

SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT FMEA NO 06-20 -1135 -2 REV: 10/20/84

ASSEMBLY : SUPPLY WATER STORAGE CRIT. FUNC: 102  
P/N RI : MC276-0020-1101 CRIT. HDW: 103  
P/N VENDOR: ITEM 4.12G VEHICLE 102 103 104  
QUANTITY : 1 EFFECTIVITY: X X X  
: ONE PER SUBSYSTEM PHASE(S): PL LO X OO X OO X LS

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-FAIL B-FAIL C-PAS

PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY: APPROVED BY (NASA):  
DES S. CASTILLO DES *[Signature]* SSM *[Signature]*  
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ITEM:  
QUICK DISCONNECT (QD) AND CAP SUPPLY WATER CROSS-TIE, 80V62T981

FUNCTION:  
PROVIDES ACCESS AND CONTROL TO SUPPLY WATER SYSTEM FOR CONTINGENCY USE OF CROSS DUMPING SUPPLY AND WASTE WATER THROUGH THE SUPPLY OR WASTE WATER DUMP NOZZLES.

FAILURE MODE:  
FAILS OPEN, INTERNAL LEAKAGE OF POPPET/CAP

CAUSE(S):  
MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION

EFFECT(S) ON:  
(A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSION (D)CREW/VEHICLE

(A) LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT SEAL IN SUPPLY WATER DUMP LINE.

(B) SECOND ASSOCIATED FAILURE (REDUNDANT SEAL LEAK) CAN CAUSE LEAKAGE OF WATER FROM THE SUPPLY WATER DUMP LINE INTO CREW CABIN AND CAUSE LOSS OF SUPPLY WATER DUMP LINE CAPABILITY.

(C, D) NO EFFECT FOR FIRST FAILURE.

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECT - LOSS OF ALL SUPPLY WATER DUMP CAPABILITY (WASTE WATER DUMP LINE, FES DUMP MODE, AND FUEL CELL OVERBOARD DUMP NOZZLE) CAN DEAD HEAD FUEL CELL WATER OUTPUT LINE AND CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

REDUNDANCY SCREEN A FAILS BECAUSE CAP SEAL CAN NOT BE VERIFIED DURING GROUND TURNAROUND, AND REDUNDANCY SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE QD POPPET LEAK IS UNDETECTABLE AFTER CAP IS INSTALLED.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:  
(A)DESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSPECTION (D)FAILURE HISTORY (E)OPERATIONAL USE

(A) DESIGN  
QD IS ALL STAINLESS STEEL CONSTRUCTION WITH AN ETHYLENE PROPYLENE (EPR) O-RING SEAL AND A TEFLON BACKUP RING SEAL. CAP IS STAINLESS STEEL WITH EPR O-RING SEAL. CAP IS INSTALLED BEFORE FLIGHT AND PROVIDES REDUNDANT SEAL TO QD POPPET. POPPET IS SPRING-LOADED CLOSED.

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(B) TEST

QUALIFICATION TESTS FOR 100 MISSION LIFE INCLUDE: SHOCK TEST OF 20 G, OPERATION TEST OF 5 CYCLES AT 0 PSIG AND AT 55 PSIG, BURST TESTED AT 180 PSIG FOR 5 MINUTES (MAXIMUM OPERATING PRESSURE OF 22 PSIG), RANDOM VIBRATION - 0.2G SQ/HZ AT 10 PSIG FOR FIRST 24 MINUTES/AXIS FOLLOWED AT 90 PSIG FOR 24 MINUTES/AXIS. 5% SALT/85% RH FOR 50 HOURS, AND THERMAL TEST AT 250 F FOR 15 MINUTES AND AT -65 F FOR 3 HRS.

ACCEPTANCE TESTS - LEAKAGE AND PROOF PRESSURE - PRESSURIZED AT 10, 55 AND 90 PSIG IN THE MATED, DEMATED, AND CAPPED CONFIGURATIONS. LEAKAGE WILL NOT EXCEED 0.0001 SCCS Hr. CAP LEAK TESTED WHILE MATED TO TOOLS OF MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM DIMENSIONS TO ASSURE A PROPER FIT TO ALL QD'S.

OMRSD: LEAK CHECK OF QD AFTER GSE DEMATING AND PRIOR TO CAP INSTALLATION. VISUAL INSPECTION OF CAP INCLUDING O-RING SEAL PRIOR TO INSTALLATION.

(C) INSPECTION

RECEIVING INSPECTION

CERTIFICATION OF RAW MATERIALS AND PROCESSES IS VERIFIED.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL

CONTAMINATION CONTROL AND DIMENSIONS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. CORROSION PROTECTION PROVISIONS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

VISUAL INSPECTION FOR DAMAGE DURING INSTALLATION. WELDING CERTIFICATION AND HEAT TREATMENT ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

TESTING

ACCEPTANCE TEST IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

HANDLING/PACKAGING

PARTS PROTECTION, HANDLING AND PACKAGING REQUIREMENTS ARE VERIFIED.

(D) FAILURE HISTORY

TWO INSTANCES WHERE DEMATED QD'S LEAKED DUE TO SCRATCH ON POPPET; PERSONNEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO USE ONLY APPROVED AND PROPER TOOLS DURING QD INSTALLATION. (CAR #AC1552, AB2840)  
TWO INSTANCES OF A METAL SLIVER LODGED BETWEEN POPPET AND SEAL; IMPROVED ASSEMBLY PROCEDURES (CLEANING, WORKMANSHIP). (CAR #AB5643, AB5921)

(E) OPERATIONAL USE

FIRST FAILURE IS NO EFFECT UNTIL SECOND SEAL LEAKS. ISOLATE LEAK BY CLOSING DUMP ISOLATION VALVE. USE THE PES TO DUMP SUPPLY WATER (PROCEDURE IS PART OF NORMAL CREW TRAINING).

06-2D-21