SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN PROPER ENGINE NPSP, DELAYING UNCONTAINED SSME SHUTDOWN DUE TO LOW NPSP UNTIL LATE IN POWERED FLIGHT. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

FAILS B SCREEN BECAUSE NO INSTRUMENTATION IS AVAILABLE TO DETECT FAILURE.

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DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A)DESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSPECTION (D)FAILURE HISTORY (E)OPERATIONAL USE

(A-D) DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE:

REFER TO APPENDIX F, ITEM NO. 4 - DIODE, AXIAL LEAD.

(B) GROUND TURNAROUND TEST

PRESS CNTL REDUNDANCY W/ET SIM V41ACO.030C,E,G,I,K,M;
V41ACO.060C,E,G,I,K,M EVERY FLIGHT.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE

NO CREW ACTION CAN BE TAKEN FOR LOSS OF GO2 ULLAGE PRESSURE CONTROL OR FAILURES WHICH RESULT IN EXCESSIVE GH2 ULLAGE PRESSURE. THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS CAN BE TAKEN FOR LOW GH2 ULLAGE PRESSURE:

LH2 ULLAGE PRESSURE IS ON SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT (SM) ALERT. CREW WILL OPEN THE LH2 FLOW CONTROL VALVES (VIA COCKPIT SWITCH S53 ON PANEL R2) FOR A LOW LH2 ULLAGE PRESSURE CONDITION.

IF THE LH2 NPSP DROPS BELOW THE PRE-FLIGHT ACCEPTED LEVELS (PER FLIGHT RULES), THE CREW WILL MANUALLY THROTTLE THE ENGINES TO KEEP THE NPSP HIGH ENOUGH TO PREVENT LH2 TURBOPUMP CAVITATION.