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FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CRITICAL HARDWARE

NUMBER: 05-60S-2005-X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: EPD&C-DRAG CHUTE

REVISION : 1 04/23/92

	PART NAME VENDOR NAME	PART NUMBER VENDOR NUMBER
■ LRU :	DRAG CHUTE CONTROLLER ASSY	VQ70-765440
■ SRU :	CONTROLLER, HYBRID DRIVER	MC477-0261-0002

 PART DATA

- EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (HDC), TYPE I - FIRST STAGE DEPLOY FIRE 2
COMMAND DRIVER
- REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: 50V76A214AR2
: 50V76A215AR2
- QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 2
TWO, ONE PER ASSEMBLY NO. 1 & NO. 2
- FUNCTION:
UPON RECEIPT OF 28VDC SIGNAL FROM FIRE 2 COMMAND SWITCH, THE FIRST STAGE
HDC PERFORMS AS AN ENABLE TO THE SECOND STAGE DRIVER. THE FIRST STAGE
OUTPUT IS FED BACK TO MAINTAIN FIRE 2 COMMAND SIGNAL INITIATED BY
MOMENTARY PUSHBUTTON SWITCH.

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FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CRITICAL FAILURE MODE

NUMBER: 05-6DS-2005-01

REVISION# 1 04/23/92 R

SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C-DRAG CHUTE
 LRU :DRAG CHUTE CONTROLLER ASSY
 ITEM NAME: CONTROLLER, HYBRID DRIVER

CRITICALITY OF THIS
 FAILURE MODE:1R3

■ FAILURE MODE:

FAILS "ON", INADVERTENT OUTPUT

MISSION PHASE:

LO LIFT-OFF
 DO DE-ORBIT

- VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY: 102 COLUMBIA
 : 103 DISCOVERY
 : 104 ATLANTIS
 : 105 ENDEAVOUR

■ CAUSE:

PIECE PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
 PROCESSING ANOMALY, THERMAL STRESS

- CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

- REDUNDANCY SCREEN A) PASS
 ■ B) FAIL
 ■ C) PASS

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

- A)
 ■ B)
 FAILS SCREEN "B" BECAUSE HDC FAILURE CANNOT BE DETECTED INFLIGHT UNTIL
 POWER IS PROVIDED VIA FIRST STAGE FIRE 1 HDC OUTPUT SIGNAL.
 ■ C)

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

■ (A) SUBSYSTEM:

FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT

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- (B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):
FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT
- (C) MISSION:
FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT
- (D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):
FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT
- (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF DRAG CHUTE IS PREMATURELY DEPLOYED CAUSING DEGRADATION OF VEHICLE CONTROL. DURING ASCENT, PREMATURE DEPLOYMENT COULD RESULT IN DAMAGE TO ENGINE BELL RECIRCULATION LINES RESULTING IN POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. DURING LANDING, PREMATURE DEPLOYMENT AT ALTITUDES OF 40-135 FEET COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INSUFFICIENT ENERGY TO REACH THE RUNWAY. REQUIRES TWO ADDITIONAL FAILURES (ONE POLE OF THE DEPLOY SWITCH WHICH CONTROLS FIRE 1 FAILS CLOSED AND ARM HDC FAILS "ON") BEFORE EFFECT IS MANIFESTED.

- DISPOSITION RATIONALE -

- (A) DESIGN:
REFER TO APPENDIX B, ITEM NO. 1 - HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
- (B) TEST:
REFER TO APPENDIX B, ITEM NO. 1 - HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER

GROUND TURNAROUND TEST
VERIFY THAT F2 HDC DOES NOT FAIL "ON" BY VERIFYING THAT PICS DO NOT FIRE WHEN SYSTEM IS PROPERLY ARMED AND POWER IS SUPPLIED ONLY TO F1 PORTION OF THE CIRCUIT. TESTS ARE PERFORMED EVERY FLOW IF DRAG CHUTE IS INSTALLED.
- (C) INSPECTION:
REFER TO APPENDIX B, ITEM NO. 1 - HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
- (D) FAILURE HISTORY:
REFER TO APPENDIX B, ITEM NO. 1 - HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
- (E) OPERATIONAL USE:
IN THE EVENT OF PREMATURE DEPLOYMENT OF DRAG CHUTE, TIME PERMITTING, CREW WILL ARM AND JETTISON THE DRAG CHUTE. THE JETTISON WILL RELEASE THE DRAG CHUTE FROM THE ATTACH/JETTISON MECHANISM AND THEREBY PRECLUDE DEGRADATION OF VEHICLE CONTROL AND/OR STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO THE ORBITER.

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CRITICAL FAILURE MODE

NUMBER: 05-605-2005-01

- APPROVALS -

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 QUALITY ENGINEERING : W. R. HIGGINS
 NASA RELIABILITY :
 NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER :
 NASA EPO&C RELIABILITY :
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