

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- HARDWARE
NUMBER: M0-AG1-M15 -X**

SUBSYSTEM NAME: REMOTELY OPERATED FLUID UMBILICAL (ROFU)
REVISION: 01/23/03

PART DATA

PART NAME VENDOR NAME	PART NUMBER VENDOR NUMBER
: ROFU	V847-544100-001
: MECHANICAL LINKAGE COMPONENTS	V751-544153
: MECHANICAL LINKAGE COMPONENTS	V751-544201
: MECHANICAL LINKAGE COMPONENTS	V751-544204
: MECHANICAL LINKAGE COMPONENTS	V751-544209
: MECHANICAL LINKAGE COMPONENTS	V751-544221
: MECHANICAL LINKAGE COMPONENTS	V751-544223

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:
MECHANICAL COMPONENTS INCLUDE DRIVE ROD, BELLCRANK, LINK, PISTON, SPRING, PISTON EXTENSION AND HOOK.

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: N/A

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS:
ONE PER ROFU ASSEMBLY

FUNCTION:
THIS ASSEMBLY OF MECHANICAL COMPONENTS TRANSFERS THE ROTATIONAL OUTPUT OF THE DUAL ELECTRIC MOTOR HOOK (LATCH) ACTUATOR INTO APPROPRIATE LINEAR MOTION TO MOVE THE LATCH HOOKS INTO AND OUT OF THEIR LATCHED POSITION.

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LRU:

CRITICALITY OF THIS

ITEM NAME: MECHANICAL LINKAGE COMPONENTS

FAILURE MODE: 2/2

FAILURE MODE:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING OR FAILS FREE

MISSION PHASE:

OO ON-ORBIT

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:

102	COLUMBIA
103	DISCOVERY
104	ATLANTIS
105	ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:

ADVERSE TOLERANCE/WEAR, CONTAMINATION/FOREIGN OBJECT/DEBRIS, LOSS OF LUBRICANT, FAILURE/DEFLECTION OF INTERNAL PART, TEMPERATURE, FATIGUE, VIBRATION

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN

- A) N/A
- B) N/A
- C) N/A

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

A)
N/A

B)
N/A

C)
N/A

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

(A) SUBSYSTEM:

LOSS OF (HOOK) LATCH/UNLATCH FUNCTION.

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(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):

PAYLOAD CANNOT BE DEPLOYED DUE TO ORBITER-PAYLOAD DISCONNECT HALVES CANNOT BE DISCONNECTED.
RETRIEVED PAYLOAD CANNOT BE REMATED FOR ENTRY.

(C) MISSION:

LOSS OF ROFU MISSION OBJECTIVE.

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):

NO EFFECT.

SUCCESS PATHS REMAINING AFTER FIRST FAILURE: 0

- TIME TO EFFECT -

REACTION TIME: SECONDS

-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

(A) DESIGN:

DESIGN FACTOR OF SAFETY IS 1.4 X LIMIT LOAD. ALL COMPONENTS SHOW POSITIVE MARGINS BY ANALYSIS. DESIGN PRECLUDES DAMAGE UNDER STALLED CONDITION.

ALL THE MECHANISM MATERIALS HAVE BEEN CHOSEN FOR HIGH STRENGTH/LOW WEAR CHARACTERISTICS. MECHANISM DESIGNED WITH POSITIVE MARGINS OF SAFETY FOR WORST CASE THERMAL CONDITIONS. ALIGNMENT MECHANISM DESIGNED TO ENSURE PROPER CAPTURE ENVELOPE FOR WORST CASE THERMAL CONDITIONS.

(B) TEST:

QUALIFICATION:

THE ROFU MECHANISM IS CERTIFIED PER CR 60-44-544100-001-C. SYSTEM

QUALIFICATION TESTS INCLUDED:

- * VISUAL EXAMINATION TO VERIFY CONFORMANCE TO DRAWINGS, IDENTIFICATION MARKINGS, AND CLEANLINESS.
- * ENVIRONMENTAL TESTS - VIBRATION FOR 600 SEC/AXIS (STOWED). VIBRATION FOR 1400 SEC/AXIS (MATED) BY THE ROFU QUALIFICATION TEST. FIVE THERMAL / VACUUM CYCLES.
- * OPERATIONAL LIFE TESTS - 500 CYCLES, BY THE ROFU QUALIFICATION TEST, ON ARM AND LATCH MECHANISM.
- * QUALIFICATION ACCEPTANCE TESTS TO CERTIFY MECHANISM FOR FIVE ACCEPTANCE THERMAL AND FIVE ACCEPTANCE VIBRATION TESTS.
- * MAXIMUM DISPLACEMENT TESTS TO VERIFY OPERATIONAL ENVELOPE.
- * LIMIT, LIMIT PLUS LOADS TESTS TO VERIFY STATIC LOADING.
- * ARM AND LATCH STALL LOAD TESTS.

ACCEPTANCE:

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THE LATCH MECHANISMS WERE RIGGED PER CONTROLLED SPECIFICATION ML0308-0187, PLUS:

- * ACCEPTANCE VIBRATION RANDOM SPECTRUM 3 MIN/AXIS.
- * FIVE ACCEPTANCE THERMAL CYCLES.

CERTIFICATION BY ANALYSIS/SIMILARITY:

FACTORS INCLUDE: HUMIDITY, FUNGUS, OZONE, SALTSpray, SAND/DUST, ACCELERATION, FACTORS OF SAFETY, HAIL, LIGHTNING, RAIN, SOLAR RADIATION (THERMAL AND NUCLEAR), STORAGE/OPERATING LIFE, METEOROIDS, ACOUSTICS, AND EXPLOSIVE ATMOSPHERE.

GROUND TURNAROUND:

OMRSD - ANY TURNAROUND TEST CHECKOUT TESTING IS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OMRSD

(C) INSPECTION:

RECEIVING INSPECTION

MATERIAL AND PROCESS CERTIFICATIONS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL

INSPECTION VERIFIES CLEANLINESS IS MAINTAINED. INSPECTION VERIFIES CORROSION PROTECTION PER MA0608-301.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

DIMENSIONS OF DETAIL PARTS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. FASTENER INSTALLATION IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. ASSEMBLY AND RIGGING OF HOOK LINKAGE COMPONENTS IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION

PENETRANT INSPECTION OF DETAIL PARTS IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

CRITICAL PROCESSES

APPLICATION OF LB0140-005 DRY FILM LUBRICANT PER MA0112-302 IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. HEAT TREATING IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

TESTING

ACCEPTANCE TESTING OF THE HOOK LINKAGE COMPONENTS ASSEMBLY PRIOR TO DELIVERY IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION PER APPLICABLE PROCEDURE.

HANDLING/PACKAGING

HANDLING AND PACKAGING REQUIREMENTS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

(D) FAILURE HISTORY:

CURRENT DATA ON TEST FAILURES, FLIGHT FAILURES, UNEXPLAINED ANOMALIES, AND OTHER FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING GROUND PROCESSING ACTIVITY CAN BE FOUND IN THE PRACA DATA BASE.

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(E) OPERATIONAL USE:
NONE

- APPROVALS -

S&R ENGINEER	:A. NGUYEN	:/S/ ANH NGUYEN_____
CARGO/INTEG ITM.	:J. CAPALENI	:/s/ Bob Dueease for_____
DESIGN ENGINEER	:P. HOE	:/S/ PHAM HOE_____
SSM	:L. J. SALVADOR	:/s/ Pham Hoe for_____
NASA/DCE	:B. BROWN	:/s/ B. Brown_____
MOD	:K. SMITH	:/S/ K. SMITH_____
SR&QA	:H. MALTBY	:/s/ Harry Maltby_____
USA/SAM	:R. SMITH	:/s/ R. Smith_____
USA CARGO/INTG ELEMENT	:S. KUNKEL	:/s/ S. Kunkel_____
USA ORBITER ELEMENT	:S. LITTLE	:/s/ Suzanne Little_____