

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL HARDWARE
NUMBER: 06-3A-0613 -X**

SUBSYSTEM NAME: ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL

REVISION: 0 02/04/88

PART DATA

	PART NAME	PART NUMBER
	VENDOR NAME	VENDOR NUMBER
	: WATER SPRAY BOILER	
LRU	: DISCONNECT, WATERTANK FILL	MC621-0038-0100

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:
DISCONNECT, WATER TANK FILL

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 3
ONE EACH BOILER ASSEMBLY

FUNCTION:
PROVIDES CAPABILITY TO LOAD AND UNLOAD WATER TANK, RETAINS WATER IN TANK WHEN DISCONNECTED AFTER LOADING. A CAP, WHICH PROVIDES A SECONDARY SEAL, IS INSTALLED DURING WSB OPERATION.

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS FMEA - CIL FAILURE MODE

NUMBER: 06-3A-0613- 03

REVISION#: 2 08/25/98

SUBSYSTEM NAME: ATCS - WATER SPRAY BOILER

LRU: DISCONNECT, WATERTANK FILL

CRITICALITY OF THIS

ITEM NAME: DISCONNECT, WATERTANK FILL

FAILURE MODE: 1R3

FAILURE MODE:

LEAKAGE, EXTERNAL TO CAP

MISSION PHASE:

LO LIFT-OFF
DO DE-ORBIT

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:

102 COLUMBIA
103 DISCOVERY
104 ATLANTIS
105 ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:

CORROSION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, DAMAGED SEAL

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN

A) FAIL
B) N/A
C) PASS

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

A)

"A" SCREEN IS FAILED SINCE CAP SEALING INTEGRITY IS NON-VERIFIABLE DUE TO THE DISCONNECT'S POPPET SEAL MASKING CAP FAILURE.

B)

"B" SCREEN IS "N/A" SINCE ITEM IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.

C)

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

(A) SUBSYSTEM:

NO EFFECT - DISCONNECT POPPET PREVENTS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF WATER.

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(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):

FIRST FAILURE: NO EFFECT. SECOND FAILURE (LEAKAGE OF ASSOCIATED DISCONNECT POPPET): POSSIBLE LOSS OR LIMITED RUN TIME OF ONE APU/HYD SYSTEM. LIMITED RUN TIME MAY NOT ALLOW APU/HYD SYSTEM TO SUPPORT ENTIRE POWERED FLIGHT OR ENTRY PHASE. LOSS OF HYDRAULIC CAPABILITY TO THROTTLE ONE MAIN ENGINE, LOSS OF HYDRAULIC LANDING GEAR DEPLOY AND NOSEWHEEL STEERING IF SYSTEM ONE IS LOST, AND LOSS OF ONE OF THREE ET UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATORS FOR EACH UMBILICAL PLATE. LOSS OF REDUNDANT HYDRAULIC POWER SYSTEM FOR FOUR TVC ACTUATORS. LOSS OF ONE OF THREE HYDRAULIC POWER SYSTEMS TO FLIGHT CONTROL SURFACES AND BRAKES.

(C) MISSION:

NO EFFECT

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):

NO EFFECT AFTER FIRST FAILURE.

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:

FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS - POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE WITH THREE FAILURES: THIS FAILURE, LEAKAGE PAST ASSOCIATED POPPET AND LOSS OF AN ADDITIONAL APU/HYD SYSTEM.

-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

(A) DESIGN:

DISCONNECT IS 17-4 PH STAINLESS STEEL WITH AN ETHYLENE PROPYLENE (EPR) "O" RING SEAL AND A TEFLON BACKUP RING. CAP IS 17-4 PH STAINLESS STEEL WITH EPR "O" RING SEAL. CAP IS INSTALLED BEFORE FLIGHT AND PROVIDES A SECONDARY SEAL TO DISCONNECT POPPET. POPPET IS SPRING LOADED CLOSED AND SYSTEM PRESSURE AIDS IN MAINTAINING IT CLOSED.

(B) TEST:

QUALIFICATION:

- SAND AND DUST - MALE COUPLING WITH CAP INSTALLED SHALL WITHSTAND 28 HOURS OF REQUIRED SAND/DUST ENVIRONMENT. PASS/FAIL CRITERIA: SHALL PASS SUBSEQUENT COUPLING PERFORMANCE RECORD TEST AND CAP/PLUG PROOF/PERFORMANCE TEST.

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- SALT AND FOG - MALE COUPLING WITH CAP INSTALLED SHALL WITHSTAND 30 DAYS OF REQUIRED SALT/FOG ENVIRONMENT. PASS/FAIL CRITERIA: SHALL PASS SUBSEQUENT COUPLING PERFORMANCE RECORD TEST AND CAP/PLUG PROOF/PERFORMANCE TEST.
- BENCH SHOCK TEST - DROP MALE COUPLING HALF WITH CAP INSTALLED 4 TIMES ON EACH END FOUR INCHES FROM BENCH TOP PER MIL-STD-810, METHOD 516.1, PROCEDURE V. PASS/FAIL CRITERIA: SHALL PASS SUBSEQUENT COUPLING PERFORMANCE RECORD TEST AND CAP/PLUG PROOF/PERFORMANCE TEST.
- BASIC DESIGN SHOCK TEST - MALE COUPLING HALF WITH CAP INSTALLED, TESTED AT 20 G PEAK FOR 11 MS DURATION PER MIL-STD-810, METHOD 516.1, PROCEDURE I. PASS/FAIL CRITERIA: SHALL PASS SUBSEQUENT COUPLING PERFORMANCE RECORD TEST AND CAP/PLUG PROOF/PERFORMANCE TEST.
- LANDING SHOCK TEST - MALE COUPLING HALF WITH CAP INSTALLED SHALL WITHSTAND SPECIFIED LANDING SHOCK PEAKS FOR REQUIRED DURATIONS. PASS/FAIL CRITERIA: SHALL PASS SUBSEQUENT COUPLING PERFORMANCE RECORD TEST AND CAP/PLUG PROOF/PERFORMANCE TEST.
- BURST TESTS - COUPLING ASSEMBLY SHALL WITHSTAND 400 PSIG AT 155 DEG F FOR 2 MINUTES MINIMUM WITH NO RUPTURE IN THE FOLLOWING CONFIGURATIONS: MALE COUPLING ALONE, MALE AND FEMALE COUPLED. PRESSURE CAP ATTACHED TO TEST FIXTURE.
- CAP ENDURANCE TEST - CAP TESTED AT 250 CYCLES AT 50 PSIG AND 90 DEG F WITH CAP IN TEST FIXTURE. TEST REPEATED AT 2 PSIG. PASS/FAIL CRITERIA: SHALL PASS SUBSEQUENT PRESSURE CAP AND PLUG PROOF/PERFORMANCE TESTS.
- WSB ASSEMBLY QUALIFICATION - INCLUDES RANDOM VIBRATION, SHOCK TEST, PERFORMANCE RECORD TEST (INCLUDING WATER CIRCUIT PROOF AND LEAK TESTS, AND DESIGN POINT CHECK), MISSION PROFILE TEST, THERMAL CYCLE TEST AND WATER CIRCUIT BURST TEST (74 PSIG).

ACCEPTANCE:

- EXAMINATION OF PRODUCT - VERIFICATION OF WORKMANSHIP, FINISH, DIMENSIONS, CONSTRUCTION, CLEANLINESS, IDENTIFICATION, TRACEABILITY LEVEL AND PROCESSES PER DRAWINGS AND MC621-0038 (WATER BOILER QUICK DISCONNECT PROCUREMENT SPEC).
- CAP PROOF TEST - TESTED FOR 2 CYCLES AT 200 PSIG, 90 DEG F, FOR 2 MINUTES. PASS/FAIL CRITERIA: NO EVIDENCE OF EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, PERMANENT SET, OR ERRATIC COUPLING/UNCOUPLING
- PERFORMANCE RECORD TEST - INCLUDES:
 - 5 PSIG APPLIED TO FEMALE HALF WITH MALE HALF CAPPED. REPEATED AT 50 PSIG.PASS/FAIL CRITERIA: NO EVIDENCE OF EXTERNAL LEAKAGE WHEN COUPLED. UNCOUPLING FLUID LOSS SHALL NOT EXCEED 5 CC'S.

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- PRESSURE CAP/PLUG PROOF/PERFORMANCE TEST - TESTED AT 2 CYCLES, 2 MINUTES EACH. AT 90 DEG F, AT FOLLOWING PRESSURES: 200 PSIG, 5 PSIG, AND 50 PSIG. PASS/FAIL CRITERIA: NO EXTERNAL LEAKAGE.
- CLEANLINESS. LEVEL 300 OF SPEC MA0110-301.
- WSB ASSEMBLY ATP - INCLUDES LOW SIDE GN2 PROOF TEST, WATER CIRCUIT LEAK CHECK, AND DESIGN POINT TEST.

GROUND TURNAROUND TEST

- ANY TURNAROUND CHECKOUT TESTING IS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OMRSD.

(C) INSPECTION:

RECEIVING INSPECTION

RAW MATERIALS ARE SENT TO A TEST LAB FOR MATERIAL AND CHEMICAL ANALYSIS AND CERTIFICATION, SHOP TRAVELER INSPECTION IS PERFORMED FOR CORRECT RAW MATERIAL PRIOR TO MACHINING.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL

INSPECTION VERIFIES CONTAMINATION CONTROL ON SHOP TRAVELERS.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

IN-PROCESS INSPECTION IS REQUIRED FOR CRITICAL DIMENSIONS CERTIFICATION. FLUID CONNECTION TORQUE REQUIREMENTS ARE VERIFIED FOR PHYSICAL AND SEALING DAMAGE.

CRITICAL PROCESSES

WELDING IS PERFORMED BY OUTSIDE VENDOR AND CERTIFICATION IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. HEAT TREATMENT IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION

PARTS ARE PENETRANT INSPECTED AFTER WELDING OPERATION AND VERIFIED BY INSPECTION

TESTING

LEAKAGE IS VERIFIED BY PROOF PRESSURE AND HELIUM LEAK TESTS.

HANDLING/PACKAGING

PROPER HANDLING AND STORAGE ENVIRONMENT ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

(D) FAILURE HISTORY:

CURRENT DATA ON TEST FAILURES, FLIGHT FAILURES, UNEXPLAINED ANOMALIES, AND OTHER FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING GROUND PROCESSING ACTIVITY CAN BE FOUND IN THE PRACA DATA BASE.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE:

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NONE

- APPROVALS -

EDITORIALLY APPROVED
TECHNICAL APPROVAL

: BNA
: VIA APPROVAL FORM

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: 95-CIL-009_06-3A