

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL HARDWARE

NUMBER: 03-1-0263 -X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: MAIN PROPULSION

REVISION: 2 08/08/00

PART DATA

	PART NAME	PART NUMBER
	VENDOR NAME	VENDOR NUMBER
LRU	:LH2, LO2 3- WAY SOLENOID VALVE SOLENOID, TYPE 2 UNITED SPACE ALLIANCE - NSLD	MC284-0404-0032, -0042 13111-5, -6

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:

THREE-WAY SOLENOID VALVE, NORMALLY CLOSED, 1/4 INCH. LH2, LO2 FEED DISCONNECT LATCH CONTROL (LOCK).

VALVE WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED AND MANUFACTURED BY WRIGHT COMPONENTS (NOW PERKIN ELMER) BUT IS NOW MANUFACTURED BY UNITED SPACE ALLIANCE-NSLD AS AN ALTERNATE PRODUCTION AGENCY.

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: LV65
LV67

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 2
ONE EACH LH2, LO2

FUNCTION:

CONTROLS PNEUMATIC PRESSURE TO LOCK THE 17-INCH FEED DISCONNECT LATCH, PREVENTING INADVERTENT FLAPPER CLOSURE BY A MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE. THE UNLOCKING SOLENOIDS (LV66, LV68) (REFERENCE FMEA/CIL 03-1-0264) MUST DEACTUATE TO ALLOW THE LATCH TO LOCK. THE LOCK SOLENOIDS MUST DEACTUATE TO ALLOW THE LATCH ACTUATOR TO VENT WHEN THE LATCH IS COMMANDED TO UNLOCK.

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LRU: LH2, LO2 17" DISC LATCH LOCK SOL (LV65, 67)

CRITICALITY OF THIS

ITEM NAME: LH2, LO2 17" DISC LATCH LOCK SOL (LV65, 67)

FAILURE MODE: 1R2

FAILURE MODE:

FAILS TO DEACTUATE (LATCH FAILS TO UNLOCK, REFERENCE FMEA/CIL 03-1-0454-03).

FAILS TO PROVIDE VENT TO UNLOCK LATCH FOR ET SEPARATION.

MISSION PHASE:

PL PRE-LAUNCH

LO LIFT-OFF

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:

102 COLUMBIA

103 DISCOVERY

104 ATLANTIS

105 ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:

PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, BINDING, VENT CHECK VALVE FAILS TO OPEN,

ACTIONATION PORT FILTER CLOGGING

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN

A) PASS

B) PASS

C) PASS

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

A)

B)

PASSES SCREEN B BECAUSE THE LATCH FAILURE TO UNLOCK IS DETECTABLE USING THE LATCH POSITION INDICATORS.

C)

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

(A) SUBSYSTEM:

THE 17-INCH DISCONNECT VALVE WILL NOT BE CLOSED PNEUMATICALLY. VEHICLE SOFTWARE WILL NOT COMMAND THE DISCONNECT CLOSED IF THE LATCH IS NOT

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UNLOCKED. DISCONNECT VALVE WILL AUTOMATICALLY BE CLOSED (MECHANICALLY) DURING THE UMBILICAL RETRACT.

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):

SAME AS A.

(C) MISSION:

NO EFFECT.

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):

SAME AS C.

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:

CASE 1:

1R/2 2 SUCCESS PATHS. TIME FRAME - POST MECO

- 1) DISCONNECT LATCH LOCKING SOLENOID (LV65, 67) FAILS TO DEACTUATE.
- 2) MECHANICAL CLOSURE SEPARATION DEVICE FAILS TO CLOSE VALVE. (ET OR ORB FORK STRUCTURAL FAILURE)

VEHICLE SOFTWARE WILL INHIBIT ET STRUCTURAL SEPARATION SINCE BOTH DISCONNECT CLOSED SWITCHES WILL PROPERLY INDICATE ORBITER FLAPPER FAILURE TO CLOSE. FOR NOMINAL, ATO, AND AOA MISSIONS ET SEPARATION IS DELAYED FOR SIX MINUTES TO VENT RESIDUAL PROPELLANT THROUGH FAILED DISCONNECT. THIS IS TO PREVENT ORB/ET RECONTACT DUE TO PROPULSIVE VENTING AT SEPARATION. POSSIBLE TILE AND DOOR DAMAGE AT THE ORB/ET UMBILICAL AREA DUE TO CRYO EXPOSURE. FOR RTLS, TAL, AND MISSIONS WHERE OMS BURN CANNOT BE DELAYED ET STRUCTURAL SEPARATION IS INITIATED IMMEDIATELY AND ET/ORB RECONTACT IS LIKELY. ALSO RESULTS IN LOSS OF HELIUM SUPPLY DURING MANIFOLD REPRESS CAUSING POSSIBLE LOSS OF CRITICAL AFT COMPARTMENT ENTRY PURGE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

CASE 2:

1R/2 2 SUCCESS PATHS. TIME FRAME - POST MECO

- 1) DISCONNECT LATCH LOCKING SOLENOID (LV65, 67) FAILS TO DEACTUATE.
- 2) LATCH TOGGLE FAILS TO ROTATE/PIVOT.

POSSIBLE FAILURE TO CLOSE FLAPPERS DURING BACKUP MODE UMBILICAL SEPARATION DUE TO MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE BETWEEN ORBITER FLAPPER FORK AND ET ROLLER ARM ASSEMBLY. FAILURE TO SEPARATE ET FROM ORBITER. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

CASE 3:

1R/2 2 SUCCESS PATHS. TIME FRAME - LOADING/PRELAUNCH.

- 1) FIRE/LEAKAGE REQUIRING ISOLATION OF EXTERNAL TANK AND PROPELLANTS BY CLOSING THE 17" DISCONNECT.
- 2) DISCONNECT LATCH LOCKING SOLENOID (LV65, 67) FAILS TO DEACTUATE.

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RESULTS IN A FAILURE TO ISOLATE THE PROPELLANTS FROM FIRE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

(A) DESIGN:

VALVE IS DESIGNED FOR A PRESSURE FACTOR OF SAFETY OF 2.0 PROOF, 4.0 BURST. THE CLOSURE DEVICE IS A 430 CRES BALL ACTING UPON EITHER OF TWO VESPEL SEATS. THE VALVE FEATURES A BALANCED LOAD ON THE BALL BY APPLYING INLET PRESSURE (750 PSIG NOMINAL) DIRECTLY TO THE BALL AT THE INLET SEAT AND INDIRECTLY (VIA A BELLOWS) THROUGH THE VENT SEAT. THE BELLOWS IS ASSISTED BY A SPRING, THE FORCE OF WHICH INSURES THE BALL IS HELD SECURELY AGAINST THE INLET SEAT WHEN THE SOLENOID IS DEENERGIZED. UPON BEING ENERGIZED THE SOLENOID DEVELOPS THE FORCE TO OVERCOME THE SPRING LOAD AND SEATS THE BALL ONTO THE VENT SEAT TO ALLOW HELIUM FLOW. TOTAL POPPET MOVEMENT (STROKE) IS LESS THAN 0.040 INCH.

FOR THE VALVE TO FAIL TO DEACTUATE MEANS THE FORCE TO RETURN THE BALL TO THE INLET SEAT IS NOT PRESENT, THE FORCE HOLDING IT ON THE VENT SEAT IS NOT REMOVED, OR FLOW OUT THE VENT PORT IS PREVENTED. WHEN THE SOLENOID IS DEENERGIZED, THE FORCE TO RETURN THE BALL TO THE INLET SEAT IS PROVIDED BY THE BELLOWS ASSEMBLY AND SPRING THROUGH THE VALVE POPPET. IF THE BELLOWS FAILS, OR LEAKS TO THE POINT OF REDUCING THE BELLOWS INTERNAL PRESSURE TO LESS THAN THE VALVE INLET PRESSURE, THE LOAD BALANCING FEATURE IS ELIMINATED. INLET FLOW AGAINST THE BALL WOULD CONTINUE TO HOLD IT AGAINST THE VENT SEAT (AFTER DEENERGIZING THE SOLENOID) CAUSING THE VALVE TO FAIL TO DEACTUATE. THE BELLOWS ARE MADE OF NICKEL-COBALT-COPPER AND ARE ASSEMBLED INTO A SUB-ASSEMBLY. THIS SUB-ASSEMBLY IS PROOF PRESSURE TESTED AT 1550 PSIG PRIOR TO VALVE FINAL ASSEMBLY. IF THE SPRING BREAKS THE PRESSURIZED BELLOWS WOULD EXERT SUFFICIENT FORCE TO RETURN THE BALL TO THE INLET SEAT; HOWEVER, SEAT LEAKAGE MAY RESULT. THE SPRING IS MADE FROM 17-7PH CRES (ELGILOY) WIRE AND IS HEAT TREATED FOLLOWING FORMING. IT HAS A SPRING RATE OF 13.5 LB/INCH AND EXERTS A FORCE OF 7.54 LB. IN ITS INSTALLED CONDITION.

FAILURE TO REMOVE THE FORCE HOLDING THE BALL ON THE VENT SEAT, WHEN THE SOLENOID IS DEENERGIZED, COULD BE CAUSED BY BINDING IN THE SOLENOID. FORCE TO DRIVE THE BALL TO THE VENT SEAT IS DELIVERED FROM THE SOLENOID BY A PLUNGER AND BY TWO PUSHRODS (ALIGNED IN SERIES WITHIN, AND GUIDED BY, THE SOLENOID STOP). THE AREAS OF POTENTIAL BINDING ARE BETWEEN THE PLUNGER AND SOLENOID OR BETWEEN THE PUSHRODS AND THE SOLENOID STOP. TO PRECLUDE BURRS THE SOLENOID BORE IS HONED, AND TO PREVENT BINDING, THE PLUNGER IS COATED WITH A DRY-FILM LUBRICANT. THE SOLENOID STOP IS MADE OF A MUCH HARDER MATERIAL (430 CRES) THAN EITHER OF THE PUSHRODS (17-4PH AND 304 CRES) TO PREVENT GALLING.

THE VENT CHECK VALVE, WHICH SCREWS INTO THE SOLENOID VALVE VENT PORT, IS OF SIMPLE DESIGN, CONTAINING ONLY 5 PARTS. CRACK AND RESEAT PRESSURES ARE 0.5 PSID AND THE UNIT IS DESIGNED FOR 10,000 CYCLES. HIGH INLET PRESSURE (710 PSIA NOMINAL) ACTING ON A LARGE POPPET (0.603 INCH DIAMETER) PRODUCES A FORCE IN

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EXCESS OF 400 POUNDS TO ASSURE CHECK VALVE OPENING. THE CHECK VALVE BODY AND POPPET ARE OF 2024-T6 ALUMINUM, AND TO PREVENT GALLING OR BINDING, HAVE BEEN HARD ANODIZED. TO PRECLUDE COCKING, THE POPPET STEM IS CLOSELY GUIDED OVER 50% OF ITS LENGTH BY THE BODY BORE (STEM, 0.139 INCH DIAMETER; BORE, 0.141 INCH DIAMETER).

CLOGGING OF THE 20 MICRON NOMINAL, 40 MICRON ABSOLUTE, RATED ACTUATION PORT FILTER WOULD PREVENT THE SOLENOID FROM VENTING THE ACTUATOR, CREATING THE EFFECT OF FAILURE TO DEACTUATE. THE FILTER IS PLEATED IN ORDER TO INCREASE SURFACE AREA.

THE -0032, -0042 CONFIGURATION SOLENOID VALVES ARE IDENTICAL TO THE -0012 CONFIGURATION WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ADDING THE FILTER (10 MICRON NOMINAL, 25 MICRON ABSOLUTE) IN THE VENT PORT OF THE SOLENOID VALVE AND REDESIGN OF THE VENT PORT CHECK VALVE. THIS FILTER WAS ADDED TO PREVENT CONTAMINATION AND METALLIC PARTICLES GENERATED DURING THE REMOVAL OF THE VENT PORT CHECK VALVE DURING OMRSD LEAKAGE MEASUREMENTS FROM ENTERING THE SOLENOID VALVE.

THE VENT PORT CHECK VALVE WAS REDESIGNED TO PREVENT THE POPPET FROM BEING EJECTED DUE TO SHEARING OF THE RETAINING NUT THREAD. A PIN WAS ADDED TO THE CHECK VALVE HOUSING, WHICH RETAINS THE POPPET WITHIN THE CHECK VALVE HOUSING. A NEW ALUMINUM NUT, WHICH PROVIDE A MINIMUM ENGAGEMENT OF THREE THREADS, WAS UTILIZED TO INCREASE RELIABILITY.

(B) TEST:

ATP

AMBIENT TEMPERATURE TESTS:

PROOF PRESSURE (1560 PSIG); EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (850 PSIG); ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND RESPONSE; INTERNAL LEAKAGE (740 PSIG, ENERGIZED AND DEENERGIZED).

REDUCED TEMPERATURE TESTS (-160 DEG F):

ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND RESPONSE; INTERNAL LEAKAGE

ELECTRICAL BONDING TESTS

SOLENOID SUBASSEMBLY TESTS:

ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS; ENCLOSURE LEAKAGE (ONE ATMOSPHERE).

CERTIFICATION

TWO SPECIMENS -

PORT AND FITTING TORQUE

SALT FOG EXPOSURE FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL AND LEAKAGE CHECKS

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AMBIENT VIBRATION TESTS: TOTAL 13.1 HOURS BOTH AXES FOR TWO VIBRATION LEVELS PLUS TRANSIENT VIBRATION SWEEP - RUN WITH ONE SPECIMEN ENERGIZED AND ONE DEENERGIZED - FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND LEAKAGE CHECKS

HANDLING SHOCK TEST

ENERGIZED AND DEENERGIZED FLOW TESTS

FIFTY HOUR CONTINUOUS CURRENT TEST AT 130 DEG F

AMBIENT TEMPERATURE ENDURANCE (4500 CYCLES FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL AND LEAKAGE CHECKS); 130 DEG F ENDURANCE (500 CYCLES FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL AND LEAKAGE CHECKS); OPERATION CYCLES (REPEATED 20 TIMES); REPEAT OF AMBIENT TEMPERATURE ENDURANCE ; -160 DEG F ENDURANCE (500 CYCLES FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL AND LEAKAGE CHECKS)

DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION

BURST PRESSURE (3400 PSIG)

GROUND TURNAROUND TEST

ANY TURNAROUND CHECKOUT IS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OMRSD.

(C) INSPECTION:

RECEIVING INSPECTION

RAW MATERIALS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION FOR MATERIAL AND PROCESSES CERTIFICATION. BODY HOUSING BAR STOCK IS ULTRASONICALLY INSPECTED.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL

CLEANLINESS LEVEL VERIFIED TO 100A. CORROSION PROTECTION IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

ALL PARTS ARE PROTECTED FROM DAMAGE AND CONTAMINATION. MICROSCOPIC EXAMINATION OF ALL DETAIL PARTS IS MADE PRIOR TO ASSEMBLY. ALL SURFACES REQUIRING CORROSION PROTECTION ARE VERIFIED. MANDATORY INSPECTION POINTS ARE INCLUDED IN THE ASSEMBLY PROCEDURE. MECHANICAL SURFACE FINISH AT 125 RMS IS INSPECTED AND VERIFIED WITH A PROFILOMETER. SURFACE FINISHES SMOOTHER THAN 125 RMS ARE INSPECTED USING A COMPARATOR AT 10X MAGNIFICATION. ALL CRITICAL DIMENSIONS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

CRITICAL PROCESS

HEAT TREATMENT AND PARTS PASSIVATION VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. POTTING OF SOLDER CUPS, ELECTRICAL WIRE STRIPPING, AND SOLDERING OF CONNECTORS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. DRY FILM LUBRICATION APPLIED TO THE PLUNGER IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION

WELDS VISUALLY EXAMINED & VERIFIED BY X -RAY, DYE PENETRANT, AND EDDY CURRENT. THE SOLENOID ASSEMBLY IS SUBJECTED TO LEAKAGE VERIFICATION USING

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RADIOACTIVE TRACER TECHNIQUES. THE VALVE BODY, PRIOR TO FINAL MACHINING, IS SUBJECTED TO ETCH AND DYE PENETRANT INSPECTION. BELLOWS ASSEMBLY IS PROOF PRESSURE TESTED AND LEAK CHECKED.

TESTING
ATP VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

HANDLING/PACKAGING
PACKAGING FOR SHIPMENT VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

(D) FAILURE HISTORY:

THE SOLENOID VALVE EXPERIENCED ERRATIC BUT ACCEPTABLE PERFORMANCE AT KSC DUE TO EXCESSIVE SLIDING FRICTION CAUSED BY BURRS, AND SHARP EDGES ON THE ARMATURE (CAR AC1181). THE CONTROLLED PNEUMATIC VALVE OPERATION WAS ACCEPTABLE. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION RESULTED IN THE REDESIGN OF THE VALVE TO ELIMINATE THE BURRS AND SHARP EDGES. INSPECTION WAS IMPROVED AND AN OMRSD REQUIREMENT FOR CURRENT SIGNATURE TRACE WAS IMPOSED.

AFTER THE ACTUATION SIGNAL WAS REMOVED, TWO VALVES AT NSTL VENTED CONTINUOUSLY (CAR A7662) DUE TO BINDING OF THE PLUNGER CAUSED BY BURRS AND GALLING. DETAIL PARTS WERE INCORRECTLY FABRICATED/ASSEMBLED. THESE VALVE DEFECTS WERE REPAIRED.

DURING QUALIFICATION TESTING AT THE SUPPLIER (CAR AC3193), AND SUBSEQUENTLY AT KSC (CAR AC8975 AND AD0352), THE VALVES FAILED TO CYCLE (ACTUATE OR DEACTUATE) WHICH OCCASIONALLY PREVENTED PROPER OPERATION OF THE CONTROLLED PNEUMATIC VALVE. FAILURE INVESTIGATION DISCLOSED FRETTING ON THE PLUNGER AND IN THE BORE AREA. THIS GENERATED SMALL PARTICLES LEADING TO BINDING OF THE VALVES. THE FRETTING WAS THE RESULT OF A LACK OF REQUIRED LUBRICANT. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS THE APPLICATION OF MICROSEAL (DRY FILM LUBRICANT) ON ALL NEW PARTS AND THE REPLACEMENT OF PLUNGERS WITH MICROSEAL WHEN VALVES WERE RETURNED TO THE SUPPLIER FOR REWORK.

FOUR SOLENOID VALVES FAILED TO ACTUATE PROPERLY DURING ATP. TWO FAILED TO ACTUATE DUE TO BINDING (CARS AC0737, ACO894) AND THE OTHER TWO FAILED DUE TO INCORRECT STROKE OF THE PLUNGER (CARS ACO739, AC1469). DETAIL PARTS WERE INCORRECTLY FABRICATED/ASSEMBLED. THESE VALVE DEFECTS WERE REPAIRED AND ARE ATP SCREENABLE.

CURRENT DATA ON TEST FAILURE, FLIGHT FAILURE, UNEXPLAINED ANOMALIES, AND OTHER FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING GROUND PROCESSING ACTIVITY CAN BE FOUND IN THE PRACA DATABASE.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE:

NO CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED (FIRST FAILURE).

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- APPROVALS -

S&R ENGINEERING	: W.P. MUSTY	:/S/ W. P. MUSTY
S&R ENGINEERING ITM	: P. A. STENGER-NGUYEN	:/S/ P. A. STENGER-NGUYEN
DESIGN ENGINEERING	: DAVID NEARY	:/S/ DAVID NEARY
MPS SUBSYSTEM MGR.	: TIM REITH	:/S/ TIM REITH
MOD	: BILL LANE	:/S/ BILL LANE
USA SAM	: MIKE SNYDER	:/S/ MIKE SNYDER
USA ORBITER ELEMENT	: SUZANNE LITTLE	:/S/ SUZANNE LITTLE
NASA SR&QA	: ERICH BASS	:/S/ ERICH BASS