

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) – CRITICAL HARDWARE
NUMBER: 03-1-0407-X**

SUBSYSTEM NAME: MAIN PROPULSION

REVISION: 1 5/11/94

	PART NAME VENDOR NAME	PART NUMBER VENDOR NUMBER
LRU	: DISCONNECT, LH2, 17 INCH	MC284-0389-0451 (ORB HALF)
LRU	: DISCONNECT, LH2, 17 INCH	MC284-0389-1451 (ORB HALF)
LRU	: DISCONNECT, LH2, 17 INCH	MC284-0389-0452 (ET HALF)

PART DATA

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:
DISCONNECT, LH2 FEED, 17 INCH, ORBITER & ET HALF. (PD2)

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 1
ONE

FUNCTION:

ET/ORBITER FEED LINE DISCONNECT PROVIDES LH2 PROPELLANT TO THE MPS AND A MEANS OF LOADING AND DETANKING THE ET. EACH DISCONNECT HALF CONTAINS A PNEUMATICALLY ACTUATED FLAPPER CLOSURE DEVICE WHICH REMAINS IN ITS LAST ACTUATED POSITION (BISTABLE). THE VALVES ARE CLOSED AFTER MECO TO PREVENT PROPULSIVE VENTING LEADING TO ET/ORBITER RECONTACT, TILE/DOOR DAMAGE DUE TO EXPOSURE TO PROPELLANTS, LOSS OF HELIUM SUPPLY DURING MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION (RTLS/TAL ABORT CRITICAL), AND SYSTEM CONTAMINATION DURING ENTRY. DURING UMBILICAL SEPARATION, THE VALVE SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO MECHANICALLY CLOSE BOTH THE ORBITER AND ET DISCONNECT FLAPPERS IF UNABLE TO CLOSE THEM PNEUMATICALLY (POST MECO). REDUNDANT OPEN AND CLOSE (TWO EACH) VALVE POSITION SWITCHES ARE LOCATED ON THE ORBITER HALF OF THE DISCONNECT. THE FLAPPER DRIVE MECHANISM IS DESIGNED TO ALLOW RELIEF OF PROPELLANTS TRAPPED BETWEEN THE FLAPPERS AFTER DISCONNECT CLOSURE.

A PNEUMATICALLY ACTUATED LATCH MECHANISM IS PROVIDED TO PREVENT THE VALVE FLAPPERS FROM CLOSING DURING FLOW CONDITIONS. THE LATCH IS BISTABLE AND IS CONTROLLED BY A SEPARATE PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY WITH REDUNDANT LOCK AND UNLOCK (TWO EACH) POSITION SWITCHES. LATCH MECHANISM INCORPORATES A TOGGLE PIVOT WHICH ALLOWS FLAPPER CLOSURE DURING BACK UP MECHANICAL SEPARATION WITH LATCH IN LOCKED POSITION. SEE LATCH FMEA/CIL 0454 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : MAIN PROPULSION FMEA NO: 03-1 -0407 -11 REV:12/17/87

ASSEMBLY :
P/N RI : MC284-0389-KXXX CRIT. FUNC: 1
ORB HALF 0451 CRIT. HDW: 1
ET HALF 0452

P/N VENDOR:
QUANTITY : 1 VEHICLE 102 103 104
EFFECTIVITY: X X X
PHASE(S): PL X LO X CO CO LS

PREPARED BY: DES J E OSLUND
REL L H FINEBERG
QE E M GUTIERREZ

REUNDANCY SCREEN: A- B- C-
APPROVED BY: DES [Signature]
REL [Signature]
QE [Signature]

APPROVED BY (NASA):
SSM [Signature]
REL [Signature]
QE [Signature]

1-27-88

ITEM: DISCONNECT, LH2 FEED (WITH LATCH) 17 INCH, ORBITER & ET HALF. (PD2)

FUNCTION:
ET/ORBITER FEED LINE DISCONNECT PROVIDES LH2 PROPELLANT TO THE MPS AND A MEANS OF LOADING AND DETANKING THE ET. EACH DISCONNECT HALF CONTAINS A PNEUMATICALLY ACTUATED FLAPPER CLOSURE DEVICE WHICH REMAINS IN ITS LAST ACTUATED POSITION (BISTABLE). THE VALVES ARE CLOSED AFTER MECO TO PREVENT PROPULSIVE VENTING LEADING TO ET/ORBITER RECONTACT, TILE/DOOR DAMAGE DUE TO EXPOSURE TO PROPELLANTS, LOSS OF HELIUM SUPPLY DURING MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION (RTLS/TAL ABORT CRITICAL), AND SYSTEM CONTAMINATION DURING ENTRY. DURING UMBILICAL SEPARATION, THE VALVE SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO MECHANICALLY CLOSE BOTH THE ORBITER AND ET DISCONNECT FLAPPERS IF UNABLE TO CLOSE THEM PNEUMATICALLY (POST MECO). REDUNDANT OPEN AND CLOSE (TWO EACH) VALVE POSITION SWITCHES ARE LOCATED ON THE ORBITER HALF OF THE DISCONNECT. THE FLAPPER DRIVE MECHANISM IS DESIGNED TO ALLOW RELIEF OF PROPELLANTS TRAPPED BETWEEN THE FLAPPERS AFTER DISCONNECT CLOSURE.

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FAILURE MODE
RUPTURE/LEARAGE OF VALVE BODY

CAUSE(S)
FATIGUE, MATERIAL DEFECTS, DAMAGED AND/OR DEFECTIVE SHAFT/BODY SEALS

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : MAIN PROPULSION

FMEA NO: 03-1 -0407 -11 REV:12/17/87

EFFECT(S): ON

(A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSION (D)CREW/VEHICLE:

(A,B) LH2 LEAKAGE INBOARD, OVERBOARD, AND INTO UMBILICAL AREA. FOR GROSS LEAKAGE, SHUTDOWN OF ALL THREE ENGINES WITH UNCONTAINED DAMAGE DUE TO STARVATION CUTOFF. LOSS OF CRITICAL ADJACENT COMPONENTS DUE TO CRYO EXPOSURE. POSSIBLE AFT COMPARTMENT OVERPRESSURIZATION AND FIRE/EXPLOSIVE HAZARD. POSSIBLE TILE AND DOOR DAMAGE AT THE UMBILICAL AREA DUE TO CRYO EXPOSURE AND ORBITER/ET RECONTACT DUE TO PROPULSIVE VENTING FOLLOWING ET STRUCTURAL SEPARATION. LEAKAGE INTO THE AFT COMPARTMENT IS DETECTABLE DURING LOADING USING HAZARDOUS GAS DETECTION SYSTEM (HGDS).

(C)ON GROUND, VIOLATION OF HGDS LCC WILL RESULT IN LAUNCH SCREW.

(D) POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A)DESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSPECTION (D)FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE:

(A) DESIGN

DESIGN FACTORS OF SAFETY ARE 1.3 PROOF, 1.5 BURST FOR THE DISCONNECT VALVE. THE MATED ORBITER AND EXTERNAL TANK DISCONNECTS ARE DESIGNED TO BURST PRESSURE OF 450 PSIG WITH THE FLAPPERS OPEN. THE ORBITER DISCONNECT ASSEMBLY IS DESIGNED FOR 2500 CYCLES AT AMBIENT AND 1000 CYCLES AT CRYOGENIC TEMPERATURES. THE EXTERNAL TANK DISCONNECT ASSEMBLY IS DESIGNED FOR 100 CYCLES AT AMBIENT AND 50 CYCLES AT CRYOGENIC TEMPERATURES. STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS INDICATES POSITIVE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR ALL CONDITIONS OF VALVE OPERATION; FRACTURE/FATIGUE ANALYSIS SHOW THAT ALL CRITICAL PARTS ARE SATISFACTORY FOR FOUR TIMES EXPECTED LIFE (3 - ONE MISSION, ORBITER - 100 MISSIONS).

POTENTIAL DISCONNECT LEAK PATHS ARE:

ORB AND ET BODY ASSEMBLY/FOLLOWER ARM CAP ASSEMBLY INTERFACE
ORB BODY ASSEMBLY/DRIVE SHAFT (INPUT) ASSEMBLY INTERFACE
ORB BODY ASSEMBLY/LATCH MECHANISM INTERFACE
ORB BODY ASSEMBLY/PLUG INTERFACE
ET BODY ASSEMBLY/DRIVE SHAFT (INPUT/OUTPUT) ASSEMBLY INTERFACE

THE DISCONNECT BODY IS OF 2219 AL ALLOY, ANODIZED. THE ORBITER AND ET BODY ASSEMBLY/FOLLOWER ARM CAP ASSEMBLY INTERFACE SEALS ARE TEFLON (FEP) JACKETED WITH AN INCONEL 718 SPRING. THE ORBITER BODY ASSEMBLY/LATCH MECHANISM HAS REDUNDANT INTERFACE SEALS (KEL-F JACKETED WITH AN ELGILOY SPRING). THE ORBITER BODY ASSEMBLY PLUG INTERFACE USES A METALLIC BOSS SEAL FABRICATED FROM A286 CRES COATED WITH NICKEL-LEAD ALLOY. ALL OTHER INTERFACE SEALS ARE TEFLON (TFE) JACKETED WITH AN INCONEL 718 SPRING.

(B) TEST

ATP (ACTUATOR)

PROOF: AMBIENT, 1275 PSIG

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : MAIN PROPULSION

FMEA NO: 03-1 -0407 -11 REV:12/17/87

OPERATIONAL (TWO CYCLES): AMBIENT: 400, 740, 780 PSIG

RESPONSE TIME (OPENING/CLOSING): ROOM AMBIENT/-300 DEG F
RESPONSE TIME AT 400, 700 AND 780 PSIG

LEAKAGE: EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL, AMBIENT AND CRYO

ATP - ET/ORBITER MATED DISCONNECT ASSEMBLY

FLAPPER ANGLE: ET 0.75 +/- 0.25 DEG, ORB 2.4 +/- 0.25 DEG

TIP LOAD: ET 55 LB MINIMUM, ORB 40 LB MINIMUM

POSITION SWITCH VERIFICATION: LATCH IN LOCKED POSITION. ROTATION FROM
FLAPPER POSITION OF REST ON DOWNSTRIKE SURFACE TO FLAPPER POSITION
WHERE OPEN INDICATOR LIGHT TURNS ON MUST BE 4 DEG, MINIMUM.

PROOF: AMBIENT, 1275 PSIG, ACTUATOR
286 PSIG FOR ORBITER CLOSURE DEVICE
98 PSIG FOR ET CLOSURE DEVICE

OPERATIONAL CYCLE: CRYO, -300 DEG F, ACTUATOR PRESSURE 740 PSIG FOR 2
CYCLES AND 450 PSIG FOR 5 CYCLES
AMBIENT, He AT 400 PSIG (1 CYCLE) AND 740 PSIG (3
CYCLES)

OPERATING TORQUE: ET LH2 SECTION, -410 DEG F FOR 3.5 HOURS MINIMUM,
150 FT-LBS MAX

CLEANLINESS VERIFICATION: MOISTURE FREE AND CLEANED TO LEVEL 400A OF
MA 0110-301

LEAKAGE: EXTERNAL

VALVE: LN2/AMBIENT TEMPS: 50 SCIMS OF GHE AT 10 PSIG, 50
SCIMS OF GHE AT 50 PSIG; LATCH SHAFT SEAL, 80 SCIMS OF
GHE

LH2 TEMPS: 200 SCIMS OF GH2 AT 50 PSIG; LATCH
SHAFT SEAL 80 SCIMS OF GH2

VALVE ACTUATOR:

CRYO (BODY TEMP AT -300 DEG F, ACTUATOR AT -200 TO
0 DEG F)/AMBIENT TEMPS; 100 SCIMS OF GHE AT 740 PSIG

INTERNAL

VALVE: AMBIENT TEMPS: 1000 TO 2500 SCIMS OF GHE AT 1 TO
60 PSIG

LN2 TEMPS: 2500 SCIMS OF GHE AT 60 PSIG

VALVE ACTUATOR:

CRYO (BODY TEMP AT -300 DEG F, ACTUATOR AT -200 TO
0 DEG F)/AMBIENT TEMPS: 100 SCIMS OF GHE AT 740 PSIG

RELIEF OPERATION: -300 DEG F, CRACKING/RESEAT PRESSURE, 0.1-5 PSID (ET
ONLY)

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : MAIN PROPULSION

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ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS (INSULATION RESISTANCE AND VOLTAGE DROP), AND DIELECTRIC STRENGTH

FLOW LINER - ROUNDNESS VERIFICATION (FREE END EIGHT POINTS MEASUREMENT)

OPERATING TORQUE: ET LH2 SECTION SHALL BE MANUALLY ACTUATED (OPEN/CLOSED) AFTER BEING STABILIZED AT -410 DEG F. TORQUE SHALL NOT EXCEED 150 FT LBS.

CERTIFICATION

COMPONENT QUALIFICATION (INCLUDES TESTING FROM PREVIOUS CONFIGURATION WITHOUT LATCH)

SALT FOG

VIBRATION - THREE AXES:

SINUSOIDAL: 5 TO 35 HZ AT 0.25 G, ZERO TO PEAK

RANDOM: 20 TO 2,000 HZ 5.7 G RMS FOR X-AXIS, 5.2 G RMS FOR Y AND Z-AXIS, NO FLOW (LN2), FLAPPERS OPEN, LATCH ENGAGED

THE DISCONNECT IS CHILLED WITH LN2 AND STABILIZED AT -300 DEG F. 10 PSIG DISCONNECT, 740 PSIG ACTUATOR. THESE CONDITIONS ARE MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT SINUSOIDAL AND RANDOM VIBRATION. ACTUATOR VENTED DURING LAST 1 MINUTES OF VIBRATION.

THERMAL CYCLE: -400 TO 150 DEG F, 3 CYCLES

OPERATING LIFE: AMBIENT, 740 PSIG HE FOR A TOTAL OF 2,400 CYCLES FOR ORBITER AND 100 CYCLES FOR ET. THE RELIEF MECHANISM WAS CYCLED DURING ET VALVE CYCLING.

CRYO, 740 PSIG HE, -400 DEG F FOR A TOTAL OF 1000 CYCLES FOR ORBITER AND 50 CYCLES FOR THE ET. THE RELIEF MECHANISM WAS CYCLED DURING ET VALVE CYCLING.

ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS (INSULATION RESISTANCE AND VOLTAGE DROP)

LEAKAGE: EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL, AMBIENT AND CRYO

ENGAGE - DISENGAGE: ENGAGE FORCE = 1000 LBS MAX, DISENGAGE FORCE = 6000 LBS MAX

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

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BURST TEST: PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR. 1700 PSIG HYDROSTATIC PRESSURE FOR
2 MINUTES

TYPE I AND TYPE II MATED (OPEN POSITION) 450 PSIG HYDROSTATIC
PRESSURE FOR 2 MINUTES

TYPE I AND TYPE II DEMATED (CLOSED POSITION) 330 PSIG TO
TYPE I, 68 PSIG TO TYPE II FOR 2 MINUTES

UMBILICAL SEPARATION TEST: (WITHOUT LATCH)

THE DISCONNECT WAS INSTALLED IN THE UMBILICAL ASSEMBLY DURING THE
SEPARATION TEST PROGRAM. THE UMBILICAL ASSEMBLY WAS SUBJECTED TO RANDOM
VIBRATION TESTS (4.4 HOURS PER AXIS) WHILE FILLED WITH LN2. THE
DISCONNECT WAS ALSO SUBJECTED TO UMBILICAL RETRACT TESTS AT BOTH NOMINAL
CONDITIONS AND SIMULATED HYDRAULIC RETRACT ACTUATOR FAILURES.

UMBILICAL SEPARATION TEST: (WITH LATCH)

FLAPPER PNEUMATICS/LATCH PNEUMATICS/PYRCS/RETRACTOR HYDRAULICS

- (1) PNEUMATIC CLOSURE (NORMAL) - 4 CYCLES
- (2) MECHANICAL CLOSURE (BACKUP) - 5 CYCLES

BOTH PERFORMED AT AMBIENT, LN2 AND LH2 CONDITIONS.

FLOW LINER WATER FLOW TESTS: (LH2 VALVE QUALIFIED BY SIMILARITY TO LO2)

DESIGN FLOW TO 13,100 GPM
ALLOWABLE DELTA P IS 10 PSID AT THE LINER

TO DETERMINE THE STABILITY OF THE FLOW LINER. THE FLOW TUBE HAD NO
PERMANENT DAMAGE AFTER BEING SUBJECTED TO WATER FLOWS UP TO 20,000 GPM
(TEST TIME OF 2 MINUTES / 6 RUNS MINIMUM). AFTER VERIFYING
PERFORMANCE AT 20,000 GPM, THE UNIT WAS SUBJECTED TO 22,700 GPM TO
VERIFY DESIGN MARGIN (NO PERMANENT DAMAGE).

FLAPPER ANGLE STABILITY MARGIN WATER FLOW TESTS:

ELEVEN (11) EXPLORATORY TEST SERIES (FLOW 4,000 TO 14,200 GPM)
E.T. FLAPPER SETTING VARYING FROM -3.9 TO 2.5 DEG.
ORB. FLAPPER SETTING VARYING FROM -0.9 TO 4.6 DEG.

CERTIFICATION TEST RUN AT WORST CASE PRODUCTION SETTING (FLOW RANGE
TO 109% POWER LEVEL).

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

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PRODUCTION ANGLE SETTINGS
E.T. 0.75 +/- 0.25 DEG
ORB. 2.4 +/- 0.25 DEG

FLAPPER TIP LOAD MARGIN WATER FLOW TEST:

SEVEN (7) EXPLORATORY TEST SERIES (FLOW RANGE TO 109% POWER LEVEL)

FLOW 4,000 TO 13,100 GPM
ORBITER: 2.4 +/- 0.1 DEG
TIP LOAD RANGE: 22 TO 60 LBS

ET: 0.75 +/- 0.1 DEG
TIP LOAD RANGE: 20 TO 61 LBS

RECOMMENDED TIP LOAD:

ORBITER: 40 LBS MINIMUM
ET: 55 LBS MINIMUM

LATCH WATER FLOW TESTS:

ELEVEN (11) EXPLORATORY TEST SERIES (FLOW 4,000 TO 14,900 GPM)

CERTIFICATION TEST RUN AT NOMINAL PRODUCTION SETTING (FLOW RANGE TO 109% POWER LEVEL).

TWO PROOF TESTS: 15,650 GPM AND 15,850 GPM

FILL FLOW DIRECTION: SIMILARITY TO LO2 FILL FLOW TEST

LATCH CRYO FLOW TESTS: (LH2 VALVE QUALIFIED BY SIMILARITY TO LO2)

SIXTEEN (16) TESTS WITH LN2/LO2 (FLOWS VARY FROM ONE ENGINE AT 65% TO THREE AT 109%).

OMRSD

V41AYO.020 LH2 EXTERNAL LEAK CHECKS (15)
V41AYO.140 LH2 DECAY TEST (EVERY FLT)
V41AYO.221 HELIUM SIGNATURE TEST (EVERY FLT)
V41AYO.250 LH2 SHAFT SEAL LEAK CHECK (15)
V41BUO.330 MPS COMPONENT CAVITY INSPECTION (EVERY FLT)
V41BVO.030 ORB/ET UMBILICAL DISC AND SEAL INSPECTION (EVERY FLT)
T41QAL.090 LO2/LH2 17" DISC INSPECTION (EVERY FLT)
S00000.080 LH2 ORB/ET I/F LEAK CHECKS (EVERY FLT)
S00HCO.400 VERIFY ET/ORB DISC POSITIONS (PRIOR TO MATING) (EVERY FLT)

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

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(C) INSPECTION

RECEIVING INSPECTION

RAW MATERIALS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION FOR MATERIAL AND PROCESS CERTIFICATION. ALL MACHINED ITEMS ARE DIMENSIONALLY INSPECTED AND VERIFIED (MIL-STD-105). CHEMICAL/MECHANICAL PROPERTIES AND RECORDS OF RECEIVED MATERIALS ARE RETAINED FOR VERIFICATION. BODY FORGING IS ULTRASONICALLY AND DYE PENETRANT INSPECTED.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL

CLEANLINESS LEVEL TO 400A VIA FREON FLUSH AND SAMPLE VERIFIED. ALL SEAL GROOVES ARE INSPECTED FOR CLEANLINESS AND EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

THREADED INSERTS AND CRITICAL DIMENSIONS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. SEALING SURFACES ARE VISUALLY INSPECTED FOR DEFECTS. REPAIRED AND REWORKED ITEMS ARE DIMENSIONALLY CHECKED. LOG OF CLEAN ROOM VERIFIED. ALL ENGINEERING-DEFINED FEATURES AND SURFACE FINISHES AND TORQUE REQUIREMENTS ARE COMPLETELY INSPECTED AND VERIFIED.

THE PRIMARY INTERFACE SEAL IS CHECKED FOR ID, OD AND ROUNDNESS. ALL DIMENSIONS DEFINED IN DRAWING ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

CRITICAL PROCESSES

HEAT TREATMENT AND PART PASSIVATION ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

NON-DESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION

PARTS ARE RADIOGRAPHICALLY AND DYE PENETRANT INSPECTED AS IMPOSED BY ENGINEERING IN THE DRAWING REQUIREMENTS.

TESTING

ATP AND TEST MEASUREMENT EQUIPMENT CALIBRATION VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

HANDLING/PACKAGING

PACKAGING FOR SHIPMENT VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

(D) FAILURE HISTORY

SHAFT SEAL LEAKAGE OCCURRED WHEN THE SHAFT SEALS WERE REUSED (REFERENCE CAR'S AC9394, AC9301, AC9717 AND AC9300). THIS SERIES OF PROBLEMS OCCURRED WHEN THERE WAS A SHORTAGE OF PARTS. REUSE OF SHAFT SEALS IS NOT PERMITTED. NO FURTHER INCIDENTS HAVE OCCURRED.

FOUR CASES OF ATP LEAKAGE OF THE DRIVESHAFT SEALS OCCURRED DUE TO THE POOR QUALITY OF THE SEALS (REFERENCE CARS AC3105, AC3909, AC3914, AND AC4145). THE POOR QUALITY WAS ATTRIBUTED TO A CHANGE IN SEAL SUPPLIER. THE QUALITY PROBLEMS WERE RESOLVED WITH THE SUPPLIER. NONE OF THE SEALS WERE IN ANY DELIVERED DISCONNECTS.

DURING ASSEMBLY AND ATP SEVERAL INCIDENTS OF MISHANDLED SEALS HAVE CAUSED LEAKS (REFERENCE CARS A6919 AND AC9393). TECHNICIANS WERE INSTRUCTED TO EXERCISE ADDITIONAL CARE IN HANDLING/ASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION OF DISCONNECT SEALS.

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AN INCORRECT MAIN DRIVE SHAFT SEAL RETAINER WAS INSTALLED (REFERENCE CAR A7440). INCORRECT PLANNING DOCUMENT WAS THE CAUSE. ENGINEERING PUBLISHED AN UP-TO-DATE CONFIGURATION LIST SHOWING CORRECT REVISION LETTERS FOR ALL DETAIL PARTS TO ASSIST THE PLANNING FUNCTION.

A DESIGN CHANGE TO PREVENT EXCESS LEAKAGE WAS INCORPORATED TO UPGRADE THE ET SHAFT SEAL APPLICATION BY USING THE SAME UNITS AS USED IN THE ORBITER UNIT (REFERENCE CAR A5133).

ONE UNIT (REFERENCE CAR AD3440) WAS SLIGHTLY OUT OF SPECIFICATION (2099 SCIM VERSUS 2000 SCIM ALLOWABLE @ 2 PSIG). WAIVER SDO7815 WAS INITIATED AND THE UNIT WAS ACCEPTED.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE

FLIGHT: NO CREW ACTION CAN BE TAKEN.

GROUND: OMI S1004 SEQUENCE TITLED "EMERGENCY PROCEDURE FOR MAJOR LEAK OR FIRE IN THE ORBITER AFT FUSELAGE" CONTAINS SAFING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR MAJOR LEAKS IN THE HYDROGEN SYSTEM.