

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) – NON-CIL HARDWARE
NUMBER: 05-6Q-2505 -X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: EPD&C - DISPLAYS & CONTROLS

REVISION: 1 09/07/97

PART DATA

	PART NAME	PART NUMBER
	VENDOR NAME	VENDOR NUMBER
LRU	: PANEL F6	V070-730403
LRU	: PANEL F8	V070-730404
SRU	: RESISTOR	RLR42C122GM

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:

RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMIT, 1.2K OHM, HEAD UP DISPLAY (HUD) POWER.

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS: 34V73A6R23
 34V73A8R10

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 2
 TWO, ONE PER PANEL

FUNCTION:

LIMITS CURRENT THAT CAN BE DRAWN FROM ESSENTIAL BUSES AB2 AND BC1 TO HEAD UP DISPLAY NO'S 1 AND 2 RESPECTIVELY AND PROVIDES WIRE PROTECTION.

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) - NON-CIL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: 05-6Q-2505-01

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

(A) SUBSYSTEM:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT POWER.

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):
LOSS OF POWER TO AFFECTED HEAD UP DISPLAY.

(C) MISSION:
FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT.

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):
FIRST FAILURE - NO EFFECT.

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:
SUCCESS PATHS REMAINING AFTER THE FIRST FAILURE - REDUNDANT HUD AND OTHER DEDICATED DISPLAYS MAY BE USED. WHEN LOSS OF OUTPUT IS DETECTED, THE COMMANDER (OR PILOT) WILL TRANSITION TO THE DEDICATED DISPLAYS FOR CRITICAL LANDING DATA. THE LOSS OF ALL DISPLAYS COULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE DURING LANDING.

DESIGN CRITICALITY (PRIOR TO DOWNGRADE, DESCRIBED IN (F)): 1R2

(F) RATIONALE FOR CRITICALITY DOWNGRADE:
THE OTHER HUD OR DEDICATED DISPLAYS MAY BE USED FOR THIS SCENARIO SINCE IT IS THE FIRST FAILURE AND IS LOSS OF OUTPUT (I.E. EASILY RECOGNIZABLE).

- APPROVALS -

EDITORIALLY APPROVED : BNA
EDITORIALLY APPROVED : JSC
TECHNICAL APPROVAL : VIA APPROVAL FORM

J. Kumard 9/7/97
Jim Deane 10/10/97
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