

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL HARDWARE

NUMBER: 03-1-0417 -X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: MAIN PROPULSION

REVISION: 1 11/08/00

PART DATA

	PART NAME	PART NUMBER
	VENDOR NAME	VENDOR NUMBER
LRU	: LINE, LH2 FEED ARROWHEAD PRODUCTS	MC271-0073-0202, -0302 13532-303, -304
LRU	: LINE, LH2 FEED ARROWHEAD PRODUCTS	MC271-0073-0203, -0303 13533-303, -304
LRU	: LINE, LH2 FEED ARROWHEAD PRODUCTS	MC271-0073-0204, -0304 13534-303, -304

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:

LINE, LH2 FEED 12 INCH DIA VACUUM JACKETED. OV102: MC271-0073-020X. OV103 & SUBS: MC271-0073-030X.

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: FH8
FH9
FH10

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 3
ONE OF EACH PART NUMBER PER VEHICLE

FUNCTION:

THE 12 IN DIA LINES EXTEND FROM THE PREVALVE TO THE INDIVIDUAL SSME INLET FLANGE INTERFACE. THE LINE PROVIDES FUEL FLOW FROM THE MANIFOLD TO EACH SSME FOR ENGINE CONDITIONING AND OPERATION. THE LINE IS VACUUM JACKETED FOR INSULATION WITH PENETRATIONS FOR PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT. THE VACUUM JACKET INCORPORATES A RUPTURE DISK, EVACUATION VALVE, VACUUM GAGE, AND GETTER ASSEMBLY.

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SUBSYSTEM NAME: MAIN PROPULSION

LRU: LH2 SSME 12" FEEDLINE

ITEM NAME: LH2 SSME 12" FEEDLINE

CRITICALITY OF THIS

FAILURE MODE: 1/1

FAILURE MODE:

RUPTURE/LEAKAGE.

MISSION PHASE:

PL PRE-LAUNCH

LO LIFT-OFF

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:

102 COLUMBIA

103 DISCOVERY

104 ATLANTIS

105 ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:

FATIGUE, MATERIAL DEFECT

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN

A) N/A

B) N/A

C) N/A

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

A)

B)

C)

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

(A) SUBSYSTEM:

HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH LEAKAGE OF CRYOGENIC PROPELLANTS. DURING ENGINE OPERATION, POSSIBLE PREMATURE SHUTDOWN OF AN SSME DUE TO VIOLATION OF ENGINE INLET CONDITIONS. UPON ENGINE SHUTDOWN, THE RESPECTIVE PREVALVE WILL CLOSE, THUS ISOLATING THE LEAKAGE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CRITICAL ADJACENT COMPONENTS DUE TO CRYO EXPOSURE. POSSIBLE AFT COMPT OVERPRESS AND FIRE

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HAZARD. LEAKAGE IN THE AFT COMPT DETECTABLE DURING LOADING USING HAZARDOUS GAS DETECTION SYSTEM (HGDS).

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):
SAME AS A.

(C) MISSION:
ON GROUND, VIOLATION OF HGDS LCC WILL RESULT IN LAUNCH SCRUB.

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:
NONE.

-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

(A) DESIGN:
THE FEEDLINE ASSEMBLY IS 12-INCH DIAMETER LIQUID HYDROGEN FEEDLINE. THE PRESSURE CARRIER IS CONSTRUCTED OF INCONEL 718. TWO BALL-STRUT TIE ROD ASSEMBLIES (BSTRA) FLEXIBLE JOINTS AND A GIMBLE RING FLEXIBLE JOINT GIVE THE FEEDLINE FLEXIBILITY TO PROVIDE FOR DIFFERENTIAL MOVEMENT BETWEEN THE SSME TURBOPUMP INLET AND THE LH2 FUEL MANIFOLD THE FLEXIBLE JOINTS INCORPORATE 2 PLY BELLOWS TO MINIMIZE STRESS LEVELS AND FLOW LINERS TO ELIMINATE FLOW INDUCED VIBRATION. THE LINE IS DESIGNED FOR A MAXIMUM OPERATING PRESSURE OF 45 PSIA AT -423 DEG F AND A NOMINAL FLOW RATE OF 148 POUNDS PER SECOND. MAXIMUM STATIC PRESSURE IS 105 PSIG. THE LINE CAN WITHSTAND A PRESSURE SURGE 40 TO 50 PSIG IN 200 MILLISECONDS AND A THERMAL CHANGE FROM 200 °F TO MINUS 423 ° F. THE PROOF PRESSURE FACTOR IS 1.2 AND THE BURST PRESSURE FACTOR IS 1.5 THE USEFUL DYNAMIC LIFE IS 14.2 HOURS (EQUIVALENT TO 100 ORBITER MISSIONS). THE PRESSURE CARRIER MEETS THE FRACTURE ANALYSIS REQUIREMENT FOR 400 MISSIONS. STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS INDICATES POSITIVE (GREATER THAN 1.4) MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR ALL CONDITIONS OF LINE OPERATION. THE VACUUM JACKET WILL WITHSTAND AN IMPLOSION PRESSURE OF 22 PSI.

(B) TEST:
ATP

EXAMINATION OF PRODUCT.

VACUUM JACKET PRESSURE RISE.

PRESSURE CARRIER AND VACUUM JACKET LEAKAGE (AMBIENT).

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PRESSURE CARRIER AND VACUUM JACKET LEAKAGE (CRYO - DOES NOT INCLUDE THE END FLANGES WHICH ARE EXTERNAL TO VACUUM JACKET).

PROOF PRESSURE TEST.

OPERATIONAL TEST (CRYO).

ELEVATED AMBIENT TEMPERATURE TEST.

CERTIFICATION

THE TYPE 3 AND 4 LINES ARE CERTIFIED BY SIMILARITY TO THE TYPE 2 LINE.
THE TYPE 2 LINE WAS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING QUALIFICATION TESTS:

ENDURANCE - 2200 STRUCTURAL DEFLECTION CYCLES WHILE FILLED WITH LN2 AND PRESSURIZED AT 45 PSIG CYCLES.

PRESSURE SURGE TEST - 50 CYCLES COMPRESSED AND 50 CYCLES EXTENDED POSITION, FILLED WITH LN2 AND CYCLED FROM ZERO TO 105 TO ZERO PSIG.

VIBRATION - IN ALL THREE AXES.

SINUSOIDAL SWEEP OVER THE FREQUENCY RANGE OF 5 TO 2000 HZ.

RANDOM VIBRATION WAS MAINTAINED AT THE INLET AND OUTLET ENDS FOR 13.0 HOURS PRESSURE REDUCED TO ZERO PSIG FOR LAST 0.3 HOURS. LINE FILLED WITH LH2 AND PRESSURIZED TO 35 PSIG (RANDOM VIBRATION).

PRESSURE CARRIER IMPLOSION TEST - EXTERNALLY PRESSURIZED TO 30 PSID ACROSS THE PRESSURE CARRIER.

PRESSURE CYCLE - 1140 CYCLES, PRESSURE CYCLES VARYING IN RANGE FROM 0 TO 105 PSIG AT 30 PERCENT AND 83 PERCENT COMPRESSED POSITION.

THERMAL CYCLE - WAS QUALIFIED BY SIMILARITY TO THE 17 INCH DIA LH2 FEED LINE (REFERENCE FMEA/CIL 0415-2).

BURST PRESSURE - NO LEAKAGE OR DAMAGE AFTER 5 MINUTES AT 160 PSIG.

OMRSD

ANY TURNAROUND CHECKOUT IS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OMRSD.

(C) INSPECTION:

RECEIVING/INSPECTION

RAW MATERIALS, INCLUDING CHEMICAL AND MECHANICAL REQUIREMENTS, ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION FOR MATERIAL AND PROCESS CERTIFICATION.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

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SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS GIVEN TO HIGH STRENGTH STRUCTURAL STEELS (INCONEL 718), DURING FABRICATION, IS VERIFIED. ALL COMPONENTS ARE VISUALLY, DIMENSIONALLY, AND INCREMENTALLY INSPECTED DURING FABRICATION. SEALING SURFACES PROTECTION IS VERIFIED. MACHINING OPERATION OF FLANGE DETAIL PARTS ARE PER DRAWING AND APPLICABLE SPECIFICATION AND IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

NON DESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION
WELDS ARE FLUORESCENT PENETRANT AND RADIOGRAPHICALLY INSPECTED. MACHINED PARTS ARE FLUORESCENT PENETRANT INSPECTED.

TESTING
ATP VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

CRITICAL PROCESSES
HEAT TREATMENT VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL
PARTS PROTECTION FROM DAMAGE AND CONTAMINATION ARE VERIFIED. CLEANLINESS TO LEVEL 400 VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

HANDLING/PACKAGING
PACKAGING FOR SHIPMENT VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

(D) FAILURE HISTORY:

THE OV104 LH2 TYPE II (12 INCH) LINE HAD EXCESSIVE VACUUM PRESSURE RISE AFTER ATP ELEVATED TEMPERATURE TEST. CRACKS IN THE SEALING WELD (NON-STRUCTURAL) OF THE BALL STRUT TIE ROD ASSEMBLY BELLOWS ADAPTER WERE FOUND. SEALING WELD WAS REVISED TO REDUCE THE NUGGET SIZE AND MINIMIZE THERMAL EFFECTS. EFFECTIVITY IS FOR ALL OV104 AND SUBS LINES (REFERENCE CAR AC5228). THIS IS A ONE TIME OCCURRENCE. ALL PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT LINES HAVE PASSED ATP. THIS FAILURE IS ATP SCREENABLE.

CURRENT DATA ON TEST FAILURE, FLIGHT FAILURE, UNEXPLAINED ANOMALIES, AND OTHER FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING GROUND PROCESSING ACTIVITY CAN BE FOUND IN THE PRACA DATABASE.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE:

FLIGHT: NO CREW ACTION CAN BE TAKEN.

GROUND: GROUND OPERATIONS SAFING PROCEDURES CONTAIN SAFING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR MAJOR LEAKS IN THE HYDROGEN SYSTEM.

- APPROVALS -

S&R ENGINEERING : W.P. MUSTY : /S/ W. P. MUSTY
S&R ENGINEERING ITM : P. A. STENGER-NGUYEN : /S/ P. A. STENGER-NGUYEN

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DESIGN ENGINEERING	: EARL HIRAKAWA	: /S/ EARL HIRAKAWA
MPS SUBSYSTEM MGR.	: TIM REITH	: /S/ TIM REITH
MOD	: BILL LANE	: /S/ BILL LANE
USA SAM	: MIKE SNYDER	: /S/ MIKE SNYDER
USA ORBITER ELEMENT	: SUZANNE LITTLE	: /S/ SUZANNE LITTLE
NASA SR&QA	: ERICH BASS	: /S/ ERICH BASS