NASA STS Recordation
Oral History Project
Edited Oral History Transcript
Interviewed by Jennifer Ross-Nazzal
Huntsville, Alabama – 21 July 2010
Today is July 21st, 2010. This interview is being conducted with Jody
Singer in Huntsville, Alabama as part of the STS Recordation Oral
History Project. The interviewer is Jennifer Ross-Nazzal. Thanks again
for talking with me this morning, it’s certainly appreciated.
You’re very welcome.
I thought we could start by briefly describing your career at NASA.
I started with NASA in 1985 at the Marshall Space Flight Center in
Huntsville, Alabama. I began my 25 year career with NASA in the Program
Development [PD] group as a professional intern. In PD we were involved
with planning future missions, which included estimating the design
cost, identifying the complexity of a system, and forecasting the
major development milestones and timelines. When I finished my Professional
Intern Program [PIP] it coincided with the Challenger incident [STS
51-L]. At that time the Shuttle project offices were looking for people
to help with return to flight [RTF] activities. I applied with the
Shuttle office and was selected to work in the Space Shuttle main
engine [SSME] project office with John [S.] Chapman, who was a respected
leader within the Shuttle organization. He recently retired in 2010.
I worked with John in the business office performing program planning
activities such as budget development, hardware inventory management,
and working with the prime contractor, Rocketdyne, to ensure the availability
and delivery of engine assets. We also tracked the life of the components
to predict when certain hardware items would need replacement or refurbishment.
It was important to balance the engine inventory [hardware builds
and deliveries to the launch site, Kennedy Space Center (KSC)] with
the flight manifest needs. It was critical that we were able to identify
the most efficient method to support the manifest within the funding
profile. I was in SSME until being selected by the external tank [ET]
project manager, Gerry Ladner, to be the business manager for the
ET project in 1990.
I spent approximately ten years in ET. In ET, I was able to serve
in numerous roles. I was the business manager for approximately five
years, followed by serving as the assistant manager from 1996 to 1998.
In 1998, I was selected as the ET deputy project manager. In ET, I
had the privilege of working with two outstanding project managers,
Parker Counts and Jerry [W.] Smelser. In ET, I was also fortunate
be a part of the Super Lightweight Tank [SLWT] development and delivery,
which was critical to the launch of the International Space Station
From 2000 until 2002, I served as the Space Shuttle Propulsion Office
[SSPO] assistant manager. The Shuttle propulsion office is responsible
for all the propulsion elements [external tank, the solid rocket motors,
the solid rocket booster [SRB], and the Space Shuttle main engines],
their integration, and readiness for flight which includes cost, schedule,
technical performance, and safety/risk management. In 2002, the Center
Director and the Shuttle propulsion manager [Alex A. McCool, Jr.]
made the decision to add the deputy propulsion manager job as a Senior
Executive Service [SES] position. Fortunately, I was selected as the
deputy and received my SES. I served in that capacity until December
From 2002 until 2005, I served as the reusable solid rocket motor
[RSRM] project manager. During my time as the project manager, it
was very rewarding yet sad time due to the Columbia incident [STS-107].
As a matter of fact, my first launch was STS-107. During STS-107’s
re-entry, on February 1st , we lost the crew. That [the incident
and return to flight activities] was one of those character-building
and heart breaking experiences.
In 2006 my duties were expanded when I became the manager of the solid
rocket motor and the solid rocket booster project offices. We knew
we were approaching the fly-out of the Shuttle. It was important to
maintain focus on Shuttle safety as we enabled the next generation
vehicle and implemented the President’s Vision for Space Exploration.
The solid rocket boosters were selected to be used on the new vehicle.
At Marshall, we needed to be able to share the expertise of the civil
service skills, speak with one voice to the contractors, and be evolvable
with the next project office. The result was the combination of the
NASA project RSRM and SRB project offices. The combination was determined
to be RSRB, reusable solid rocket booster project. That is the way
the Shuttle booster office exists today; one NASA project office with
two prime contractors, ATK [Alliant Techsystems, Inc.] and United
Space Alliance [USA].
From 2007 to the present, I was asked support the Shuttle propulsion
deputy, Steve [Stephen F.] Cash. In this capacity, I am responsible
for all the elements [the solid rocket motor and booster, external
tank, main engine, and the propulsion systems engineering and integration
group]. In March of this year , I was given an additional assignment
to serve as the Ares project manager deputy, so I’m in a dual
capacity to the Shuttle and Ares organizations.
Quite a varied career.
A fun and a very rewarding career.
What’s it been like to be the first female project manager in
the Shuttle projects area?
I’d say it’s been fun and challenging. I have had a lot
of great mentors and team members who supported me. The pressure to
succeed was probably more self-inflicted. I didn’t want to let
the team, the community, the astronauts, or myself down. As for being
the first female project manager in Shuttle, everyone has treated
me very much as an equal and been very supportive. I have never felt
so supported by a team in my life! It’s was a great job. It
was also a very proud moment to be able to do that.
Yes, I can imagine.
It’s like with any team, you don’t do it alone. I had
to rely on the great folks around me. They know more than I do and
support me. I must rely on their expertise. RSRB is a great team.
We had a lot of fun despite the seriousness of our job. Hopefully,
I helped “open the doors” for other folks.
Every time we look at the Shuttle Program we’re just amazed
how it was able to get off the ground. There are so many components
and so much that has to come together.
So much complexity, there really is.
I thought we would turn our attention to retirement of the Shuttle,
given your current position. I was curious if you could give us the
status of the three elements right now in the program.
Glad to. The Shuttle propulsion elements include the external tank,
referred to as the ET; the Space Shuttle main engine, SSME; and the
reusable solid rocket booster, the RSRB. Even though Marshall Space
Flight Center is the Center where the propulsion project offices are
located, our prime contractor counterparts are located across the
United States: the external tank is manufactured in New Orleans [Louisiana],
at the Michoud Assembly Facility referred to MAF; the solid rocket
booster is assembled at Kennedy Space Center [Florida (KSC)]; the
solid rocket motor is assembled in Utah; and the Space Shuttle main
engines in California.
Each one of the contractors has a unique transition plan. The first
project that finished producing all of its hardware and major testing
was the Space Shuttle main engine. All of the engines have been delivered
to KSC. We have engines in place to support the next two missions,
STS 133 and STS 134, as well as the launch on need [LON] mission,
The external tank will be the last to deliver all of its assets. Return
to flight safety enhancements and Hurricane Katrina  impacted
our ability to build external tank asset. The last manifested external
tank, ET-138, slated for the last mission, STS-134, was shipped it
to KSC this July . The launch on need tank is being completed
and is planned for shipment this September .
All of the reusable solid rocket motor, or RSRM, hardware has been
delivered. The last motor segment was delivered in May of 2010. The
booster hardware, which is produced at the Cape [Canaveral, Florida]
is being delivered and refurbished. The STS-134 hardware, which is
assigned to the February launch, is to be delivered in late September
of 2010. The launch on need hardware, if needed, would be delivered
in earlier 2011.
It must be difficult knowing that that program is coming to a close.
It’s mixed feelings. I am very proud of what we’ve accomplished.
We want to remain strong to the end making sure that the last flight
is just as safe, or safer, than the previous flight. We are all committed
to doing it right. However, there is a feeling of sadness. For many
of us, it’s been a major part of our life. [Being part of the
Space Shuttle program team] has been so much fun, so rewarding—and
tough to accept it is going away. [Shuttle] is a national asset. I
have such an emotional pride, a national pride, in knowing I played
a part and that I know the people who play or played a part. I really
want to do my best!
It’s been bittersweet. Recently, as an observer, I’ve
gotten to participate in the last delivery of the solid rocket motor
and the last external tank, and to experience the last main engine
firing. It’s amazing the pride that people have. You can see
in their faces the attitude and pride of, “We’re going
to do this right all the way to the end and we’re going to make
this happen. And yes, if you ever ask us to do it again we’d
love to!” I know that most of the Shuttle team members, if asked,
would love work to together again.
What complications have there been with the recent Senate bill that
was passed at the request of Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison? Has that
brought any dilemmas for your office?
I do not want to make a comment about the political aspects. We have
planned for Shuttle to fly-out and transition. We have assets to support
the next two missions and the launch on need mission. In order to
produce more hardware or to support more efforts, we would have to
procure and produce more hardware. As the Shuttle has been phasing
down, we have completed different cycles of production and refurbishment.
We have been and are reducing our workforce at our prime contractors
with our major vendors phasing out or shutting down if we were their
only business. It’s a major ordeal to shut down and transfer
those items. In order to get major vendors back, we have to know it
now. It takes a long lead time in order to be able to recover. So
just because someone says, “Let’s go fly,” we can’t
instantly return to flight. It would take some effort and funding
to bring back the people and to deliver the hardware.
Has that been a discussion about how long it would take to ramp up
to continue? I think it’s 2012 in the recent bill that’s
There’s some discussion ongoing. I wouldn’t want to go
into any detail. As you are aware, there are different versions and
criteria [extending the Shuttle or evolving to a next generation vehicle],
so it depends on the question asked as to the answer that best fits.
What’s going to happen with the spent hardware, like the SRBs
or the engines themselves?
The intent is that the SSP [Space Shuttle Program] hardware, if applicable
to the next program, will be transitioned. We need to take advantage
of assets and cost savings. If the assets are unusable, then they
would be retired or destroyed. It depends on the component. Some will
be going to historical places and put on display. Some may be stored
or, for lack of a better term, destroyed or decommissioned.
I thought we would go back to when you became manager of the reusable
solid rocket motor. Tell us about some of the new developments, if
there were any going on at that point, for the reusable solid rocket
motor. [Did] it pretty much, after Challenger, remain the same, or
were there changes instituted along the way, during the course of
As the manager of reusable solid rocket motor from the 2002 to 2007
timeframe, we focused on the continued safe return to flight. As I
previously mentioned, my first launch [January 16th, 2003] as the
RSRM project manager was STS-107. The Columbia re-entry incident occurred
on February 1st. From February of 2003 until the first return to flight
mission, in July 2005, STS-114, we were focused on ensuring the integrity
of our hardware and flight processes with less emphasis on hardware
change. Our [Space Shuttle] second return to flight, STS-121, did
not occur until a year later [July 4th, 2006] due to debris concerns
from the STS-114 launch.
From 2002 until 2007, as project manager, we had seven flights, most
of which occurred after December of 2006. During that time the focus
was not on making changes, it was on making sure we understood what
we were flying. We wouldn’t have flown unless it was safe; however,
we continuously asked ourselves, “Did we make it safe enough?”
Since we were close to flying out the Shuttle, we had to ask ourselves
if we could even get a change incorporated before we flew out the
assets. Most changes take at least two years to incorporate. The changes
[obsolescence changes] that were being implemented when I became manager
had been approved several years before, and due to the decreased build
took longer to implement, test, and fly.
Being able to perform ground testing is a key part of certifying a
change and developing flight rationale. The RSRM’s flight rationale
is based on process control and in knowing that we built it the same
way each time within defined parameters, from its assembly, the mixing
of propellant, to the insulation lay-up. Unlike some components, the
RSRM does not get to test each motor before flight or have a “green-run”.
For each Shuttle launch, it requires two motors [referred to as a
motor set] to perform flawlessly during ascent.
Our flight support motors [FSMs] are a critical part in validating
what we are about to fly—our “test before you fly”
philosophy. During the return to flight activity, we also tested an
engineering test motor, called ETM-3. The booster we fly today on
the Shuttle has four segments. The ETM-3 had five-segments. ETM-3
was a margin test for the SSP and has evolved into the booster for
the Ares Project. The ETM-3 margin test has been very beneficial to
us in the SSP in developing flight rationale. A full scale motor test,
especially a margin test, helps us understand the physical performance
limits of the hardware, as well as the physics of the hardware. The
test information, in conjunction with analysis, is critical in developing
strong flight rational.
Another area of concern we dealt with while I was project manager
was motor age. At the time of the Columbia incident our motors were
stacked at the Cape [KSC] ready for the next launch. As a result of
the stand-down time, and age life limits, we had to de-stack the motors
and return them to Utah. We also were required to review the age life
limits of all the assets built in the plant in Utah. The motor assets
were certified for five years. There was a concern if we did not fly
for a long time that we would have motors which exceeded their certification
If they exceeded the age life limit, we had three options: (1) generically
certifying the age life of the motors past five years [which would
be very expensive and time consuming], (2) washing out the motors
and building more [also expensive], or (3) developing flight rationale
for each motor anchored to age-life testing.
Depending on the flight set, we did different things. We took the
de-stacked assets [motor pair] returned from KSC and saw a unique
opportunity to test the identical pair, one immediately and one after
being stored. This would help bound the age of the motors we would
fly in the future. Both motors were tested, performed flawlessly,
and strengthened our flight rationale as we flew our older assets.
It turned out that we did get close to the age certification limit
as we flew out our inventory. RSRM-96, which flew on STS-117, was
the oldest motor set we flew [four years and eleven months old]. The
age limit was five. We are now flying younger motors.
Other obsolescence issues or changes we had to deal with included
the loss of the vendor for the operational pressure transducer, referred
to as the OPT. The OPT is a critical part of booster separation. The
booster’s burn for the first 2 minutes, 124 seconds to 126 seconds
of flight. The OPT’s monitors the pressure of the motor initiating
the separation process.
Also we had obsolescence with the booster separation motors, referred
to as the BSMs. The original vendor that produced the hardware went
out of business. To support the manifest and fly the STS-122 mission
in 2006, we had to completely redesign, certify and produce the separation
booster motors. The separation booster motors physically push the
SRBs from the vehicle. The OPT tells the system to separate, the BSM’s
[four in the front and four in the back] of each RSRB, kick the booster
away from the external tank and orbiter, so they can continue into
space. The booster sep [separation] motors are very critical, very
powerful, only fire for a second and a half, and make sure we don’t
On the solid rocket booster, we had a return to flight concern, the
SRB bolt catcher. I wasn’t the SRB project manager during that
time frame, David [M.] Martin was the project manager. He’s
now at the Kennedy Space Center. He would be the expert on it, but
I can describe some of the details.
The solid rocket booster and the external tank have attachment points.
The attach points are held together by large bolts. When we have SRB/ET
separation, a cartridge fires which breaks the bolt. When the bolt
separates it is ejected into the SRB bolt catcher. The bolt catcher
prevents any debris, such as the bolt, from hitting the vehicle at
separation. Debris hitting the vehicle is a concern.
During return to flight activity it was observed that the bolt catcher
may not have the proper strength. There was a concern that if the
bolt catcher didn’t have proper strength that it might fail
or become a debris source—with the heightened awareness of Columbia
and the opportunity to relook, we said, “Let’s go back
and redesign the bolt catcher and make it safer.” We redesigned
the housing, the firing cartridge and changed to the separation bolt.
There was also a change in the outside thermal protection system and
in the absorption material inside the bolt catcher. Also the housing
was changed from being a two-piece design to a one-piece formed design.
This eliminated the concern about the two-piece housing weld, a potential
weak spot. The redesign effort took a lot of work between Marshall
and the SRB prime contractor, United Space Alliance.
Each design change to the hardware must go through a thorough review
process. The acceptance of a change requires us to ensure that the
hardware will perform as designed. We prefer, if possible, to test
the component as well as the operating system. We certify that we’re
ready to go, with sound flight rationale based on an understanding
of the physics—understanding the material properties, performance
characteristics, and an understanding of the consequences if we are
Another key technology that was developed during RTF was vehicle imagery.
On STS-122, which was in 2006, one of the things that NASA wanted
to do was to look at the external tank to see any hazardous debris
was coming off. We also increased the tracking of the debris during
ascent to see if anything came off that would hurt the safety and
success of the mission. During a mission, we need to know about any
concerns as soon as possible so that we can make the decision to perform
extra inspections, repairs, abort the mission, or execute the Crew
Return Vehicle [Launch on Need mission].
A critical imagery item was observation cameras. There are cameras
mounted in the solid rocket booster forward skirt and on the ET. The
cameras can observe the ET and orbiter during ascent. The booster
cameras record up to ET/SRB separation. Once we get the boosters recovered,
we remove the film and get it processed. JSC [NASA Johnson Space Center,
Houston, Texas], MSFC and KSC look at that imagery to see if they
see anything of concern. You can see the boosters separate and tumble.
They give the viewer a Disneyland ride. The ET camera displays the
data in real time until ET separation. The ET camera is focused on
the underside or “belly” of the orbiter. All the camera
views have been very valuable, and they are also extremely neat to
You were pretty busy during that time.
Yes. For not having a lot of changes there was a lot of the return
to flight activity, including numerous reviews. We spent a lot of
effort reviewing and validating our requirements, the hazards, looking
at flight certification, reproving all of that. Even though it was
a time which was sad because of Columbia, it was also in an odd way,
revitalization to the program. The Columbia RTF effort gave the opportunity
for all of us to question, not just accept a requirement or a way
of doing business because that’s the way you’ve always
done it. There was an opportunity for a lot of us, particularly me
who was new to that project, to understand why we did it to begin
with and understand the logic and processes. It also helped us in
the future when we made decisions. We also learned how seemingly insignificant
changes can impact the entire system. Some changes, if not fully understood,
can actually make it worse. What I mean by that is, if you look at
one thing [change] it might make it better, but if you don’t
understand the rationale for the change and why it was there to begin
with, you can do something worse to another component. You really
have to understand the basis of a change, why you’re doing it,
and how it interacts with other elements or other systems. These types
of questions seem to reinvigorate the team, even those who had been
on the program for a long time. It really challenged us to ask, “Why?”
Not to say it was not okay before to dig into the “why,”
but it gave them even more authority or leeway to say, “I want
to know this component, all the way back to the basics of it. I’m
not just going to accept that’s the way it works because that’s
the way you’ve told me over the years. I’m going to personally
understand what’s there.” I think it actually strengthened
our flight rationale and our understanding.
As program manager, how deep did you get into all of these technical
As the project manager, I was the one that had to officially sign
the change and provide technical direction to the contractor. I was
the one that was going to be held accountable for a change. As far
as my depth in the involvement of the technical evaluation of the
change, there are team members that dig into the technical aspect
of it, specifically the chief engineer. The chief engineer and the
subsystem engineers were the ones that know the change, know everything
about it inside and out. They have discipline support from the engineering
and safety and mission assurance directorates, whether it is at Marshall
or across the [NASA] Centers and the prime contractors. [The support]
was another thing that was really great. We see a lot of teamwork
among the Centers in working technical issues. I believe that [involvement]
led to the success not only of the ET during return to flight but
the continued success of the whole program.
Even today, if we don’t have the expertise in house, we go to
another Center or outside to academia or to industry. For implementation
of our technical or programmatic changes, we have business and procurement
teams that help us implement them. It’s definitely teamwork.
I do not personally evaluate the “nuts and bolts” of each
change—I have to have awareness, but rely heavily on the experts
on the team to advise me. As the project manager, my job was to make
sure I managed and balanced the technical, cost, and risk.
Were there changes in attitude toward safety as a result of the Columbia
accident, in your experience?
My belief is that we always have had a focus on safety. After Columbia,
we had more of a heightened focus. We did seem to have more requirements
to prove it. Before there may have been more of an acceptance that
an element had done their homework and it was safe to fly. After Columbia,
there was more effort to say, “I believe you, but demonstrate
it.” I saw some differences—which we still do today—in
how we present safety topics, how we present our risk, and the level
of detail. I’d still say it’s not like [Columbia] made
us more or less safe, but I think the way we present our risk have
made us better at articulating the risk and did give us more of a
In 2004 the President [George W. Bush] announced his new vision for
spaceflight. Did that change in any way the project that you were
The President’s Vision, determined that the Shuttle would fly
out by 2010, or when we completed the International Space Station.
Before that point in time, in Shuttle we were assuming, based on previous
direction, that we were going to fly through 2020. So when the President’s
direction came out and said, “No, you’re not going to
fly through 2020, you’re going to end by 2010 or the completion
of the Space Station,” yes, that did give us a different view
in what we needed to do with our assets. It also gave us a realization
that the Shuttle Program is going to come to an end.
It did give us a different view of looking at our assets and our people.
A big part was the impact on the people, which we still deal with
today. It’s making sure that we have the right workforce in
place, that we’re maintaining the right focus, that we’re
enabling them to do their job—as we try to help them understand
that Shuttle is flying out, and hopefully help identify opportunities
in the next generation vehicle. We’re trying to help our people
maintain their focus, yet have the ability to look to see how they
can be a part of the future.
It’s also maintaining the assets and keeping the right tools
so that they can do their job. It was a definite paradigm shift from
when you think you’re going to fly through 2020. We must fly
safely as we transition and retire our asset and as we lose our workforce.
It’s a major shift.
Was there any discussion that perhaps you not focus anymore on development
or redesigns at that point?
Obviously if there was something that we needed to fix because of
safety or obsolescence, you fix it. For other changes, we had to consider
if we could implement them during the life of the Shuttle. As I talked
about before, even when you have a change certified, it may take two
to three years before it can be implemented into the hardware production
line, which means you couldn’t even get the change incorporated
until the end of the program. That’s where we had to make some
critical decisions on where are we safe today to continue flying with
tender loving care [extra inspections, for example], versus where
do we need to make a change.
We don’t need to make a change just for performance’s
sake; it needs to be tied to correcting a safety issue. Most of the
changes we see today have been in work for years or are driven by
obsolescence issues. For obsolescence, in many cases, we don’t
have a choice; we’re going to run out of materials, so we have
to incorporate some of these changes now. We are working with the
next generation vehicle to find opportunities to share the cost, workforce
and materials. Some of the obsolescence and safety changes in Shuttle
are applicable to the next generation vehicle.
If there are things that we need to do today to keep flying and it
benefits the next programs, we save the taxpayer and the program money
because we try to work together to say, “We both need this,
so what would be a smart way to do that?” A lot of this synergy
was accomplished on the solid rocket booster and motor projects such
as insulation, O-ring material, operational pressure transducers,
avionics, and etc. Other projects have found synergies too, but the
ones I was more familiar with are the solid rocket booster [RSRB].
What type of mission support did you provide as the project manager?
As the project manager, I was the primary mission management team;
it’s called the MMT, during launch. I was responsible for the
hardware, process, and my team during the flight readiness process
until mission complete. Sometimes people believe, “MMT is being
on console for the launch.” It is more than that. A majority
of the time, the MMT or manager responsibilities back up at least
two to three years prior to launch. There are review of hardware changes
and the resolution of technical issues, government acceptance reviews,
mate reviews, and element flight readiness reviews. From the element
reviews, there is a Shuttle program review and Space Operations Mission
Directorate [SOMD] review with Mr. [William H.] Gerstenmaier where
we’re saying, “Yes, Shuttle and Station, are ready to
Prior to launch, there’s the mission management team, or L [launch]
minus two day review and L minus one readiness reviews, followed by
the tanking meeting, launch countdown, and then launch. After we launch
the element, the MMT are responsible for post flight activities [data
review, and recovery, if applicable]. While the mission is on-going,
the MMT is reporting on hardware performance and reporting anything
that would cause any issue with the safety of the crew or execution
of the mission. As the Shuttle propulsion deputy program manager [Stephen
F. Cash] or me, as his alternate, support the mission through on-orbit
and landing. After the mission is complete [wheels stop], the flight
readiness cycle begins again for each element. It’s a very methodical,
precise, and very important process.
Were you at launch control when you were a project manager, and then
today as deputy?
Yes. When I am the primary MMT, I sit in the Launch Control [Center],
LCC, in Firing Room 4. During that timeframe I am responsible for
the elements. Element MMTs poll all their systems during the countdown
to make sure that their element is ready to go—with all your
counterparts [prime contractor, the disciplines from Safety and Mission
Assurance and Engineering, and the subsystem managers]. As the MMT,
I give the final go for my area to the launch integration manager,
which says my team is not working any issues and am ready to launch.
From there, if all systems are go, it is turned over to the launch
Is that at the T minus nine hold? Is that when you make those decisions
or is it well before that?
It depends. There’s the countdown process which begins two days
before the launch [L-2]. There are many different launch processes
and systems checkouts that are in work until we launch. Usually, about
four hours prior to the launch the MMT reports “on station”
in the LCC. We [the MMT] report on-station and status if we are working
any issues. We are responsible for resolving issues through countdown.
I will admit, it’s a nerve-racking time. You know you and your
teams have done everything possible to make the hardware perform as
perfect as possible, but issues happen. Electronics cannot work, sensors
can malfunction, the weather cannot agree. There are a lot of things
happening simultaneously. I always have a nervous anticipation. I
want to do it right. You know lives, seven lives are riding on us
being right, so it’s a lot of pressure. It’s an extremely
rewarding and fun job. It’s very exhilarating we when launch
and land safely and successfully.
Have you ever had to cancel a launch because of one of the elements,
any of the missions you were involved in?
In the missions I have been in as a project MMT, I’ve never
had to scrub a launch. The weather has always been the one that scrubbed
it. As the deputy project manager for propulsion, I was on console
where we did scrub due to external tank sensor issues.
Well, it’s been very interesting. I think we’re at our
time, so thank you very much for coming in.