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PRINT DATE: 06/07/94

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) - CRITICAL HARDWARE
NUMBER: 01-5B-380123-X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: PURGE, VENT, & DRAIN - ACTRS

REVISION: 1 06/02/94

	PART NAME VENDOR NAME	PART NUMBER VENDOR NUMBER
LRU	: DOOR DRIVE ACTUATOR ELLANEF	MC147-0007 A1063A010
SRU	: GEARBOX/DIFFERENTIAL	
SRU	: TORQUE LIMITER	

PART DATA

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:

FOR 01-5B-380123-01:

GEARBOX/DIFFERENTIAL, DOOR DRIVE ACTUATOR, VENTS 3, 5, OR 6 (PLB)

FOR 01-5B-380123-02, 01-5B-380123-03:

TORQUE LIMITER, DOOR DRIVE ACTUATOR VENTS, 3, 5, OR 6 (PLB)

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 6

(3 RH & 3 LH)

(1 PER ACTR; 1 PER DOOR)

FUNCTION:

FOR 01-5B-380123-01:

TO TRANSMIT/DISTRIBUTE PROPER POWER/TORQUE FROM EITHER ONE OR BOTH ELECTRIC MOTORS TO THE DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM (TO OPEN/CLOSE THE VENT DOOR)

FOR 01-5B-380123-02, 01-5B-380123-03:

TO PROTECT THE VENT DOOR STRUCTURE, DOOR DRIVE LINKAGE AND ACTUATOR BY ALLOWING PREDETERMINED SLIPPAGE DURING A STALL OR JAM CONDITION.

**FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) - CRITICAL FAILURE MODE
NUMBER: 01-5B-380123-03**

REVISION# 1 06/02/94

SUBSYSTEM NAME: PURGE, VENT, & DRAIN - ACTRS
LRU: DOOR DRIVE ACTUATOR
ITEM NAME: TORQUE LIMITER

CRITICALITY OF THIS
FAILURE MODE: 1R3

FAILURE MODE:
TORQUE LIMITER FAILS TO SLIP AT MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE TORQUE

MISSION PHASE:
DO DE-ORBIT

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:

102	COLUMBIA
103	DISCOVERY
104	ATLANTIS
105	ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:
ADVERSE TOLERANCES/WEAR, CHANGE IN MATERIAL PROPERTIES,
CONTAMINATION/FOREIGN OBJECT/DEBRIS, DEFECTIVE PART/MATERIAL OR
MANUFACTURING DEFECT TEMPERATURE

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN

A) FAIL
B) FAIL
C) PASS

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

A)
FAILS REDUNDANCY SCREEN 'A' SINCE THERE ARE NO PRACTICAL TURNAROUND
TESTS TO VERIFY A FAILURE OF THE TORQUE LIMITER.

B)
FAILS SCREEN 'B' SINCE THIS FAILURE IS NOT DETECTABLE UNTIL A JAM OR STALL
CONDITION OCCURS.

C)

- FAILURE EFFECTS -

(A) SUBSYSTEM:
POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO LINKAGE DOOR STRUCTURE OR ACTUATOR IF STALLED OR
JAMMED CONDITION OCCURS. LOSS OF ABILITY TO CONTROL VENT DOOR POSITION,
REDUCED VENTING OR REPRESSURIZATION OF COMPARTMENT.

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S):
NO EFFECT FIRST FAILURE

(C) MISSION:

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NO EFFECT FIRST FAILURE

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S):
NO EFFECT FIRST FAILURE

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER THREE FAILURES (TORQUE LIMITER FAILURE, MECHANISM SUBSEQUENT TO THE TORQUE LIMITER JAMMED, AND THE OPPOSITE DOOR FAILS CLOSED) DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE FROM PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL ON ENTRY. LOCALIZED THERMAL DAMAGE ONLY, IF DOORS ARE FAILED OPEN ON ENTRY; THERMAL ANALYSIS (SAS-TA-RCC-78-152, -79-012 AND 79-065) SHOWS THAT CREW AND VEHICLE WILL SURVIVE.

-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

(A) DESIGN:

THE VENT DOOR SUBSYSTEM CONSISTS OF SEALED DOORS INTO THE FUSELAGE CAVITIES (THAT ARE OPENED OR CLOSED TO REGULATE INTERNAL PRESSURE) AND ARE POSITIONED BY ELECTROMECHANICAL DOOR DRIVE ACTUATORS CONNECTED TO TORQUE TUBES, BELLCRANKS AND CONNECTING-RODS. EACH VENT DOOR ACTUATOR CONSISTS OF A PLANETARY GEARBOX/DIFFERENTIAL AND A SPRING-LOADED (4) BALL-DETON TORQUE LIMITER DRIVEN BY TWO (REDUNDANT) 3-PHASE ELECTRIC MOTORS. EACH MOTOR HAS AN INTEGRAL SPRING-LOADED FRICTION BRAKE; WITH LIMIT SWITCHES, SOFT (LEAF SPRING) STOPS AND HARD MECHANICAL STOPS TO CONTROL/LIMIT ACTUATOR MOVEMENT/ROTATION. THE ACTUATOR HOUSING IS FABRICATED OF 6AL-4V TI AND DESIGNED TO PRECLUDE THE ENTRY OF FOREIGN PARTICLES. GEARS MADE OF PH13-8M0 AND 15-5PH CRES; 4340 AND 9NI-4CO-2CSTL. BEARINGS MADE OF 440 AND OTHER CRES. PARTS ARE CLEANED TO LEVEL 300, PER MA0110-301 (PRIOR TO ASSEMBLY); ASSEMBLED IN A CLASS 100,000 CLEAN ROOM (PER FED-STD-209). DUAL ROTATING SURFACES ON BEARINGS. SAFETY FACTOR 1.4 MINIMUM. PROVISION EXISTS TO CYCLE THE ACTUATOR (TO LOOSEN A STALLED/JAMMED MECHANISM). BRAKES MUST BE ELECTRICALLY ENERGIZED TO DISENGAGE AND ARE DESIGNED TO FAIL IN THE ENGAGED POSITION. DIFFERENTIAL IS DESIGNED TO DISTRIBUTE POWER FROM EITHER ONE OR BOTH (REDUNDANT) MOTORS. MOTORS ARE DESIGNED TO OPERATE IN AN EMERGENCY 2-PHASE CONDITION. THE TORQUE LIMITER IS DESIGNED TO PROTECT BOTH MOTORS AND THE DRIVE TRAIN FROM AN OVERLOAD FAILURE.

(B) TEST:

QUALIFICATION TESTS: QUAL-CERTIFIED PER CR-28-147-0007-0006. QUALIFICATION TESTS INCLUDE: HUMIDITY TEST (PER MIL-STD-810B), SHOCK TEST (PER MIL-STD-810, PROCEDURE I, METHOD 516.1), THERMAL VACUUM TEST (0.000001 TORR FOR 55 HOURS, WITH TEMPERATURE CYCLED BETWEEN -100 DEG F AND +330 DEG F, AND ACTUATOR CYCLED), THERMAL CYCLE TEST (TEMPERATURE CYCLED BETWEEN -100 DEG F AND +330 DEG F; INCLUDES MOTOR 1 AND MOTOR 2 CYCLED 500 TIMES EACH, ALONE, AND WITHIN 10 SEC/DIRECTION UNDER LOAD FROM CLOSE-OPEN-CLOSE; 750 CYCLES WITH BOTH MOTORS AT 5 SEC/DIRECTION FROM CLOSE-OPEN-CLOSE; AND 250 CYCLES WITH BOTH MOTORS FROM CLOSE-OPEN-INTERMEDIATE-CLOSE) AND MECHANICAL STOPS TEST (ACTUATOR OPERATED AT FULL RATE AND WITH NO LOAD OR BRAKES, 100 TIMES IN EACH DIRECTION). POWER CONSUMPTION TEST, FREEPLAY TEST AND IRREVERSIBILITY TEST WERE CONDUCTED AS DEFINED IN THE ACCEPTANCE TESTS. CERTIFICATION BY ANALYSIS/SIMILARITY INCLUDED: QUAL-ACCEPTANCE VIBRATION TEST (QAVT) (ACOUSTIC VIBRATIONS FROM 20-2,000 HZ; PER MF0004-32), FLIGHT

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VIBRATION TEST (20-2,000 HZ), FUNGUS, OZONE, SALT SPRAY, SAND/DUST, TRANSPACKAGE, ACCELERATION, LANDING SHOCK, MARGIN OF SAFETY AND EXPLOSIVE ATMOSPHERE.

ACCEPTANCE TESTS: INCLUDES EXAMINATION OF PRODUCTS (FOR WEIGHT, DIMENSIONS, CONSTRUCTION, CLEANLINESS AND FINISH), ACCEPTANCE VIBRATION TESTS (AVT) (20-2,000 HZ, 30 SEC TO 5 MINUTES, IN EACH OF THREE ORTHOGONAL AXES; WITH ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS MONITORED FOR CONTINUITY), ACCEPTANCE THERMAL TESTS (ATT) (CYCLED BETWEEN -150 DEG F AND +310 DEG F; MOTOR 1, MOTOR 2 AND DUAL MOTOR), POWER CONSUMPTION TEST (OPERATED AT RATED LOAD, SINGLE MOTOR DEPLOYED WITHIN 10 SEC, DUAL MOTORS DEPLOYED WITHIN 5 SEC, 115 WATTS/MOTOR MAXIMUM, 400% MAXIMUM STARTING CURRENT AT RATED LOAD), INSULATION RESISTANCE TEST AND DIELECTRIC STRENGTH TEST (PER MF0004-002), CYCLING TEST (SINGLE MOTOR, 20 CYCLES EACH FROM CLOSE-OPEN-CLOSE AT 10 SEC/DIRECTION; DUAL MOTOR, 40 CYCLES FROM CLOSE-OPEN-CLOSE AT 5 SEC/DIRECTION; DUAL MOTOR, 20 CYCLES FROM INTERMEDIATE-OPEN-CLOSE), FREEPLAY TEST (MAXIMUM ANGULAR FREEPLAY AT OUTPUT SHAFT +/-0.015 DEGREES, WITH 10.0 INCH-LB REVERSING TORQUE), STALL/MAXIMUM TORQUE TEST (STALL/MAXIMUM OUTPUT NOT TO EXCEED 1.5 TIMES MAX OPERATING TORQUE OF 670 INCH-LB), IRREVERSIBILITY TEST (ACTUATOR MUST BE IRREVERSIBLE TO THE MAXIMUM OPERATING LOAD IN EITHER DIRECTION), MECHANICAL LIMITS TEST AND ELECTRICAL LIMITS TEST (ACTUATOR AND OUTPUT ARM CYCLED FULL TRAVEL TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL LIMITS).

OMRSD: NO PRACTICAL TEST IS AVAILABLE FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.

(C) INSPECTION:

RECEIVING INSPECTION

MATERIAL AND PROCESS CERTIFICATIONS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. ALL PURCHASED PART DATA PACKAGES ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL

PARTS ARE CLEANED TO A 300 LEVEL PER MA0110-301 IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. CORROSION PROTECTION PROVISION ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

MANUFACTURING, INSTALLATION AND ASSEMBLY OPERATIONS ARE VERIFIED BY STOP TRAVELER MANDATORY INSPECTION POINTS (MIPS). TORQUE LIMITER ASSEMBLY IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. SLIP TORQUE, SPRING DIAMETERS AND FORCE ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION

STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF DETAIL PARTS VERIFIED BY PENETRANT OR MAGNETIC PARTICLE INSPECTION. TECHNIQUES AND TECHNICIANS ARE CERTIFIED.

CRITICAL PROCESSES

HEAT TREAT IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

TESTING

ATP IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

HANDLING/PACKAGING

PROPERLY MONITORED STORAGE ENVIRONMENTS VERIFIED. PART PROTECTION IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

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(D) FAILURE HISTORY:

CURRENT DATA ON TEST FAILURES, FLIGHT FAILURES, UNEXPLAINED ANOMALIES, AND OTHER FAILURES EXPERIENCED DURING GROUND PROCESSING ACTIVITY CAN BE FOUND IN THE PRACA DATABASE.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE:

NONE

- APPROVALS -

PAE MANAGER : K. L. PRESTON
PRODUCT ASSURANCE ENG. : T. AI
DESIGN ENGINEERING : A. P. YSON
NASA SSMA :
NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER :

Stell JA 6/8/94

Amelia

PAE Gen 6/2/94

DR Malone 7/6/94

P. E. Davis 7/6/94
